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THE LAWFULNESS OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE
TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM**t
JOHN NORTON MOORE and JAMES L. UNDERWOOD*
In recent months, critics of United States assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam have increasingly used legal arguments in their attacks on
that assistance. They have asserted that the United States presence and
* John Norton Moore is Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia; B.A. 1959,
Drew University; LL.B. 1962, Duke Law School; LL.M. 1965, Univ. of Illinois; Graduate
Fellow 1965-66, Yale Law School; James L. Underwood is Assistant Professor of Law at
the University of South Carolina College of Law; B.A. Emory University, 1959; LL.B.
1962, Emory Law School; LL.M. 1966, Yale Law School.
The authors are indebted to Professor Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law
at Yale, for helpful advice on the writing of the paper and the preparation of an outline.
** This paper is presented as a brief for the lawfulness of the major outline of United
States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam-a policy which may share lawfulness in com-
mon with other alternatives-and is presented in the interest of obtaining a more complete
exposition of the legal issues involved. It neither evaluates the alternatives available in the
Viet Nam crisis nor argues for the present United States policy in Viet Nam, and is intended
only to demonstrate that the United States policy in Viet Nam is a lawful policy alternative.
This is not to divorce law from policy-any meaningful approach must do quite the opposite
-but it is to recognize that in any given situation there may be a number of lawful alterna-
tives. For a brief attacking the lawfulness of United States assistance to the Republic of Viet
Nam see the Memorandum of Law of Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Viet-
am, reprinted in 112 CoNG. Rac. 2551-59 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). See also Friedmann,
United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 Am. J. INTL L. 857 (1965), and
Wright, Principles of Foreign Policy, WoRLDviEw (February 1965), reprinted in, THE V ET-
NA READER 7 (Raskin &. Fall eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as VrET-NAM READER].
Since it is unnecessary for the conclusions reached, this paper does not consider whether
the United States is legally obligated under international law to render assistance to the
Republic of Viet Nam.
For general background documentation with respect to the Viet Nam conflict see STAFF
Or SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN REIATIoNs, 89TH CONG., IST SEss., BACKGROUND INFORMATION
RuATING To SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM (Rev. ed. Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited
as Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965)]; Documents Relating
to British involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965],
Command Paper 2834). See also Hearings on S. 2793 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1966).
t Since this paper first appeared in the Congressional Record in June, 1966 [112 CONG
REC. 13232-33:(daily ed., June 22, 1966); 112 CoNG. REc. 14943 (daily ed., July 14, 1966)]
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activities in Viet Nam violate general principles of international law
and the United Nations Charter. In support of these assertions, they
argue that the Republic of Viet Nam is not a state, that the United
States is merely intervening in a civil war, and that this intervention
neither qualifies as self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter nor is otherwise legally justified. Although there is certainly room
for choice and disagreement among the available policy alternatives, these
legal arguments substantially misstate the case.
The present United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is
lawful under the most widely accepted principles of customary inter-
national law and the United Nations Charter. Since the Republic of Viet
Nam has requested aid from the United States and other nations of the
world to meet a situation with a significant component of outside armed
aggression, there can be no question that the United States and the other
nations responding with appropriate assistance are lawfully acting pur-
suant to the right of self-defense recognized under customary inter-
national law and the United Nations Charter.'
so much of significance has been recorded with respect to the Viet Nam conflict that it would
require another paper to adequately treat the new developments. On the theory that
virginity may have its attractions we have reluctantly decided to leave the paper in its
original form and to call to the attention of the reader that this paper reflects our assessment
of the situation in early 1966 on the basis of materials then available. We might also add
that although in early 1966 there were fewer sources for even semi-hard facts about the
Viet Nam conflict, and for this reason we were sometimes forced to rely on newspaper ac-
counts, today a host of good additional materials are available. For example, on the crucial
questions of extent of military interaction between the Viet Cong and Hanoi prior to the first
substantial increase in United States forces in late 1961 and prior to the commencement of
regular bombing of the North in 1965, Douglas Pike's informative study of the Viet Cong
is particularly helpful. (PIKE, VIET CONG, 1966). If anything, these additional materials
strengthen our basic conclusion that United States assistance to South Viet Nam is a
permissive defensive response to off-set at least substantial military assistance provided to
the Viet Cong.
With respect to dialogue on lawfulness there have been several thoughtful articles
critical of the lawfulness of United States policy which we feel should be called to the
attention of the reader. In particular, Professor Richard Falk has written a scholary critique
of the State Department Brief in the Yale Law Journal and Professor Quincy Wright has
written a critical analysis for the American Journal of International Law. See, Falk, Inter-
national Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122 (1966);
Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60 Am. J. INT'L. L. 750 (1966). Although
we disagree with their general conclusion, we recommend that their arguments be studied
and compared with those in this paper. For a reply to Professor Wright's article see Moore,
The Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam, 61 Am. J. Irr'L. L. -
(1967). For other recent treatments of the legal issues see Alford, The Legality of American
Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A Broader Perspective, 75 YALE L.J. 1109 (1966); Partan,
Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.U.L. REv. 281 (1966).
We hope that despite the fact that this paper .is now somewhat dated that it will provide
balance to the current dialogue and that its somewhat heavy documentation will serve as a
reference to materials not ordinarily encountered.
1. On February 21, 1966, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association passed
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These conclusions are based not on mere legalistic exercises but on
the genuine shared expectations of the international community as devel-
oped through a long history of practices and authoritative communica-
tions and reflected in principles designed to ensure minimum world
public order. The principal thrust of many of the more important prin-
ciples of contemporary international law, both customary and as incor-
porated into the United Nations Charter, is to secure genuine freedom
of choice to the peoples of the world about their own form of government.
Thus, under customary international law, states have not only been
accorded a most comprehensive right of self-defense but have also been
authorized to give aid to the established governments of other states,
when such states are attacked by enemies from without or within.2
Similarly, the self-determination of peoples is stated as a principal goal
of the United Nations and few of its goals have been more insistently
sought in the practice of the organization; the Charter contains many
provisions designed to preclude attacks, by any means, upon the ter-
ritorial and political integrity of states; and the sum total of provisions in
the Charter would, in the absence of an effective centralized peacekeeping
machinery, appear greatly to enhance the authorization of states recip-
rocally to assist each other when subjected to attack.' These widely
accepted principles are consistent with declared United States goals of
complete self-determination for the people of the Republic of Viet Nam
and the maintenance of minimum world order through the rule of law.
The following discussion will show point by point that the United
States presence in Viet Nam is lawful under customary international
law and the United Nations Charter, that the particular United States
a resolution affirming the lawfulness of the United States presence and activities in Viet Nam.
The resolution stated in part: "[Ble [it] resolved by the American Bar Association that the
position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law, and is in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty ... ." N.Y. Times, Feb.
22, 1966, p. 1, col. 7 (city ed.). See also the brief by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, The Legality of U.S. Participation In The Defense of Viet-Nam (March
4, 1966) reprinted in DEP'T STATE BULL. (March 28, 1966); Deutsch, The Legality of the
United States Position in Vietnam, 52 A.B.A.J. 436 (1966) ; the address by Secretary of State
Dean Rusk 1965 PROC., Am. Soc. INT'L. L. 247; and Comment, The United States in Viet
Nam: A Case Study In The Law of Intervention, 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 515 (1962). This 1962
study is somewhat out of date, particularly with respect to the increased armed aggression
from the D.R.V., the increased United States response and United States submission to the
United Nations, but provides a useful analysis of the 1962 situation in Viet Nam under
customary international law.
For a short statement endorsed by 31 professors of international law that the United
States policy in Viet Nam is lawful under general principles of international law and the
United Nations Charter see 112 CONG. REc. A410 (daily ed. January 27, 1966).
With respect to Australian aims in assisting the Republic of Viet Nam see Paltridge,
Australia and the Defense of Southeast Asia, 44 FOREIGN Ar mrs 49 (October. 1965).
2. See the discussion and authorities cited at pp. 294-309 infra.
3. See generally McDoudAL & FELiciAwo, LAw. & MnIPMV- WORLD PUBLIC.-ORDER (1961).
1966-19671
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activities in Viet Nam are lawful; that the United States has met its
obligations under the United Nations Charter; and that the Geneva
Accords support the United States position in Viet Nam. In particular,
the discussion will show in detail that the Republic of Viet Nam is a
state under international law and that today there are substantial expecta-
tions that the Republic of Viet Nam (South Viet Nam-the R.V.N.)
and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam-the
D.R.V.) are separate and independent states Under international law;
that the Viet Nam conflict cannot be fairly characterized as a "civil
war"; that the R.V.N. has requested assistance from the United States
to meet armed aggression; that the present United States assistance to
the R.V.N. is in accordance with the right of self-defense recognized
under customary international law and the United Nations Charter;
that the United States seeks a solution through the machinery of the
United Nations; and that the United States assistance is supported by
the Geneva Accords which have been fundamentally breached by the
D.R.V. in its armed aggression against the R.V.N.
THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN VIET NAM
IS LAWFUL UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL. LAW.
AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
In examining the lawfulness of the United States assistance to. the
Republic of Viet Nam, it is important to distinguish between the lawful-
ness of the United States general presence in Viet Nam and the lawfulness
of the particular United States activities in. Viet Nam. When all relevant
proscriptions are reviewed, it will appear evident both that the United
States-presence in the R.V.N. is lawful and that the use of the military
instrument is well within the permissible limits of self-defense.
Under customary international law and the United Nations Charter
a recognized state such as the R.V.N. has the right to request and receive
assistance from other states pursuant to its right of self-defense.4 It is
important to note, however, that even if the R.V.N. were not a recognized
state under international law, and was instead a mere "temporary zone"
not "qualifying politically as a state," there still would be no basis 'for
suggesting that it would not be entitled to receive assistance pursuant
to its right of self-defense when subject to armed aggression from another
zone in violation of a major purpose of the international agreement
establishing it. In fact, the United Nations action in Korea and the major
thrust of contemporary international law and the United Nations Charter
strongly indicate that even a temporary zone in an internationally divided
country has the right to request and receive assistance in self-defense. One
of the major purposes of the United Nations Charter is to authorize
4. See the discussion and authorities cited at pp. 294-309 :infra.
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collective measures for the suppression of acts of armed aggression,
whether by United Nations action as such, or by collective assistance
from individual states, until the United Nations is able to act. Moreover.
clearly one state does not have the right under customary international
law and the United Nations Charter to armed aggression against another.5
And since there are substantial expectations today that the D.R.V. and
the R.V.N. are separate and independent states under international
law, any armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is in violation
of a fundamental principle of customary international law and the United
Nations Charter. But again, it is important to note that even if the
D.R.V. and the R.V.N. did not qualify as separate states under inter-
national law, but were instead merely separate "temporary zones" not
"qualifying politically" as states, it is still clear that armed aggression
by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. would violate the same fundamental
principles of customary international law and the United Nations Charter
in breaching by force the core of the international. agreement that estab-
lished them in a situation not authorized by self-defense. Aggression in
these circumstances, whether against a state under international law or
against a mere "temporary zone" not "qualifying politically as a state"
is still violative of fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter.
The Republic of Viet Nam Is A Recognized State Under
International Law
The classical definition of a state under international law points to
four factors: a people, a territory, a government, and capacity to enter
into relations with other states.'- The Republic of Viet Nam meets all of
these qualifications. It has a current population of approximately 15
million, administers a territory in Viet Nam south of the 17th parallel of
approximately 66,000 square milesJ has a widely recognized govern-
5. Article 2 §§ 3 & 4 of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER provide:
a 3. ADl Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such-
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
There is substantial authority that this proscription binds nonmembers as well as members
of the U.N., whether by its; own force or as a rule of customary international law. See
generally the authorities cited at pp. 294-309 infra, and note 248 infra.
6. See the statement of Philip C. Jessup in advocating the admission of Israel'to the
United Nations, reprinted in BIoGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 69-71 (2d ed. 1952).
7. Although no two sources agree perfectly on these population and area statistics, a
recent Rand McNally 'Official Map of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia puts the population of
South Viet Nam at 15,900,000 and the area at 66,280 square miles. A 1963 State Department
fact sheet on Southeast Asia puts the population at 14,520,000. and the area at 63,000 square
miles. See Dept.'of State Publication 7473, Far Eastern Series 118, released January 1963..
Although the Viet Cong exercise influence over a significant *portion of this area, they do
not remotely approach the status of the Saigon. government with. respect to international
1966-1967]
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ment,8 and has repeatedly been recognized as having capacity to enter
into relations with other states." Similarly, at least since the Geneva
Accords of 1954 the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam also meets these
qualifications for statehood, although to a lesser extent with regard to
international recognition. 10 And although the R.V.N. and the D.R.V.
qualify as states even under these restricted classical requirements, there
have been instances in which political entities have been recognized as
states in spite of difficulty in meeting one or more of these requirements
as, for example, was the case with the State of Israel in 1948.11 In the
final analysis, then, it is the expectations of the international community
as manifested by their conduct toward a particular political entity which
establishes its statehood. In this regard, probably the most important
indicators of the expectations of the international community as to state-
hood are recognition and United Nations determinations. Thus it is said
in Oppenheim, one of the leading international law treatises: "In recogniz-
ing a new State as a member of the international community the existing
States declare that in their opinion the new state fulfills the conditions
of statehood as required by International Law." 2 In fact, this author
asserts in unnecessary extreme that it is the act of recognition itself which
creates statehood: "Recognition, while declaratory of an existing fact,
is constitutive in its nature."'" Similarly, Article 10 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States which is declaratory of the general
international law in this respect provides: "Recognition implies that
recognition of governmental authority to administer and speak for this territory. Similarly, in
light of this long continued international recognition, temporary loss of control by the Saigon
government over portions of this territory in the course of civil strife largely precipitated by
the defensive conflict against the D.R.V.-Viet-Cong, can not be validly regarded as reducing
the established statehood of the R.V.N.
8. The Republic of Viet Nam is recognized by about 60 nations today and has de jure
diplomatic relations .with about 52 of these, including France, United Kingdom, West
Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Switzerland and Ethiopia. A list of those nations may be obtained
from the Embassy of Viet Nam, Washington, D.C. See also Legal Status of South Viet-Nam,
Release 4/31b-865BT, Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, United. States
Department of State. :
9. This is discussed in more detail throughout this section but it might be noted briefly
here that the Republic of Viet Nam is a member of at least 30 international organizations
including 12 specialized agencies of the United Nations.
10. The Rand McNally Official Map of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia puts the population
of North Viet Nam at 17,500,000 and the area at 61,294 square miles.
The D.R.V. is recognized by about 24 nations. See Release 4/31b-865BT, Office of
Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.
11. See authority cited note 6 supra. See also BaiGGs, op. cit. sura note 6, at 66.
12. I OPPENEmIm, INTERNATIOMNAL LAW 127 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). And Brierly
says: "The primary function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact something which has
hitherto been uncertain, namely, the independence of the body claiming to be a State, and to
declare the recognizing State's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that fact...
BumRLY, THE LAW or NATiOnS 124 (4th ed. 1949).
1 13. OPPENH&m, op. cit. supra note 12, at 128.
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the State granting it accepts the personality of the new State, with all
the rights and duties that international law prescribes for the two
States.' 1
4
In addition, as Professor O'Connell points out, United Nations deter-
minations are also important indicators of statehood: ". . . the United
Nations Charter allows membership only to States, and decision on
membership would seem to be conclusive on the question of de facto
Statehood."' 5 Moreover, Professor Briggs has written that: "[A] deter-
mination [by the General Assembly of the United Nations] that . . .
[a state has] the capacity to accept and perform the obligations of the
Charter is a recognition of . . . statehood and international juridical
capacity, whether or not . . . [it is] admitted to the United Nations."' 6
It should also be pointed out that there are essentially no major differences
in consequences under international law whether recognition is de facto
or de jure.17
In the light of these general principles of international law the next
sections will examine the international status of the Republic of Viet
Nam and its predecessor governments and the Democratic Republic of
Viet Nam. This examination will look at the international status of these
communities prior to the Geneva Accords of 1954, will discuss the effect
of the Geneva Accords on that status, and finally will examine their
status today, nearly twelve years after the Geneva Accords.
STATUS PRIOR TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954
Historically, the territory comprising all of Viet Nam has been divided
between rival political factions or separate government units during a
substantial part of its history.'8 In the words of Anthony Eden: "Indo-
14. See BaIGs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 101.
15. I O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1965). "In order to be admitted to member-
ship in the United Nations, the applicant must first of all fulfill the requisite conditions; one of
them is that it be 'a State." Liang, Who Are the .Non-Members of the United Nations? 45
AMr. J. INT'L. L. 314, 316 n.11 (1951).
16. Briggs,. Community Interest In the Emergence of New States: The Problem of
Recognition, 1950 PROc. Am. Soc. INT'L LAW 169, 176.
17. "Although for political purposes de facto recognition has sometimes been regarded as
provisional or limited, the legal consequences of de facto and de jure recognition are essentially
the same. The distinction is thus properly a political rather than a juridical distinction, and is
so regarded by-contemporary doctrine." BRIGGS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 129.
See also I O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1965). "Since international law is
indifferent to the form of recognition any practical distinction between recognition de facto
and recognition de jure must be discovered, if anywhere, in municipal law." Ibid.
18. See generally Do VANG LY, AGGRESSIONS By CHINA (2d ed. 1960); NGUYEN-VAN-
TAI & NGuYEN-VAN-MUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF ViET-NAm (1958); Jumper & Normand,
Vietnam: The Historical Background, from KAHIN, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST
ASIA 375-390 (2d ed. 1964), reprinted in GETTL. mAN, VmT NA: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS, AND
OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WoRa CRIsIs 10-28 (Fawcett ed. 1965).
1966-1967]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
China had no tradition of unity, and there was little in common between
the rich south and the overpopulated north."' 9 In recent times, Viet
Nam was composed of several French territories themselves in turn parts
of the larger French Indo-China, which during the Second World War
was largely controlled by the Japanese. Following World War II, pursuant
to the Potsdam agreements of 1945, Viet Nam was divided at the 16th
Parallel between the British and the Chinese commands for the purpose of
accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops in Indo-China. During
this brief period of occupation in 1945-46, the Chinese allowed the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam under Ho Chi Minh to become
entrenched principally in North Viet Nam as the government of Viet
Nam, while the British subsequently encouraged return of French
colonial government beginning in South Viet Nam and moving North and
which also claimed sovereignty to all of Viet Nam.' ° Although territory
Dr. B.S.N. Murti has written:
As far back as 17th and 18th century, Vietnam was divided roughly along the
16th Parallel between Tonkin in the North and Cochin-China in the South. The
Dong Hoi Wall, which was built in 1631 and was more than 100 kilometers long, 3
meters high and 6 meters broad at the bottom at certain places, was an impregnable
thing located between the South and the North .... Thus geography, history and
politics met for centuries somewhere near 16th Parallel in Vietnam."
MURTI, VIETNAw DIVIDED 27-28 (1964) [hereinafter cited as MURTI].
For an official British view focusing on events since World War II see Documents
Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25
[1965], Command Paper 2834), at 5-17.
Viet-Nam had been partitioned before. Apart from divisions which had occurred
in earlier centuries, the country had been split into two zones by the Potsdam
arrangements in 1945; indeed, the partition of 1954 repeated, except for the difference
of one degree of latitude, the partition of 1945, and was in fact the consequence
of that partition, for it was the occupation of northern Viet-Nam by Chinese forces
that enabled the Viet Minh to consolidate their grip on that part of the country to
such a degree that it proved impossible to dislodge them.
Id. at 17.
19. EDEN, FULL CiRcLE 88 (1960).
20. This is a greatly condensed version of a complex situation. For more detail see
Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 5-12, 47-52
(Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), and NGuYEN, op. cit. supra note 18
at 323-46.
Although in the short period prior to the arrival of British occupation forces in southern
Viet Nam the D.R.V. had proclaimed independence and sovereignty over all of Viet Nam, its
provisional government was proclaimed in Hanoi and apparently its principal control was in
the North. According to the British Foreign Office: "The Democratic Republic claimed
sovereignty over the south as well as the north, and in Saigon a Communist-controlled Pro-
visional Executive Committee for South Viet-Nam was set up. In practice, however, there
was no government in Saigon or anywhere else in southern Viet-Nam, and looting and attacks
on French nationals were common occurrences." Documents, supra at 7.
B.S.N. Murti has written:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was ruling in the area North of the 16th
Parallel as a sovereign State between August 1945 and December 1946. It was in
effective control of this area and there was no French interference during this period.
[Vol. 5:235
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both North and South has changed hands since then, at least from that
time until the present, there have essentially been two separate govern-
ments in Viet Nam controlling different territories, developing along
different ideological lines and both at least until recently, claiming sover-
eignty over all of Viet Nam.
In June 1948, the French High Commissioner for Indo-China signed a
declaration recognizing the independence of the State of Viet Nam as an
associated state within the French Union,2 and in 1949 and 1950
pursuant to the Elysee Agreement this status was achieved.22 Although
the agreement did not effectively provide complete independence to the
French recognized Boa Dai government at that time, it and subsequent
French actions did create a substantial international status for the Bao
Dai government which was in the next few years recognized by at least
thirty states,23 a number which would grow to about thirty-five prior to
During this period, in the area South of the 16th Parallel, the French were
brought back for civil administration and the revolutionary Government set up was
dispersed within a few weeks and during the period from August 1945 to December
1946 the French were in effective control of that area. According to de facto doctrine,
therefore, before the civil war there were in fact two sovereign authorities-the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a sovereign State in the North and the French
colonial rule in the South.
MURTI, 171. But see Isaacs, Independence for Vietnam? in GETTLEMAN, VIET NAM: HISTORY
DOCUMENTS AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISES 37, 40-45 (Fawcett ed. 1965).
21. 1947-1948 DOCUMEINTS ON INTERNATIONAL APPAis 736-37 (Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs 1952).
22. 1949-50 DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 596-609 (Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs 1953). Documents, supra note 20 at 10-11.
For a discussion of these agreements and the Pau agreements of 1950 see SURvEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949-50 427-28, 432, 435-36, 437-38 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1953). "With the regulation of these common services France [in 1950] relinquished
control over the internal affairs of. the Associated States." Id. at 438.
23. Vietnam [the State of Viet Nam] now has a government freely appointed by the
head of the State, national representation and its own administration and army. Its
existence as an international entity has been recognized by. more than thirty powers.
It participated in the San Francisco Conference on the Treaty of Peace with Japan;
it belongs to many international bodies which are listed for members of the Security
Council in document S/2756.
Statement of Mr. Hoppenot, of the French delegation to the United Nations, made in the
Security Council on September 18, 1952. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFT. REC. 7th year, 602nd
meeting 16 (S/PV.602) (1952).
[The State of Viet Nam] .. .has been recognized by more than thirty nations,
and ... has been admitted to membership of most of the United Nations specialized
agencies. Furthermore . . .. [it is a member] of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East, and . . . [has] participated in various important international
conferences and ... [is party] to several international conventions.
On the basis of all these facts my Government is satisfied that Vietnam .. .
[has] attained a full measure of sovereignty and independence. For these reasons
the Netherlands recognized . . . [Viet Nam] in April 1950 as [a] freely associated'
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the Geneva Accords. 4 Pursuant to this legal status, the State of Viet
Nam was given legal authority over many internal matters and was able
to enter into some treaties in its own name. In particular, on June 18,
1952 it ratified the Treaty of Peace with Japan.2" And on November 5,
1952 it accepted the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
with respect to disputes arising under this Japanese Peace Treaty, again
in the name of the State of Viet Nam. 6 Most importantly, however, in
1952 it was recognized as a state by the United Nations. Pursuant to a
French draft resolution to admit the Bao Dai government of the State of
Viet Nam to the United Nations, the Security Council on September 19,
1952 voted 10 to 1 in favor of admission. The Soviet Union cast the only
vote against the resolution, but this negative vote by a permanent member
of the Council prevented the adoption of the resolution. In response to
this Soviet "veto," on December 21, 1952 the General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted a resolution by a vote of 40 to 5 with 12 absten-
• .. [State] of the French Union. By this act my country indicated more than two
years ago, that it was satisfied that these three countries [Viet Nam, Laos and
Cambodia] were sovereign States.
Statement of Mr. Von Balluseck, of the Netherlands delegation to the United Nations, made
in the Security Council on September 18, 1952. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 7th year,
602nd meeting 19 (S/PV.602) (1952).
Also see I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
Some members of the Union, such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, seem to have
acquired a certain degree of independent international status, including the power to
make treaties. In recognising in 1948 the independence of Vietnam, France declared
that the independence has no other limits than that implied in Vietnam's associate
membership of the French Union. Vietnam undertook to respect the rights and
interests of French nationals, to ensure respect for the principles of democracy and to
give preference to French advisors and experts.
Ibid.
The declaration [of 1948] was confirmed by a French law of February 2, 1950,
which also covered the similar cases of Laos and Cambodia. . . . The independence of
these three States was recognised soon after by a number of other States, including
the United States of America and the United Kingdom.
Id. at 174 n.5.
And see generally SuRvEY OF IN'rRRNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949-50 427-31 (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1953).
24. For the figure of thirty-five see the speeches by French Foreign Minister Bidault
made at the Geneva Conference on May 8, 1954, and May 14, 1954. Documents Relating to
the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference (Miscellaneous No. 16
[1954], Command Paper 9186). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXI
(1953/54), at 109 & 133. For the possibility that 33 nations may have been the maximum
number recognizing the State of Viet Nam prior to the Geneva Accords see AMERICAN
FOREIG POLICY-CURRENT DOCUMENTS 121 n.3 (1958).
25. 136 U.N.T.S. 46-47 (1952); I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 174 n.4 (8th ed.
Lauterpacht 1955).
26. 150 U.N.T.S. 147-149 (1952).
27. U.N. SECURrrY'CouNcIL OFF. Ric. 7th year, 603rd meeting 11 (S/PV.603) (1952).
For the Security Council debates on this resolution see Id; 602nd meeting 15-20; 603rd
m eeting 1-11. . . . . , " . . . .I ' I .
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tions to the effect that the State of Viet Nam was a state qualified for
membership in the United Nations, and calling on the Security Council
to take note of this General Assembly determination.28 The resolution
said in part:
"[The General Assembly] Determines that Vietnam is, in its judgment,
a peace-loving state within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, is
able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter, and should
therefore be admitted to membership in the United Nations . . ,29
By this resolution, the United Nations recognized the Bao Dai govern-
ment of the State of Viet Nam as representative of a state under inter-
national law. It should be pointed out that this recognition of the Bao
Dai government of Viet Nam was made by the United Nations despite
arguments by the Soviet Union that Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic
of Viet Nam was the only government of Viet Nam entitled to admission
to the United Nations.30 A Soviet draft resolution to this effect to admit
the D.R.V. as the sole representative of the State of Viet Nam was
rejected in the Security Council by vote of 10 to ."'
As further evidence of its international status at this time, the State
of Viet Nam (the Bao Dai government) was a member of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and
Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union, the International Labour Organiza-
tion, the Universal Postal Union, and the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. 2
28. The Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly voted on December 19,
1952 by a vote of 38 to 5 with 16 abstentions to recommend admission of Bao Dai's State of
Viet Nam to the United Nations. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 7th Sess., Ad Hoc Pol. Comm.
318 (A/AC.61/SR.50) (1952). A copy of this resolution appears in U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC.
7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 19, at 10 (A/2341 & Corr. 1) (1952). The General
Assembly voted for this resolution as discussed in text at U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 7th
Sess., Plenary 410 (A/PV.410) (1952).
There is some authority that a vote for the admission of a state to the United Nations
"implies recognition, at least for those members who vote for it." I O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 169 (1965).
29. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFP. REc. 7th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 19, at 10 (A/2341
& Corr. 1) (1952).
30. U.N. SEcuRiTY CouNcIL OrF. REc. 7th year, 603rd meeting 9 (S/PV.603) (1952).
31. Id. at 19. Although the resolutions for the admission of Viet Nam, adopted by the
Security Council and the General Assembly, did not on their face indicate which government
of Viet Nam was being recommended for admission, this Soviet draft resolution calling for the
admission of Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, which was defeated, and the
debates themselves, made it evident that the: Security Council and the General Assembly had
voted to admit Bao Dai's State of Viet Nam. See particularly the remarks of Mr. Malik, the
delegate of the U.S.S.R. Id. at 2, 7 & 8.
32. Id. at 1-2.
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This substantial recognition by other nations of the world, membership
in international organizations, conclusion of treaties in its own name, and
United Nations recognition indicate that as early as 1952 the State of
Viet Nam had substantial recognition as a state under international law.
This international status was further reinforced when in June, 1954
France signed a treaty with the State of Viet Nam which by its terms
granted the State of Viet Nam complete independence as of June 4, 1954.83
Subsequent to the signing of this treaty but prior to the Geneva Accords,
the leadership of the State of Viet Nam substantially passed from Bao
Dai to Ngo Dinh Diem, who Bao Dai had appointed as the new Premier
of the State of Viet Nam. 4 Premier Diem formally organized his govern-
ment on July 7, 1954. " Thus prior to the Geneva Accords, there were
33. See 161 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 649-51 (1954). See also the speeches by
U.S.S.R. Foreign Affairs Minister Molotov on June 8, 1954 and of Chou En-Lai, Foreign
Affairs Minister of the People's Republic of China on June 9, 1954, both made at the Geneva
Conference and both apparently adverting to this independence agreement. Although Molotov's
remarks on June 8, 1954 indicate that independence agreements were as yet "unsigned and
therefore unpublished," and were not of a "nature to inspire confidence," Chou En-Lai's
remarks on June 9, 1954 show full awareness of the treaties and indicate that they had been
initialled by then. Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the
Geneva Conference (Miscellaneous No. 16 [1954], Command Paper 9186). Great Britain
Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 147 & 164.
The Speech by French Foreign Minister Bidault on May 14, 1954, during the Fourth
Plenary Session on Indo-China indicated that an independence agreement was actually con-
cluded with Viet Nam sometime prior to May 12, 1954, and that the delegation of Viet Nam
read it to the Conference on May 12th. Id. at 134. Although possibly not Bidault's refer-
ence, the State of Viet Nam's proposal on May 12 refers to "the joint Franco-Viet Nam
Declaration of April 28, 1954, which provides for the signature of two fundamental treaties:
the first of these treaties recognises the complete independence of the State of Viet Nam
and its full and entire sovereignty: the second establishes a Franco-Viet Nam association
within the French Union based on equality." Id. at 123. Although this independence
declaration reinforced substantial expectations of independence, it seems likely that the
treaty was not formally initialled until June, although this was still more than a month
prior to the Accords. See note 36 infra. Also see the July 3, 1953 declaration by the French
government of its intention to accord full independence to the State of Viet Nam, 1949-50
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 470-71 (Royal Institute of International Affairs
1953), and the joint Franco-Vietnamese declaration to the same effect on April 28, 1954,
161 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 648 (1954). See also former President Eisenhower's
discussion of these French declarations in EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: THE WHITE
HOUSE YEARS 1953-1956 218, 421 (Signet ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as MANDATE FOR
CHANGE].
34. See SCHEER, How THE UNITED STATES GOT INVOLVED IN VIETNAM 12-13 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as SCEER].
See also Do VANG LY, AGGRESSIONS By CHiNA 104 (2d ed. 1960).
[T]he French under pressure from common friends were at last driven to negotiate
with Ngo Dinh Diem, who agreed to head the government at Saigon on June 17,
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some expectations that the State of Viet Nam was an independent state
under international law and by the conclusion of the Conference the State
of Viet Nam was recognized by about thirty-five states. 6 Moreover, at
the Geneva Conference itself, the French made it clear to all concerned
that the State of Viet Nam was legally independent and that France
lacked the capacity to negotiate on its behalf.17
36. There is also evidence of some degree of factual French control and influence over
Vietnamese affairs, rapidly decreasing but continuing to some extent until 1956, but the
evidence including the fact that Diem was asserted to be anti-French and that Prime
Minister Mendes-France feared Vietnamese disruption of the Geneva Conference points to
some degree of factual independence in decision-making prior to and during the Conference.
For the proposition that Diem was committed to re-making Vietnamese society in an anti-
French mold see SCHEER, 20.
With respect to Mendes-France's fears of Vietnamese disruption of the Conference,
former President Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs that:
Mendes-France had only one request: [to U.S. representative Bedell Smith] that
we use our influence with the Vietnamese Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem-newly ap-
pointed by Bao Dai-to prevent him from needlessly obstructing any honorable
truce which the French might reach with the Vietminh.
MANDATE FOR CHANcE, 442. Also see EDEN, FULL CIRCLE 146 (1960).
See also SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 44 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1957).
There was a delay of several days after the decision on the composition of the
Indo-China conference, occasioned by the necessity of waiting for the arrival of
representatives of the Vietnamese government and the Viet Minh, and by that of
obtaining the consent of Bao Dai to Viet Minh representation. M. Marc Jacquet,
Mr. Donald Heath, the American Ambassador in Saigon, and M. Bidault's personal
secretary all flew to Cannes to exercise their persuasiveness to this end. Negotiations
between France and the Vietnamese government had been under way since 8
March to draft the treaties which should accord independence to Viet Nam and
define its relationship with the French Union, and it had been widely reported in
the press that the treaties would be signed before the opening of the Geneva
Conference. However, this plan collapsed at the last moment, apparently because
of a decision by the French government to defer the signing of the main treaties
until the accompanying detailed convention had been agreed upon. Bao Dai issued
an indignant statement on 25 April saying that the failure to agree was no fault of
the Vietnamese, and protesting against the idea of a "Munich" in Indo-China. A
"joint declaration" that the two governments had agreed on the total independence
of Viet Nam was signed on 28 April, though this did not change the juridical
position of Viet Nam, which went to the conference with its sovereign status rather
uncertain.
Id. at 44. "The treaties were initialed in June." Id. at 44 n.7.
It should be noted that the Indo-China phase of the Geneva Conference began in early
May, 1954, and the Geneva Accords were not signed-orally agreed to in the case of the
Final Declaration-until July 21, 1954. (The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was
back-dated to July 20, 1954 apparently to meet Mendes-France's self-pronounced deadline.)
For the recognition figure see note 24 supra.
37. Thus, French Foreign Minister Bidault said in a speech on May 8, 1954 at the
opening of the Indo-China Phase of the Geneva Conference:
[I]ndependence [for the State of Viet Nam] has already been completed..
In Viet Nam, and in spite of the war, France has been able to keep its promises
and full independence has been recognised and has become effective. Thirty-five free
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The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam on the other hand could, prior
to the Accords, also claim some right to be regarded as a state under inter-
national law, for at one time the French had concluded a treaty with the
D.R.V. at least factually recognizing its existence,8 it had been recog-
nized by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and a number
of East European nations, 9 and it had formal diplomatic relations at
least with the People's Republic of China, although arguably under the
countries, by recognising those three States, [Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos] and a
number of international organizations by accepting them in their midst, have
consecrated that independence. The national Government of Viet Nam has been able
to set up an administration to organise its finance, to develop its economy, to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with the main free countries. It built up an army. All those
elements mean sovereignty .... The independence of those States is not at stake....
[The French Government has] .. . removed all reason for this conflict to exist
by recognising fully and unreservedly the independence of Viet Nam....
Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference
(Miscellaneous No. 16 [1954], Command Paper 9186). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 108-109.
And in a speech on May 14, 1954, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Conference on
Indo-China Bidault said:
Independence is the final goal of a process of development which began im-
mediately after the Second World War and which has already been. achieved, a
fact proclaimed in this very place and in the most precise and detailed manner by
the representatives of the three states [Viet Nam, Cambodia & Laos]. . . . The
Vietminh proposals pay scant regard to facts and events. . . . [T]here does exist a
Government of the State of Viet Nam. That Government is the government of His
Majesty, Bao Dai, which is recognised by thirty-five states, is a member of various
international organisations, and which is represented here in the eyes of all those
who have recognised it. This Government is fully and solely competent to commit
Viet Nam. With it the French Government has conducted a series of negotiations
which, as I mentioned at the beginning of this statement, led to the joint declaration
and to the conclusion of two treaties which the delegation of Viet Nam read to the
Conference on the 12th of this month. The sovereignty and independence of Viet
Nam are therefore recognised by France over the whole territory of Viet Nam ...
Id. at 132-34. See also 270 infra.
38. See Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-
1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), at 9.
Negotiations led to an agreement of 6 March, 1946, by which the Viet Minh
undertook not to oppose the entry of French forces [in northern Viet Nam] while
the French Government recognised the Democratic Republic as a free State with its
own government, legislature, army and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese
Federation and the French Union; a referendum was to decide whether Cochin-
China should be united with Annam and Tongking as one State....
Ibid.
39. MuaTi, 171.
See also SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1949-50 429-30 (Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs 1953).
40. "After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic Republic of
Viet Nam established formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China."
Excerpt from a speech by Chou En-Lai, Head of the Delegation of the People's Republic of
China, May 12, 1954. Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the
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classic test the statehood of the D.R.V. was not as clear as that of the
State of Viet Nam. Perhaps an indication of the true state of international
expectations prior to the Geneva Accords is indicated by the fact that
Professor Lauterpacht, at one time a judge of the International Court of
Justice, in a list apparently made prior to the Accords, listed both Viet-
minh and Viet Nam as separate states under international law.4
THE EFFECT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954
Nine states participated in some phase or another of the 1954 Geneva
Conference on Indo-China. They were Great Britain, Cambodia, the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (Viet-minh), France, Laos, the
People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the State of Viet Nam, and
the United States.42 It should be noted that both the D.R.V. and the
State of Viet Nam were represented at the Conference, a factual recogni-
tion of the reality of two long separate and competing states in Viet
Nam."' The final products of the Conference, reached on July 21, 1954,
are widely known as the Geneva Accords of 1954.
The Geneva Accords with respect to Viet Nam consisted of an Agree-
ment on the Cessation of Hostilities, signed only by representatives of the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the French Union Forces in Indo-
China,44 and an unsigned Final Declaration of the Conference.45 The
Geneva Conference (Miscellaneous No. 16 [1954], Command Paper 9186). Great Britain
Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953-54), at 124.
41. Under the heading "States At Present International Persons" Professor Lauterpacht
listed among others "Viet-minh, Vietnam, North Korea and South Korea." I OPPENEMI,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 255-258 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955). See also MURTI, 171-172, 172 n.7.
42. Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva
Conference (Miscellaneous No. 16 [19541, Command Paper 9186). Great Britain Parlia-
mentary Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 106. With respect to an account of the
Geneva Conference see generally SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 42-73 (Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1957).
43. This was not true of Cambodia and Laos where the governments of the Khmer and
Pathet Lao were denied the right to participate.
44. Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Con-
ference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [1954], Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 27-38; 161 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 818-837
(1954). The actual signatures appeared as:
For the Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indo-China:
DELTIEL,
Brigadier-General.
For the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet Nam:
TA-QUANG-BUU,
Vice-Minister of National Defence
of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
Command Paper 9239 at 38; 161 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS at 835.
45. Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Con-
ference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [19541, Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parliamentary
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Agreement On Cessation Of Hostilities which, as was indicated by the
fact that it was signed, was the core of the Accords, provided principally
for a military cease fire to be followed by a regroupment of opposing
French Union and D.R.V. forces to the South and North respectively of a
provisional military demarcation line, a limitation on the introduction of
armaments and military personnel in order to prevent further conflict
between the opposing forces,46 and the creation of an International Con-
trol Commission to supervise the execution of the agreement. Civil ad-
ministration was to be in the hands of the party whose forces were re-
grouped in that zone pending general elections for the unification of Viet
Nam. The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was dated July 20,
1954. The Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference made on July 21,
1954, which reiterated the spirit of the cease fire agreement and which
dealt in slightly more detail with the provisions for elections was signed by
no one. It was orally approved, however, by all of the nine states attending
the Conference except the United States and the State of Viet Nam each of
whom made unilateral declarations of their own." The United States
Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 9-11; 161 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 359-361
(1954).
46. One of the puzzling aspects of the Accords is that by their terms they only prohibit
the introduction into Viet Nam of military personnel and armaments and do not, at least by
their language, prohibit buildup of indigenous military forces. If this interpretation is correct,
and there is no indication in the Accords that it is not, it would seem to constitute one of
the serious weaknesses in the Accords. It also makes the ban on introduction of armaments
and military personnel seem somewhat onesided in view of the subsequent withdrawal of the
substantial number of French troops constituting a major portion of the French Union forces
in Viet Nam at the time of the Accords and it casts some doubt on the continuing efficacy
of the ban on introduction of military personnel and armaments after that withdrawal, at
least in a situation where elections could not be held and division continued for a substantial
period. See Articles 16, 17 & 36 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities. Section 4
of the Final Declaration of the Conference strongly supports this interpretation that the ban
is only on the introduction of military personnel and armaments and nothing in the final
Declaration would suggest any other interpretation. Section 4 provides:
The Conference takes note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of
hostilities in Viet Nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet Nam of foreign troops
and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. (Emphasis
added.)
Moreover, the Chairman of the International Control Commission took the position in a
press conference on November 21, 1954 that the Accords were not concerned with increases
in indigenous forces either in the North or the South. See MURTI, 53. If this interpretation
is correct, neither an increase in the size of the R.V.N. nor D.R.V. forces would per se be
prohibited by the Accords as is apparently popularly supposed. See SCHEER 62.
It should also be noted that by the terms of Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement on the
Cessation of Hostilities it was essentially the introduction of "troop reinforcements,"
"additional military personnel" and "reinforcements" of armaments and munitions that was
prohibited. There was some latitude for replacement of existing forces and armaments
written into the Agreement.
47. See Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva
Co nference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [1954), Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parlaimen-
*tary Sessional Papers XXXI (1953/54), at 5-9. For discussion see text at pp. 324-41 infra.
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declared that it would refrain from the use of force to disturb the settle-
ments, in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Char-
ter but would view any future aggression in violation of the agreements as
seriously threatening peace and security. The United States also reiterated
its position that "peoples are entitled to determine their own future, and
that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this.148 The
State of Viet Nam, toward which, as has been seen, there existed expecta-
tions that it was an independent state under international law at this time
and which was not a party to the Accords protested them.49In a final
declaration which the Conference took note of, however, the State of Viet
Nam pledged itself not to use force to resist the cease fire arrangements in
spite of its general objections to those agreements.5 °
Because the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam
referred to a "provisional military demarcation line," and "regrouping
zones" pending general elections for the unification of Viet Nam, and the
Final Declaration said:
The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the
Agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions
with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarca-
tion line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted
as constituting a political or territorial boundary..
some have concluded that "under the Geneva Accords of 1954, South Viet
Nam is merely a temporary zone not even qualifying politically as a
state, '"52 and that aggression by North Viet Nam against South Viet Nam
48. Further Documents supra note 47 at 7; 161 BrRisIS & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 365
(1954). For a full text of the United States unilateral declaration see text at pp. 324-41 infra.
49. See Further Documents supra note 47 at 7, 9. See also Fall, How the French Got
Out of Viet-Nam in VIET-NAw READER 81, 86-87.
At a restricted session of the Geneva Conference on 18 July, the Viet-Namese
Delegate dissociated himself from discussion of draft documents embodying the
principle of partition; and in the concluding session on the 21st of the month, he
wanted the inclusion in the Final Declaration of terms indicating his Government's
reservation, though the Chairman, Mr. Eden, rejected this suggestion. Thus the
Government of Viet-Nam was not a party to the Agreement on the Cessation of
• Hostilities nor did it join in the Final Declaration of the Conference.
Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 (Miscel-
laneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), at 17.
See also SuRvy or INTERNATIONAL AFNARs 1954 48, 64 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1957). As -to independence prior to the Accords see notes 36 & 37 supra.
50. Further Documents supra note 47 at 7, 9. See also SuavEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRs
1954 67 (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1957).
51. Article 6 of the Final Declaration.
52. Memorandum of Law of Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam,
reprinted in 112 CONG. REc. 2552-59, at 2553 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). Although the
"Lawyers' Committee" makes the claim that their "memorandum" is "fully documented"
(Id. at 2553) they cite no authority for their interpretationof the Accords to the effect that
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is merely a civil war, comparable even to the United States Civil War.53
These conclusions are based on erroneous interpretations of the Geneva
Accords. As has been seen, at the Conference Viet Nam was represented
by two states each claiming sovereignty to all of Viet Nam and each
recognized as the only lawful government of Viet Nam by one or the other
of the major opposing power blocs at the Conference. The Communist
nations supported the credentials of the D.R.V., and the Western powers
implicitly backed by the prior United Nations action supported those of
the State of Viet Nam. Seen in context, then, this language as to pro-
visional zones was intended to preserve the existing claims to sovereignty
to all of a united Viet Nam by both the D.R.V. and the State of Viet Nam,
and to indicate that the participants contemplated eventual unification of
Viet Nam by free elections. This language was not intended to undercut
the existing credentials of statehood of either of the contenders prior to
unification. The participants at the Conference each wanted to avoid
recognizing the government championed by the other side as a lawful
government of any part of Viet Nam and each wanted to preserve the
claims to sovereignty over all of Viet Nam of the government that they
recognized. To say that the participants at the Conference intended to
reduce the legal status of the particular government of Viet Nam that they
recognized to that of a "temporary zone not qualifying politically as a
state" is practically to state the opposite of what both sides intended. The
the Republic of Viet Nam does not qualify as a state unless it is an asserted article by Judge
Edgerton in the New Republic for May 22, 1965. See Id. at 2555 n.17. The communication
by Judge Edgerton to the New Republic does not say that the Republic of Viet Nam is not
a state and on this point does not advert to evidence beyond the language of the Accords set
out above. See The New Republic, May 22, 1965, p. 28.
53. See 112 CONG. REc. at 2554, 2556 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). It should be pointed out
that there may be substantial differences between categorization of a conflict as a "civil war"
as used in everyday speech, and categorization of a conflict as a "civil war" for a particular
legal purpose. The legal realists have long since demonstrated to the legal world that cate-
gorization may differ depending on the purpose for which the categorization is made. Here,
some critics seek to label the Viet Nam conflict as a civil war for purposes of arguing that
assistance to the South Vietnamese government is unlawful. Although the proposition that it
is unlawful per se to render assistance to a recognized government such as the government of
the R.V.N. is highly doubtful even in a civil war situation, as is shown at pp. 294-309 infra,
there are substantial legal differences between the Viet Nam conflict and a "civil war" that
make authorities concerned with "civil wars" not controlling. As is demonstrated by this
section there are substantial expectations today that the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. are separate
and independent states under international law and in any event they are separated by a
military cease-fire line making aggression across that line unlawful. For the purpose of
assessing the lawfulness of assistance to the R.V.N., then, the use of the military instrument
by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. cannot be validly classified as a "civil war." Similarly, since
the campaign to overthrow the government :of the R.V.N. by armed attack receives at least
significant assistance and direction from the D.R.V., the Viet Nam conflict within the R.V.N.
cannot be validly classified as a "civil war" for purposes of prohibiting outside assistance to
the recognized government under attack.,'
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declarations and actions of the parties before, during, and after the con-
ference make this opposite interpretation evident.
Thus, the foreign ministers of the United States, France, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, in a February 18, 1954 Berlin Resolution
agreeing on the holding of the Geneva conference said: "It is understood
that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned
Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case
where it has not already been accorded." 4
After consultations between the French and Soviet delegations at the
Conference, the list of nine participating states, including both the D.R.V.
and the State of Viet Nam was agreed to but again subject to this non-
recognition provision of the Berlin Resolution."'
Similarly, French Foreign Minister Bidault made it clear in the opening
address at the proceedings on Viet Nam that:
For France, there is a Viet Nam State of which the unity, terri-
torial integrity and independence must be respected. With the
presence at this Conference of a party which, in order to fight
against this state, has organised armed forces, has been admitted
as a necessity with a view to bringing about a cessation of
hostilities, this presence must not be interpreted as implying on
our side any kind of recognition ... The elements of this solu-
tion depend, first and foremost, in our opinion, upon the opinion
which will be expressed by the Government of Viet Nam."
and in a later address at the Conference he reiterated that:
[T]here does exist a Government of the State of Viet Nam.
That Government is the government of His Majesty, Bao Dai,
54. Resolution On The Holding Of A Far Eastern Conference Agreed By The Four
Foreign Ministers, February 18, 1954, in Documents Relating to the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of
America, Berlin, January 25-February 18, 1954, (Miscellaneous No. 5 [1954], Command
Paper 9080). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXI (1953/54), at 33. A
major purpose of the resolution at this time, of course, was to avoid recognition of the
Chinese People's Republic.
55. French Foreign Minister Bidault said in the fifth plenary session of the Conference
on June 8, 1954:
As a result of exchanges of views between the French Delegation and the
Soviet Delegation, the list [of members of the Conference] was finally settled with
the agreement of the nine participants, subject to, the reservation included in the
Berlin communique that 'neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-
mentioned Conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case
where it has not already been accorded.'
Documents Relating to the Discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference
(Miscellaneous No. 16 [1954], Command Paper 9186). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers XXXI (1953/54), at 137.
56. Id. at 110.
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which is recognized by thirty-five states, is a member of various
international organizations, and which is represented here in the
eyes of all those who have recognized it. This Government is
fully and solely competent to commit Viet Nam .... The sover-
eignty and independence of Viet Nam are therefore recognized
by France over the whole territory of Viet Nam. . ... 7
Proposals made by both the State of Viet Nam58 and the D.R.V."9 at
the Geneva Conference called explicitly or implicitly for recognition of
the sovereignty of their particular government. And there is no indication
in the records of the Conference in the British Command Papers6 ° or in
the Accords themselves that the D.R.V. consented to relinquish its exist-
ing claims to statehood and sovereignty, at least over North Viet Nam, by
signing the cease fire agreement and acceding to the Final Declaration.
Certainly the State of Viet Nam which expressly objected to the Final
Declaration and which had not even signed the cease fire agreement did
not consent to have its status reduced from a recognized state under
international law to that of a mere zone. And the same is apparently true
with respect to the interpretations by all of the other participants in the
conference with respect to the Accords on Viet Nam. There can be no
better evidence of this intention than by the subsequent interpretations
on this point by the participants in the Conference itself. As the comments
to the Harvard Research Draft Convention on The Law of Treaties
indicate:
In interpreting a treaty, the conduct or action of the parties
thereto cannot be ignored. If all the parties to a treaty execute
it, or permit its execution, in a particular manner, that fact
may reasonably be taken into account as indicative of the real
intention of the parties or of the purpose which the instrument
was designed to serve."'
Similarly, Article 69 of the International Law Commission 1964 Draft
Articles On The Law Of Treaties provides:
57. Id. at 133-34.
58. Id. at 123. It is a generally accepted proposition in international law that preparatory
work at a Conference, (travaux pr~paratoires) including the records of negotiation and the
minutes of the plenary meetings, may be a useful aid in interpretation. See I OPPENEmz,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 862-63 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1948); Harvard Research Draft Convention
on The Law of Treaties, 29 Am. J. INT'L. L. 652, 937, 953-66 (Supp. 1935).
59. Documents, supra note 55 at 116-21. See particularly §§ 1 and 4 of the D.R.V.
proposal. See French Foreign Minister Bidault's interpretation of the Viet-minh proposals
Documents, supra note 55 at 133-34.
This insistence by both sides on recognition of the sovereignty of the government
championed by their side was implicit in much of the discussion at the Conference. See
Documents, supra note 55 at 105-168.
60. Documents, supra note 55 at 105-168.
61. 29 Am. J. INT'L. L. 966 (Supp. 1935).
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.. There shall also be taken into account, [in the interpretation
of treaties] together with the context: . . .
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which clearly establishes the understanding of all the parties re-
garding its interpretation.62
By way of subsequent conduct of the participants with respect to Viet
Nam, the British government, one of the Co-Chairman of the Conference,
said sometime after the Conference was concluded:
The references in the title and text of this message to the
"Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" do not involve any depar-
ture from the policy of her Majesty's government in recogniz-
ing, in accordance with their obligations under Article 12 of the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam as the only legal Government of
Vietnam. 63
And, by way of further indication of this, the British Joint Parliamen-
tary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in the House of
Lords on June 25, 1957:
The present division of Viet-Nam into two parts on either
side of the 17th Parallel dates from the agreements reached at
the Geneva Conference of 1954. In the North authority is vested
in the so-called Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam resident in Hanoi. The South is administered from
Saigon by the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam of
which Ngo Dinh Diem is President. Her Majesty's Government
recognizes the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam as the
sole Government entitled to represent the State of Viet-Nam
in international affairs. 4
Similarly, in a dispute with respect to the maintenance of a United
States consulate in Hanoi shortly after the Accords, both the D.R.V. and
the United States seemed to interpret the Accords as preserving the state-
hood of the governments of the D.R.V. and the Republic of Viet Nam
respectively.65 Later statements by the Soviet Union delegates to the
62. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixteenth session
11 May-24 July 1964, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RFc. 19th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 25 (A/5809)
(1964).
63. Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements (Vietnam No. 2 [1956], Command Paper
9763). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XLV (1955/56), at 3 n.1.
64. Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965
(Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), at 126.
65. See MutTi, 173-74. Dr. Murti also points out:
Both the Western bloc as well as the Soviet bloc of countries recognised the
State of Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Governments respec-
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United Nations are consistent with the retention of claims to statehood
by the governments concerned.66 In fact, although it is always difficult to
prove the negative, a cursory but conscientious search indicates that none
of the participants in the Geneva discussions on Viet Nam ever put forth
the interpretation that under the Geneva Accords the D.R.V. and the
R.V.N. were both merely "temporary zones not qualifying as states."
In the face of the uncontradicted evidence of what the participants
actually intended by the Geneva Accords such assertions of loss of state-
hood are untenable.
Certainly the participants in the Conference intended, at least by the
language of the agreements, that Viet Nam be unified by free elections
under one or the other of the competing governments variously recog-
nized by the two sides. This, however, is quite a different intent from
that of reducing the statehood of the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. to "tem-
porary zones not qualifying as states." It is principally this intent that
Viet Nam be unified by free election which is expressed by the "provi-
sional zones" language in the Accords. To suggest, however, from this
intent that aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is merely a
"civil war" even comparable to the United States Civil War is to ignore
the crucial fact, among others, that the central purpose of the inter-
nationally drawn provisional demarcation line in Viet Nam was for a
military cease fire making aggression across that line unlawful. If nothing
else, the two zones were at least intended as separate international entities
with respect to the lawfulness of the use of force by one zone against the
other.67 Consequently, even if the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. were not today
two separate states, aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a
fundamental breach of the Geneva Accords entitling the R.V.N. to the
appropriate corresponding right of self-defense. Since this point has
often been ignored, it bears emphasizing that even if this were a "civil
war" in Viet Nam in the sense that there were no current expectations
that two independent and separate states exist today in Viet Nam, never-
theless, the fact that armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
is in fundamental breach of an internationally drawn cease fire line makes
the legal consequences radically different from those attending a "civil
tively, as the only legal Government over the whole of Vietnam. Even after the
Geneva Agreement, the two blocs continued their recognition and their diplomatic
missions in the two zones and claimed that the Government supported by them
was the only legal Government for the whole of Vietnam.
Id. at 173.
See also as to continued French recognition of the Saigon government, SuvawY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 83 (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1957).
66. See text at notes 91-94 infra.
67. See in particular Articles 19, 24 and 42 of the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities and paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration.
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war.)68 As Professor Quincy Wright pointed out in the 1959 Proceedings
of the American Society of International Law:
Another complication may result from the protracted func-
tioning of a cease-fire or armistice line within the territory of a
state. While hostilities across such a line by the government in
control of one side, claiming title to rule the entire state, seems
on its face to be civil strife, if such lines have been long con-
tinued and widely recognized, as have those in Germany, Pales-
tine, Kashmir, Korea, Viet Nam and the Straits of Formosa,
they assume the character of international boundaries. Hos-
tilities across them immediately constitute breaches of inter-
national peace, and justify "collective defense" measures by
allies or friends of the attacked government, or "collective secu-
rity" measures by the United Nations. If this were not so,
armistice and cease-fire lines would have no meaning at all .... 11
The United Nations action in Korea lends support to this distinction.
Moreover, it cannot be validly maintained that the military demarcation
line pursuant to the Geneva Accords no longer has validity in Viet Nam.
For both the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. regard the Accords as having con-
tinuing legal validity and continue to make complaints to the Interna-
tional Control Commission.7" Furthermore, the decisions and continued
68. Violation of a cease-fire line in an international agreement by the use of force,
unless in self-defense or pursuant to valid United Nations collective action, would also seem
to be a patent violation of the fundamental principle against the use of force in international
relations; a principle embodied in Article II, sections 3 & 4 of the United Nations Charter.
Since there can be no doubt that the D.R.V. violations of the Accords by force are aimed
at the political and territorial integrity of the R.V.N., and are neither justified by self-
defense nor by valid collective United Nations action, they are undoubtedly also in violation
of fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. Professor Quincy Wright has said:
The Charter explicitly permits a state to use armed force in the territory of a
foreign state or across an internationally recognized armistice or cease-fire line
only in 'individual or collective self-defense' in response to an 'armed attack';
under authority of the United Nations itself; or on invitation by the government
of the state in whose territory the force is used, in case that government is in fact
in a position to speak for the state.
Wright, International Law and Civil Strife, 1959 PROC. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 145, 148 (1959).
69. Id. at 151.
70. For example, on the commencement of United States bombing of military targets
in the D.R.V. in February, 1965, the D.R.V. registered a formal complaint with the I.C.C.
of violation of the Geneva Accords. See Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva
Conference on Indo-China of February 13, 1965 (Vietnam No. 1 [1965], Command Paper
2609), at 7-10. During the same period, the R.V.N. also registered a formal complaint with
the I.C.C. of D.R.V. violations of the Accords by armed attack against the R.V.N. See
Id. at 16-30.
That this is currently the official D.R.V. position is also indicated in a Report by
D.R.V. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong made to the National Assembly of the D.R.V.
on April 8, 1965 in which he said: "It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the
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functioning of the International Control Commission long after the July
1956 failure to hold elections also indicate the continuing legal validity
of the internationally set demarcation line in Viet Nam."' In addition,
apparently all parties concerned regard the Accords at least as the be-
ginning point of any current settlement, and the general international
community attitude bears out this expectation that the demarcation line
is of continuing validity today. This continuing legal validity of the
demarcation line in Viet Nam is consistent with the stated United States
policy not to attack the integrity of the D.R.V. as a territorial or political
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Viet-
nam .... " APTHEKER, MISSION TO HANOI 113 (1966).
It should also be pointed out that Article 14 of the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities provided for administration of separate zones "pending the general elections
which will bring about the unification of Viet Nam," and regardless of the cause, such
elections have not yet been held.
71. Out of eleven Interim Reports and a number of Special Reports issued to date
by the International Commission for Supervision and Control In Vietnam, six of the Interim
Reports and all of the Special Reports have been issued after the July 1956 date for elections
had passed. These also included the 1962 Special Report of the I.C.C., finding violations
against the D.R.V. for its aggression against the R.V.N., and finding violations against the
R.V.N. for receving military assistance to meet that aggression.
It is also clear from these I.C.C. reports and the official messages of the Co-Chairmen
of the Geneva Conference that the failure to hold elections did not affect the continuing
legal validity of the international cease-fire line in Viet Nam. Thus, in an official message
from the British and Soviet Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on May 8, 1956
which adverted to the possibility of non-implementation of the election provisions, the Co-
Chairmen said: "Pending the holding of free general elections for the reunification of Viet-
Nam, the two Co-Chairmen attach great importance to the maintenance of the cease-fire
under the continued supervision of the Inter-national Commission for Viet-Nam." Documents
Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965],
Command Paper 2834), 96-99, at 97. In the Eighth Interim Report of the I.C.C. issued on
June 5, 1958, the Commission indicated that its supervision was to continue until free
elections were held, saying:
The Commission notes that there has been no consultation between the two
Parties with a view to holding free nation-wide elections for the reunification of the
country, and to resolving the political problems and thus facilitating an early
termination of the activities of the Commission and the fulfilment of its tasks.
Eighth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control In
Vietnam (Vietnam No. 1 [1958], Command Paper 509), at 15. And in its Ninth Interim
Report issued on March 10, 1959 the Commission said: "The Commission, as directed by the
Co-Chairmen, has persevered, and will continue to persevere in its efforts to maintain and
strengthen peace in Vietnam in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreement... ;
and
There has been no progress in the field of political settlement as envisaged in the
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference. There has been no consultation between
the two Parties with a view to holding free nation-wide elections for the reunifica-
tion of Vietnam. This has maintained the prospect of an indefinite continuance of
the Commission and its activities.
Ninth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in
Vietnam (Vietnam No. 1 [1959], Command Paper 726), at 17.
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entity, but simply to induce the D.R.V. to halt its armed aggression
against the R.V.N.
The nearly ten years of separate development of the D.R.V. and the
R.V.N. along different ideological lines after the date set for elections
had come and gone indicates that the cease fire line established by the
Geneva Accords in fact created continuing expectations of an interna-
tional boundary between the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. The actions of the
D.R.V. in continuing attempts to conceal their military direction and
assistance with respect to the N.L.F., 72 rather than openly admitting that
the attack on the R.V.N. includes elements of the PAVN army, also
provides some indication that the D.R.V. regards the cease fire line as
a valid international demarcation line with respect to the employment
of force across that line, and that they regard the use of force by the
D.R.V. against the R.V.N. as something other than "civil strife."
Although some have argued that assistance even to the recognized
government in a "civil war" should be outlawed because of the danger
of civil strife escalating to international war,7 the same argument would
appear to apply even more strongly with respect to the use of force by
the D.R.V. across what is at least a factual international cease fire line
dividing the major contending ideological systems in the world today.
And once significant outside armed aggression takes place across such a
line against the established government, certainly the situation should
give rise to appropriate rights of self-defense. It should also be pointed
out that there is no indication in the Accords themselves that they would
cease to function should elections not be held. In the light of the com-
plete lack of evidence of such an intent in the Accords and of the con-
tinuing evidence of expectations to the contrary this interpretation would
be unwarranted. And it should be remembered that any argument de-
pending on the cessation of the effect of the Geneva Accords because
elections were not held would cut both ways. Under such a theory pre-
sumably it would also be a "civil war" should the R.V.N. openly invade
the North even in some hypothetical situation in which they had no
provocation. It is doubtful that in these circumstances the nations .sup-
porting the D.R.V. would be inclined to accept the "civil war" label and
in any event this also would be too disruptive of minimum world public
72. D.R.V. Prime Minister Pham Van Dong said on January 8, 1966:
Question 3: If the United States withdrew its troops, would the DRV withdraw
its troops from South Vietnam?
Answer: The so-called "presence of forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
in South Vietnam" is a sheer U.S. fabrication in order to justify their war of
aggression in South Vietnam.
As THEaR, MISsION To HANoI 124 (1966). See also VIT REPOIRT 6, 7 (Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan.
1966).
73. See the discussion in pp. 294-309 infra.
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order. Consequently, such a theory of the expiration of the Geneva Ac-
cords when elections were not held would seem neither realistic nor
attractive.
Moreover, despite the language of the Accords there are some indica-
tions that at least some of the participants at the Geneva Conference
were aware that the Accords might result in indefinitely partitioning
Viet Nam until genuinely free elections could be held. Anthony Eden's
memoirs indicate his feelings in 1954 that the partition of Viet Nam
was the best solution.74 In fact, in view of the German and Korean ex-
periences partition seems a somewhat drastic way to arrange a cease fire
and election if that was all that was contemplated by the parties. 5
74. See EDEN, FuLL CIRCLE 97, 101, 102 (1960).
It was dear to me that any negotiated settlement was bound to produce either a
Communist share in the government of most of Indo-China, or complete Communist
control of part of the country, and I thought that the latter alternative was
preferable. . . . There were some indications of a greater willingness in Vietnam to
face partition. There was no love lost between north and south. We felt that the
distress at amputation might prove more apparent than real.
Id. at 101.
75. Former President Eisenhower has written:
In Vietnam . . . the French proposed military groupings in delimited zones--
which means that all Red formations would move north of one established line, all
those loyal to the French Union would pull south of that pa.rallel.... To me these
French proposals .... implied nothing else but partition. We knew, from experience
in Korea, that this would probably lead to Communist enslavement of millions in
the northern partitioned area.
MANDATE FOR CHANGE,; 432. See also the seven point program jointly agreed to by the
United States and the United Kingdom on June 29, 1954, which indicates that an armistice
agreement on Indo-China would be respected which:
2. Preserves at least the southern half of Vietnam....
3. Does not impose on . . . retained Vietnam any restrictions materially impairing
. . . [its] capacity to maintain stable non-Communist regimes; and especially
restrictions impairing . . . [its] right to maintain adequate forces for internal
security, to import arms and to employ foreign advisers.
4. Does not contain political provisions which would risk loss of the retained area
to Communist control.
S. Does not exclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of Vietnam by
peaceful means....
EDEN, FULL CIRCLE 149 (1960). Apparently Mendis-France also supported these objectives.
See Id. at 157.
See also SURvEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 48, 58, 60 (Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs 1957).
On 25 May the Viet Minh Foreign Minister, Mr. Dong, put forward a de-
tailed plan, which was clearly in the nature of a first approximation to the 'ac-
cepting price' of the insurgents .... This plan was, clearly, rather more than a pro-
posal for a regroupment of forces; if put into effect it would in fact provide some-
thing like a de facto military partition of the country, and one that, with its
provision that the two areas chosen should be economically viable, seemed to be
envisaged as lasting for some time.
Id. at 48. And see Do VANO LY, AGcESSIONS BY CHINA 151 (2d ed. 1960).
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Moreover, the Accords are not notoriously heavy in election provisions,
mentioning them only in a rather airy fashion. 71 It was clear that the
Conference had not come to grips with the key election problem in any
meaningful way in 1954." With this background, it may well be that the
participants at the Conference were not particularly surprised when elec-
tions were not held in 1956.
In summary, the proponents of the view that the use of the military
instrument by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a "civil war" must estab-
lish not only that factually the Accords did not establish an international
demarcation line creating expectations of two separate international
Naivete is not known as a Communist weakness. The Vietminh must have known
the true meaning of "provisional" when they bargained at Geneva for division on
the 17th Parallel. They could not have been unaware of the fact that the partitions
in Germany and Korea were also "provisional" in the beginning, and that with the
years they had, to all appearances, become about as "provisional" as the cold war.
Ibid.
The stress on civilian freedom to choose zones, which took the form of Article 14(d)
of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities providing for free transfer only during
the troop movement period, also seems to some extent an implicit recognition by the parties
that the partition might last a substantial period of time, and that in the interim there
would be two separate international entities in Viet Nam.
According to the Fourth Interim Report of the I.C.C., by July 20th, 1955, 892,876
had moved from the North to the South and only 4,269 had moved from the South to the
North under Article 14(d). Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for
Supervision and Control in Vietnam (Vietnam No. 3 [19551, Command Paper 9654).
Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XLV (1955/56), at 30, Appendix IV. In
referring to these figures the SURvEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955-56 (Royal Institute of
International Affairs 1960), says: "The figures given seem to be incomplete, but not widely
so." Id. at 18 n.1. According to Bernard Fall, ". . . perhaps as many as 80,000 local
guerrillas and regulars and their dependents, including almost 10,000 mountain tribesmen,
went northward." Fall, How the French Got Out of Viet-Nam, in VIE-NAM. READER 81, 88.
76. The only reference to elections in the signed Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities appears in Article 14(a) and reads: "Pending the general elections which will
bring about the unification of Viet Nam ... "
The unsigned Final Declaration of the Conference adverts to the election problem
in all three sentences of paragraph 7, but leaves most of the important problems to be
solved by consultations between the zones to commence on July 20, 1955. The first two
sentences of paragraph 7 are an experience in ambiguity.
77. See discussion note 76 supra. Some questions which immediately come to mind are:
What are the Vietnamese to vote on: unification, a chief executive, a constitution, a con-
stituent assembly, etc.? If the question of unification is the issue, do "general elections"
mean that a majority of the total of both zones is necessary for unification, or a majority of
each zone, both agreeing? Can elections be "free general elections" if there is only one
choice on the ballot? If not how many and what choices must there be? Is a simple majority
all that is required or some other figure?
This cavalier treatment of the political settlement problems must be considered a major
weakness of the Accords and suggests that the parties were aware of the possibility of an
extended partition in Viet Nam unless, of course, they contemplated unification other than
by elections. See generally, Fall, How the French Got Out of Viet-Nam, in VIET-NAXs
READER 81, 87-88.
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entities in Viet Nam today, but also that the military cease fire line of
the Accords had ceased to have legal validity prior to the D.R.V. aggres-
sion against the R.V.N., a result which does not automatically follow
from a mere recitation of the language in the Accords to the effect that
"the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way
be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary."" For
even if the line was not originally intended as a political or territorial
boundary this does not mean that the cease-fire line itself, a major
purpose of the Accords, is of no validity today on the issue of military
aggression across that line.
The use of the military instrument by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.,
then, is clearly not analogous to "civil strife" either for the purpose of
assessing the lawfulness of that use or for the purpose of assessing the
lawfulness of the responding assistance to the R.V.N. This is so both
because of the existence of substantial expectations today that the
D.R.V. and the R.V.N. are separate and independent states under inter-
national law and in the existence of an international cease-fire line in
Viet Nam violated by armed aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
The "civil strife" label, then, ignores the essence of the Geneva Accords
in preference to a facile verbalism. Also, of course, the United States
Civil War analogy is non-comparable, among other reasons because
the "Hanoi regime is anything but the legitimate government of a
unified country in which the South is rebelling against lawful national
authority."79
With respect to the effect of the 1954 Geneva Accords on the status
as states of both the State of Viet Nam and the D.R.V., the Accords
in no way lessened the established status of the State of Viet Nam or the
existing claims of the D.R.V. Instead, they could only have strengthened
the claims to statehood of the competing governments, particularly the
seemingly weaker claims of the D.R.V., since the reality of the settle-
ment was that the two governments had acquired, even if intended to
be temporary, relatively fixed and separate territories and had partici-
pated in an important international conference even though that partici-
pation did not technically result in recognition of their asserted state-
hood by the countries of the opposing bloc.
In the nearly twelve years following the Geneva Accords, this reality
of two separate and independent states in Viet Nam has become in-
creasingly clear.
78. From paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration.
79. The Legality oj U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam 4 (Reprint from the
March 28, 1966 Department of State Bulletin-Department of State publication 8062, Far
Eastern Series 147).
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The Present Status of the D.R.V. and the Republic of Viet Nam
Although the settlements of an international conference are a means
of effecting the status of statehood, in the final analysis they are only
one means for effecting that status and may be superseded by later and
contrary indications of the expectations of the World Community, or of
the participants in the Conference. Moreover, treaties such as the Geneva
Accords on Viet Nam cannot bind the international community as a whole
with respect to recognition of statehood, but only those states agreeing
to be bound. 0 The rest of the world Community, including the United
States, which expresslyrefused to be bound by the Accords, has always
been free to recognize the reality of two independent international enti-
ties in Viet Nam and certainly this is true for purposes of rendering
assistance for their self-defense. Today, nearly twelve years after the
Geneva Conference of 1954, there can be no real doubt as to the state-
hood of the Republic of Viet Nam, a statehood which substantially
existed even prior to the Geneva Accords and which was not adversely
affected by them. It would appear, however, that despite language of the
Geneva Accords there are now substantial expectations of two states
existing in Viet Nam which qualify as separate and independent states
under international law.8 '
On October 26, 1955, following a referendum in South Viet Nam, the
Republic of Viet Nam was formed with Ngo Dinh Diem as President.
8 2
Since the Geneva Conference of 1954, the statehood of this Republic
of Viet Nam, the successor government to the Bao Dai government of
the State of Viet Nam, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the inter-
national community.
On January 23, 1957, a draft resolution sponsored by 13 nations
including two of the participants plus the Co-Chairman of the 1954
Geneva Conference, France, the United States and Great Britain, was
introduced in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly
seeking the admission of the Republic of Viet Nam to the United Na-
tions.8 " The resolution in final form provided:
80. See the discussion in text at pp. 324-41 infra.
81. This does not mean, of course, that if at some time both the D.R.V. and the R.V.N.
should agree to unification that it would be barred by international law.
82. See the Provisional Act constituting the Republic in South Vietnam in 162 BRITISH
& FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 539-40 (1955). See also Fall, How the French Got Out of Viet-Nam,
in VIET-NA-m READER 89; THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1955 113 (Council on
Foreign Relations 1957).
For extracts from the Constitution of the Republic of Viet-Nam, promulgated on October
26, 1956, see UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK ON HumAN RIGHTS FOR 1956 259-62 (1958).
83. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. l1th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 77 (A/SPC/SR.17) (1957).
The question of the admission of the Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations was
also adverted to in December, 1955. Without a vote on the admission of Viet Nam as such,
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The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 620 C (VII) of 21 December 1952 find-
ing Viet-Nam qualified for membership in the United Nations
Noting that Viet-Nam [the Republic of Viet Nam] has been ex-
cluded from membership in the United Nations because of the
opposition of one of the permanent members of the Security
Council,
1. Reaffirms its determination that Viet-Nam is fully qualified
for admission to membership in the United Nations;
2. Requests the Security Council to reconsider the application
of Viet-Nam in the light of this determination and to report to
the General Assembly as soon as possible. 4
The co-sponsorship of this resolution by Britain, the United States,
and France, with the approval of the Republic of Viet Nam is further
evidence that the participants in the Geneva discussion on Viet Nam did
not regard the Accords as affecting the recognized status of the Republic
of Viet Nam as a state under international law. This draft resolution
was adopted by the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly
by a vote of 44 to 8 with 23 abstentions.8 5 The only 8 votes against the
resolution were the three Soviet Socialist Republics, joined by Albania,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. 6 The General Assembly
adopted the resolution on February 28, 1957, by a vote of 40 to 8 with
18 abstentions."s
It was evident from some of the debates on this resolution that the
General Assembly votes recognized the status of the Republic of Viet
Nam as an independent state under international law. Mr. Matsudaira,
the General Assembly passed a "package deal" resolution to admit "all those eighteen
countries about which no problem of unification arises." It was evident from this language
and the discussions that the Republic of Viet Nam and the Republic of Korea were not
included in the General Assembly "package deal." Since their non-inclusion at the time was
apparently in the interest of breaking the serious admissions deadlock confronting the
United Nations and since the issue of the inclusion of the R.V.N. was never pressed in the
General Assembly this non-inclusion can not be taken as authority for General Assembly
opposition to the admission of the R.V.N. In fact, when the issue was pressed in the
Security Council the Council voted 9 to 1 with 1 abstention to admit the Republic of
Viet-Nam. Again, the negative vote of the U.S.S.R., a permanent member of the Council,
prevented the resolution from passing with respect to the R.V.N. See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REc. 10th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 21, at 4-7 (1955); U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac.
10th Sess., Plenary 552nd, 409-420, at 420 (A/PV. 552) (1955) ; U.N. SEcuRrrY CourC OFF.
R1c. 10th year, 704th meeting 1-10, at 10 (S/PV. 704) (1955).
84. U.N. GEN. Ass. Or. REc. 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 9 (A/RES/523)
(1957).
85. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. llth Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 105 (A/SPC/SR.22) (1957).
86. Ibid.
87. U.N. GEa. Ass. OFF. Rc. llth Sess., Plenary 663rd (A/PV.663) (1957).
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the delegate from Japan said: "Viet-Nam had now become an inde-
pendent State which maintained diplomatic relations with forty-seven
countries and belonged to many international organizations.""8 Mr. Navia
Varon, the delegate from Colombia stated: "The Republic of Korea and
the Republic of Viet-Nam were sovereign States which fulfilled the re-
quirements of the Charter .... ,,9 In fact, significantly the Soviet dele-
gation at this time did not oppose the admission of the Republic of Viet
Nam on the grounds that it was not a state or that the Geneva Accords
had deprived it of status as a state but instead argued that both the
Republic of Viet Nam and the D.R.V. were separate and independent
states which should be admitted to membership in the United Nations
together. And in January, 1957, the Soviet delegation introduced a draft
resolution to that effect seeking "the simultaneous admission of all these
States," the D.R.V., South Viet Nam, the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea and the Republic of Korea.9"
During the debate on these resolutions, Mr. Sobolev, the delegate of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said in referring to the 13 power
draft resolutions to admit the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam: "The
two draft resolutions before the Committee served propaganda purposes:
they suggested that South Korea and South Viet-Nam represented the
whole of Korea and the whole of Viet Nam respectively. The real situa-
tion was quite different: both in Korea and in Viet-Nam two separate
States existed, which differed from one another in political and economic
structure.""' And later he said: "The fact was that there were two States
in Korea and two States in Viet-Nam."9 2 And during the same debate,
Mr. Kizya, the delegate of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic said:
"The realistic approach was to admit that there were two States with con-
flicting political systems in both Korea and Viet-Nam. In the circum-
stances, the only possible solution was the simultaneous admission of
the four countries constituting Korea and Viet-Nam. That was the pur-
pose of the USSR draft resolution."98 And Mr. Pyzhkov, the delegate
of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic said: "[T]wo completely
separate and independent States had been established in each of those
countries, [Korea and Viet Nam] with different political, social and
economic systems."94
This Soviet draft resolution and the views of the Soviet delegation
88. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. RIc. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 77 (A/SPC/SR.17) (1957).
89. U.N. GEN. Ass. Orr. REC. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 80 (A/SPC/SR.18) (1957).
90. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 5-7
(A/SPC/L.9) (A/3519) (1957).
91. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 79 (A/SPC/SR.18) (1957).
92. U.N. GEN. Ass. O". Rlc. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 101 (A/SPC/SR.22) (1957).
93. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 81 (A/SPC/SR.18) (1957).
94. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 87 (A/SPC/SR.19) (1957).
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during the debates on the various resolutions indicate that the other
Co-Chairman of the 1954 Geneva Convention, the Soviet Union, clearly
took the position that in 1957 despite the Geneva Convention or perhaps
as a result of it there were now two sovereign and independent states in
Viet Nam. It should be noted that apparently the 1954 Geneva Conven-
tion and the partition of Viet Nam had substantially changed the position
of the USSR from its 1952 stand that the D.R.V. was the sole legitimate
government of Viet Nam. It in effect admitted the legitimacy of the
government of the Republic of Viet Nam as a state under international
law and sought to establish the statehood of the D.R.V. as well. Again,
this position indicates that the participants in the Geneva discussions on
Viet Nam did not regard the Accords as limiting the statehood of the
governments of Viet Nam.
This General Assembly resolution for the admission of Viet Nam was
debated on September 9, 1957 in the Security Council.9" During the
course of the debates it was reaffirmed that the Republic of Viet Nam
was considered an independent sovereign nation. Thus Sir Pierson Dixon,
the United Kingdom delegate, stated: "My Government played a lead-
ing part in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference in 1954 which
brought an end to the tragic war in Indo-Chino and which thus enabled
the State of Viet-Nam to establish itself in independence."96 And Mr.
Jarring, the Swedish delegate said: "[O]ur affirmative vote implies recog-
nition by my Government of Viet-Nam, with the territory which it now
possesses de facto."97 From the context of the discussion as a whole it is
evident that these remarks were in reference to the Republic of Viet Nam.
The Security Council votewas 10 to 1 in favor of admission, but again
this Soviet "veto" prevented the passage of the resolution.98
On October 25, 1957, the General Assembly again responded to this
Soviet "veto" with a resolution substantially identical to that of Feb-
ruary 28." This time the resolution was passed by a vote of 49 to 9 with
23 abstentions.'00 On December 9, 1958, by a vote of 8 to 1 with 2 ab-
95. U.N. SEcURrrY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 12th year, 789-790th meetings (S/PV.789)
(S/PV.790) (1957).
96. U.N. SECURITY COUNCiL OFF. REc. 12th year, 790th meeting 5 (S/PV.790) (1957).
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 10.
99. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 25, at 2-4 (A/3712)
(1957). The vote on this resolution on October 17, 1957, in the Special Political Committee
of the General Assembly was 49 to 9, with 22 abstentions. U.N. GEM. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th
,Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 41 (A/SPC/SR.49) (1957). For debate on this resolution in the
Special Political Committee of the General Assembly see U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 12th Sess.,
Spec. Pol. Com., 44-49th meetings (A/SPC/SR. 44-49) (1957). For debate and vote on this
resolution in the General Assembly see U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Plenary 709
(A/PV.709) (1957).
100. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Plenary 709 (A/PV.709) (1957).
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stentions the Security Council again voted in favor of the admission of
the Republic of Viet Nam.' Again, however, the Soviet "veto" prevented
the resolution from passing. These votes were taken after full presenta-
tion of the arguments that the Republic of Viet Nam was not a state
representative of the people of Viet Nam and that unification of Viet
Nam should be required prior to admission to the United Nations. °2
This General Assembly resolution, then, was another decisive rejection
of the arguments against the statehood of the Republic of Viet Nam
by the most authoritative organ of the international community. And
at the least these General Assembly resolutions that the R.V.N. is fully
qualified for membership in the United Nations mean pursuant to Ar-
ticle 4 of the Charter that in the judgment of the General Assembly the
R.V.N. is capable of fulfilling its obligations under the Charter.'0 This
would seem to specifically affirm that the R.V.N. has the right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense expressly reserved under Article 51 of
the Charter. Moreover, at the present time both the R.V.N. and the
D.R.V. have pending applications for membership in the United Na-
tions,'1 4 which again under Article 4 of the Charter expresses their
willingness to be bound by the United Nations Charter and indicates
their assessment of their own status as states able and willing to carry
out the obligations of the Charter.
101. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF REC. 13th year, 843rd meeting 8-10 (S/PV.843)
(1958).
102. For example: "According to Article 14 of the Agreement on the Cessation of
hostilities in Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam was merely a zone for the regrouping of French
military units. Its administration was not a legal government which could be taken to
represent Viet-Nam as a whole." Statement of Mr. Trhllk, the delegate from Czechoslovakia.
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 12th Sess., Spec. Pol. Comm. 10 (A/SPC/SR.45) (1957);
The draft resolution proposing that South Viet-Nam should be admitted to the
United Nations . . . was contrary to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indo-China,
under which South Viet-Nam was merely an area for the re-grouping of the French
armed forces and the regime established there could not be regarded as a legal
government representing the interests of the Viet-Namese people. . . . The agree-
ments had been signed on behalf of the people of Viet-Nam by the present Govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which had thus been given factual
recognition as the only Government entitled to represent the entire Viet-Namese
people.
Statement of Mr. Voutov, the delegate from Bulgaria. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 12th Sess.,
Spec. Pol. Comm. 16-17 (A/SPC/SR.46) (1957).
103. Article 4, section 1 of the UNITED NATIONS CHARTER provides: "Membership in
the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations."
104. Information supplied by the Office of Public Affairs, the United States Mission to
the United Nations, to J. N. Moore on February 22, 1966. According to the Office of Public
Affairs, "South Vietnam submitted its application on December 17, 1951. North Vietnam
submitted its application on November 22, 1948, but it was not circulated as a Security
Council document until September 17, 1952."
1966-1967]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
This history of United Nations resolutions and debates on the status
of the two Viet Nams after the 1954 Geneva Accords leaves no doubt
that the Republic of Viet Nam is recognized as an independent state
under international law and some of the debates lend support to the
proposition that there are now two independent states in Viet Nam.
The present status of the Republic of Viet Nam as a state under inter-
national law is confirmed by the recognition presently accorded that
state by about 60 nations.10 5 It is also presently a member of at least 30
international organizations'0 6 including 12 specialized agencies of the
United Nations, 10 7 has a permanent observer to the United Nations, °8
and has participated in about 48 international conferences. 19 In fact,
the R.V.N. is a member of as many specialized agencies of the U.N.
as is the Republic of Korea and is a member of more than are Albania,
Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R., among others."0
It should also be pointed out that since the United Nations determina-
tions and the continuing international recognition of the Republic of
Viet Nam have overwhelmingly recognized the Saigon government as
the lawful government of the R.V.N. rather than the National Libera-
tion Front, there can be no question but that the Saigon government
105. See note 8 supra.
106. NGUYEN-VAN-TnHA & NGUYEN-VAN-MuNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF VIET NAM 346
(1958).
107. The Republic of Viet-Nam is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the International Labour Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World
Health Organization, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, the International Monetary Fund, the International
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal
Postal Union, and the World Meterological Organization. United Nations Press Services,
Office of Public Information, Note No. 2718/Rev. 3 (April 1964) (64-38338). The Republic
of Viet Nam is also a member of the .Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. See
U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. REc. 20th Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 1 (E/2712) (E/CN.11/407)
(1955). The government of the Republic of Viet Nam has also "made or pledged contributions
to the United Nations programmes in Korea and Palestine and to the Expanded Programme
of Technical Assistance." See the remarks of United States Ambassador Lodge made in the
Security Council on December 9, 1958. U.N. SECURITY CoUNcIL OFF. REc. 13th year, 843rd
meeting 8 (S/PV.843) (1958).
108. The office of the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet Nam to the United
Nations is located at 866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 547-9, New York 17, New York.
109. Preliminary Report on the Achievements of the War Cabinet, from June 19, 1965
to September 29, 1965, 52 (Republic of Vietnam 1965).
110. Out of 16 specialized agencies listed in April 1964, the Republic of Viet Nam
and the Republic of Korea were members of 12, Cambodia, Cuba and Czechoslovakia were
members of 11, Bulgaria, Romania and the U.S.S.R. were members of 9, Albania, Byelorussia,
and the Ukraine were members of 8, Yemen was a member of 6, Monaco and Mongolia were
members of 5, Zanzibar was a member of 4, Liechtenstein was a member of 2, and San
Marino and Western Samoa were members of 1. United Nations Press Services, Office of
Public Information, Note No. 2718/Rev. 3 (April 1964) (64-38338).
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and not the N.L.F. is regarded by the international community as the
generally recognized government entitled to speak for the Republic of
Viet Nam."'
When the United States agreed to render assistance to the Saigon
government these United Nations determinations and international recog-
nition indicate that there was no uncertainty as to which government
was entitled to speak for the R.V.N. n2 There was in fact no realistic
alternative to the Saigon government, for no other governmental entity
in South Viet Nam, including the N.L.F.-which apparently was not
even formally created until 1960"--had any realistic claim to represent
the people of the Republic of Viet Nam in international affairs. More-
over, as is discussed in the next section, the evidence indicates that the
N.L.F. receives significant assistance and control from the D.R.V. and
cannot validly claim to be representative only of indigenous sentiment
within the R.V.N. itself. As such, the Saigon government and not the
N.L.F. is the only government lawfully entitled to request defensive
assistance for the Republic of Viet Nam.
With respect to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, its claims to
statehood are strengthened by the recognition presently accorded to it
by about 24 nations," 4 and its participation in a number of international
conferences.
It should be pointed out that the continuing full recognition accorded
to the Republic of Viet Nam by the United States, Great Britain, France
111. As late as 1965 apparently the few N.L.F. representatives abroad still did not claim
diplomatic status. Fall, Viet-Cong-The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam, in VIET-NAm READER
252, 260. It would seem that for purposes of assessing the lawfulness of assistance to a
recognized government meaningful discussion as to when rebels become a generally recognized
government must distinguish the situation in which they achieve that status by virtue
of completely indigenous revolt from the situation in which the status is only achieved in
the first instance by virtue of significant outside initiation, direction, or assistance.
112. The United States was assisting the Republic of Viet Nam with limited economic
and military aid beginning in 1955, and had rendered assistance to the State of Viet Nam
even prior to that date. As Don and Arthur Larson have pointed out:
Of total aid from 1953 to 1961, less than one-fourth was classified as military, and
more than three-fourths economic. Some idea of the relatively small size of the
military side may be seen from the announcement on May 5, 1960, that the Military
Assistance and Advisory Group would be increased by the end of the year from
327 to 685.
Larson & Larson, What Is Our "Commitment" In Viet-Nam? in VIET-NA-s READER 99, 101.
The National Liberation Front, however, was not formally created until December 20,
1960, and even then led what Bernard Fall describes as a "very shadowy life for almost two
years." Fall, Viet-Cong-The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam, in V-r.-NAMa READER 252, 257.
113. See Fall, note 112 supra at 257.
114. "North Viet-Nam has full diplomatic relations with 24 countries, 12 of whom
belong to the Communist bloc." Legal Status of South Viet-Nam, Release 4/31b-865BT,
Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Dept. of State.
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and Laos and the recognition of the D.R.V. by the Soviet Union and
Communist China is again indicative that the participants in the Geneva
Conference of 1954 did not contemplate that the Accords would adversely
affect the existing statehood of the D.R.V. or the Republic of Viet Nam
in the absence of elections to unify Viet Nam.
It should also be noted that in the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos,
the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. again participated separately." 5 In fact Laos
apparently has diplomatic relations with both states, constituting addi-
tional recognition of the reality of the separateness of the D.R.V. and
the R.V.N. 116
As Dr. B. S. N. Murti, an Indian scholar who was actively associated
with the International Commission For Supervision and Control in Viet
Nam has written in 1964: "[Since the Geneva Agreement] Two inde-
pendent sovereign States, claiming sovereignty over the whole country,
came into existence in Viet Nam and the division of the country seems
permanent .... 117 Both the States are completely independent with full-
fledged Governments of their own owing no allegiance to the other."""
Today, nearly twelve years after the Geneva Accords of 1954 it can be
said that there are substantial expectations within the international com-
munity that the Republic of Viet Nam and the Democratic Republic of
Viet Nam are separate and independent states under international law." 9
115. See Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos, (Treaty Series No. 27
[1963], Command Paper 2025). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXVII
(1962/63), at 2, 22-23, 26.
116. There may be several other states as well, that have recognized both the D.R.V.
and the R.V.N. In any event, the situation is comparable to that in Korea where South
Korea has full relations with 64 nations while North Korea is recognized by 25, and
apparently both Koreas are recognized by only about one nation. For the figures on North
and South Korea, see Legal Status of South Viet-Nam, Release 4/31b-865BT, Office of Public
Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State.
See also SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955-56 16-17 (Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs 1960). "Mr. Nehru announced in the Lok Sabha on 16 March 1955 that,
though India did not have formal diplomatic relations with them, it had for all practical
purposes recognized Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam, and had a special
mission in Cambodia and consulates-general in the other three states." Ibid.
117. MURTI, VIETNAm DIVIDED (1964).
118. Id. at 176.
119. Professor Friedmann, a critic of aspects of United States assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam, apparently agrees that North and South Vietnam may be regarded as de facto
separate states.
In Yemen, where Saudi Arabia supports the royalists and Egypt the Repub-
licans, and in Viet-Nam, where North and South Viet-Nam may, since the agreement
of 1954, be considered as de facto separate states, the civil war aspects of the
conflict are purely political and to some extent religious, but not racial.
Friedmann, Intervention, Civil War and the Role of International Law, 1965 PRoc. AM. Soc.
INT'L L. 67, at 70 (1965).
It may be conceded that North and South Viet-Nam are today de facto
separate states, even though the Geneva Agreement of 1954 spoke of 'two zones.'
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The Republic of Viet Nam Has Requested Assistance From the
United States to Meet Armed Aggression
That the government of the Republic of Viet Nam has requested assis-
tance from the United States and other nations currently rendering mili-
tary and non military assistance has never seriously been questioned. In
fact, the first government of the Republic of Viet Nam requested United
States assistance and no successor government has asked the United
States to leave. It is also clear that the present government has requested
and approves of United States assistance in meeting continuing armed
aggression of mounting intensity.
Among numerous indications of this request for assistance to meet
armed aggression, and approval of that assistance, are a letter from
President Ngo Dinh Diem to President Kennedy dated December 7, 1961
in which President Diem said:
Mr. President, my people and I are mindful of the great assis-
tance which the United States has given us. Your help has not
been lightly received, for the Vietnamese are proud people, and
we are determined to do our part in the defense of the free
world.... But Viet Nam is not a great power and the forces of
International Communism now arrayed against us are more
than we can meet with the resources at hand. We must have
further assistance from the United States if we are to win the
war now being waged against us. 2 °
President Kennedy responded in a letter of December 14, 1961: "[I]n
Friedmann, United States Policy and the Crisis of International Law, 59 Am. J. INT'L L.
857, at 866 (1965).
For Professor Friedmann's views see the above two articles.
See also SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 83 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1957).
For all practical purposes, there were from the middle of the year [1954] four
states in Indo-China, North Viet-Nam, South Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos:
Political developments took a separate course in each of them, although they had
in common the problems of the armistice and of their relations with France.
Ibid.
At least with respect to the lawfulness of the use of force the Soviet Government
appears to agree that the R.V.N. and the D.R.V. are separate states.
[W]ho has given the USA the right to deal out retribution for the actions of
partisans in South Vietnam and for the defeats which the occupation forces and
their accomplices are suffering by bombing raids on the territory of a third country
-the VDR [D.R.V.]?
Broadcast text of Soviet Government statement on Viet-Nam, February 8, 1965, in Recent
Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in
Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam No. 3 [1965], Command Paper 2756), at 11.
120. Background Information Relating to-Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate 85-86 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
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response to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-
Nam to protect its people and to preserve its independence.'1
2 1
And in a letter of December 9, 1961 from the Republic of Viet Nam
to the International Control Commission the R.V.N. said:
In the face of the aggression, directed by the so-called 'Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam' against the Republic of Viet-
Nam, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreement, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the
Government of the United States of America to intensify the
aid in personnel and material which the latter was already
granting to Viet-Nam. The right of 'self-defense' being a legiti-
mate and inherent attribute of sovereignty, the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam found itself constrained to exercise
this right and request for increased aid, since North Viet-Nam
continues to violate the Geneva Agreement and to do injury to
life and property of the free people of Viet-Nam.
These measures can end as soon as the North Viet-Nam
authorities will have ceased the acts of aggression and will have
begun to respect the Geneva Agreement.'2 2
And Nguyen Cao Ky, the current Prime Minister of the Republic of
Viet Nam stated in a speech to the Vietnamese people on October 1,
1965:
At the request of the Republic of Viet Nam, the governments
of the U.S., the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand
have sent their military units to help us. Following a legitimate
self-defense plan, and very moderately, the Viet Nam Air Force
and the U.S. Air Force have successfully bombed enemy mili-
tary bases, staging areas, army barracks and supply depots in
North Viet Nam. 23
Nor is this just an official United States and Vietnamese view of the
nature of this request. Mr. Michael Stewart, the British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons in April 1965:
Faced with that situation [aggression against the Republic of
Viet-Nam from the D.R.V.] South Viet-Nam appealed to the
United States for help, and the United States responded. But it
is important to notice that in 1959, when this pressure from the
121. Id. at 84.
122. Special Report to the Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China,
(Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers, XXXIX (1961/62), at 8.
123. Preliminary Report on the Achievements of the War Cabinet From June 19, 1965
3, 6 (Republic of Vietnam).
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North began, and even as late as 1961-nearly two years later
-there were still only 700 members of the United States Armed
Forces in South Viet-Nam .... [I] t cannot be claimed that the
action taken by the North was the result of a considerable
United States military presence in the South. The action from
the North preceded the arrival of United States forces in any
considerable degree in the South.
1 4
124. Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965
(Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), at 250. With reference to this quoted
figure of 700 members of the United States armed forces in Viet Nam as late as 1961, the
exact figures vary from one account to another, possibly reflecting what month in 1961 one
is referring to. There seems to be substantial agreement, however, that prior to 1961 the
United States had only a very limited Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in
South Viet Nam-probably not more than about 800-900 with figures somewhat lower in
earlier years. See Larson & Larson, note 112 supra at 101. Some idea of the small military
role of the United States during this period is indicated by the testimony of Secretary of
State Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the first United States
military casualty in the R.V.N. occurred in December, 1961. TEE VIETNAM HzAINGS 263
(Vintage ed. 1966). There is also substantial agreement that a moderate buildup of United
States military advisory personnel began about mid-1961, going to roughly 12,000 by mid-
1962 and about 23,000 by January 1965. See the address by William P. Bundy, Assistant
Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, January 23, 1965, reprinted in Background Information
Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam 137 at 143, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965). See also Special Report to the
Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, (Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command
Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXIX (1961/62), at para-
graph 16, page 9. See also on the level of United States forces in Viet Nam during this
period the message from the President to Congress on May 4, 1965, in Background Informa-
tion Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate 219-20 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, '.965). An indication of the relatively
minor combat exposure of United States advisory personnel during much of this period
is evidenced by the fact that as late as September 2, 1963, President Kennedy indicated
that as few as forty-seven Americans had been killed in combat in Viet Nam. See Back-
ground Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, United States Senate 100 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
The more rapid build-up and the introduction of United States combat units as such
apparently began in the Spring of 1965, leading to the present level of about 260,000 United
States military personnel in the R.V.N. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1966, p. 1, col. 7 (city ed.),
at p. 3, cols. 6 & 7. This defensive build-up is continuing.
Yet it seems to be accepted that a major escalation in the military attack on the gov-
ernment of the R.V.N.-said by some to really be the beginning of the conflict-took place
about 1959-60, which is easily prior to the responding increases in United States forces. See,
for example, Fall, Viet-Cong-The Unseen Enemy in Viet-Nam in VizT-NAm RzADER 252,
at 256-57. It should also be noted that the D.R.V. issued a call in September, 1960, for the
creation of a revolutionary front in the south to overthrow the Diem government. Id. at
257. Moreover, prior to the commencement of bombing of military targets in the D.R.V. in
February, 1965, and the introduction of United States combat units as such in the Spring
of 1965, ". . . in November, December, January, over the turn of the year 1964-65 . . . North
Vietnam moved the 325th Division of the regular North Vietnamese Army from North
Vietnam to South Vietnam to up the ante. . . " Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in THE Vixrwm HEAaxNGs 263 (Vintage ed. 1966).
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And in an interview in April, 1966, Thich Tri Quang a South Viet-
namese Buddhist monk with a wide popular following in the R.V.N.
stated:
Q. Can you comment on rumors that the first thing a legis-
lative assembly might do would be to ask the Americans to
leave Viet Nam?
A. Rumors such as these are sheer libel. No proof or substan-
tiation for them exists. One should not ask whether Ameri-
cans should remain in Viet Nam. It is agreed by all that the
struggle against Communism here must be made with the assis-
tance of the Americans. So the problem is really how to en-
hance the value of that assistance. American assistance is not
now fully supported in Viet Nam because there is no popular
representation to give it such support. When an assembly is
elected, it will, by giving its moral endorsement to such assis-
tance, enhance its value and its acceptance.'25
Although there is certainly evidence that the conflict in the Republic
of Viet Nam also has internal support, no impartial observer today can
question that the campaign to overthrow the internationally recognized
government of the Republic of Viet Nam by force and violence receives
significant military assistance and direction from the D.R.V. As such,
the conflict within the R.V.N. cannot validly be categorized as a "civil
war" for purposes of assessing the lawfulness of the responding assistance
to the recognized government. As President Kennedy put it in a letter
to President Diem as long ago as 1961 :
Your letter underlines what our own information has con-
vincingly shown-that the campaign of force and terror now
being waged against your people and your Government is sup-
ported and directed from the outside by the authorities at
Hanoi. They have thus violated the provisions of the Geneva
125. "A Talk With Thich Tri Quang," Time Apr. 22, 1966, p. 27. Statements such as
this perhaps take on added weight when it is remembered that Thich Tri Quang is highly
critical of the present Ky-Thieu government and asserted United States support for that
government.
See also "2 Top Buddhists Making Efforts To Mollify U.S.," N.Y. Times, June 10,
1966, p. 1, col. 1 (city ed.), at p. 3, col. 1; "New Buddhist Policy Raps Peace Talk As Cong
Sellout," New Haven Register, June 9, 1966, p. 1, cols. 6-7 (city ed.).
Buddhist foes of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's regime ..... disavowed neutralism
and said any peace talks now would mean surrender to the Viet Cong.
The presence of American troops in the country is obviously needed tem-
porarily, said a 15-point proclamation by the Unified Buddhist Church. ....
The statement by the Unified Buddhist Church denied any neutralist tendencies
among the estimated .5 million Buddhists it represents. It said the presence of
American troops in the nation of 15 million "is obviously needed, temporarily."
Id. at p. 1, col. 6, p. 2, col. 1.
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Accords designed to ensure peace in Viet-Nam and to which
they bound themselves in 1954.126
Evidence of this external military assistance and direction is well
documented and is not just a United States view. On June 2, 1962, the
International Commission for Supervision and Control in Viet Nam,
composed of representatives from India, Canada and Poland and which
was established pursuant to the 1954 Geneva Accords issued a Special
Report which considered allegations of aggression and subversion on
the part of the D.R.V. against the Republic of Viet Nam. In this Special
Report, the first report so designated since the commencement of the
I.C.C.'s reporting in 1954, the Commission adopted the following find-
ings of the Legal Committee:
(1) The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-
Nam proceeds on the principle of the complete cessation
of all hostilities in Viet-Nam, respect by either Party of
the Zone assigned to the other, and the inescapable re-
sponsibility of the Parties for the fulfillment of the obli-
gations resulting therefrom ....
It follows that the using of one Zone for the organi-
zation or the carrying out of any hostile activities in the
other Zone, violations by members of the Armed Forces of
one Party of the territory of the other Party, or the com-
mission by any element under the control of one Party
of any act directed against the other Party, would be
contrary to the fundamental provisions of the Agreement
which enjoin mutual respect for the territories assigned
to the two Parties.
(2) Having examined the complaints and the supporting ma-
terial sent by the South Vietnamese Mission, the Com-
mittee has come to the conclusion that in specific instances
there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed per-
sonnel, arms, munitions and other supplies have been sent
from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with
the object of supporting, organizing and carrying out
hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against
the Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in the
South. These acts are in violation of Articles 10, 19, 24
and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
in Viet-Nam.
(3) In examining the complaints and the supporting material,
126. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965), at 84.
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in particular documentary material sent by the South Viet-
namese Mission, the Committee has come to the further
conclusion that there is evidence to show that the PAVN
has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting,
encouraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone
in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administra-
tion in the South. The use of the Zone in the North for
such activities is in violation of Articles 19, 24 and 27
of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-
Nam .... 127
In adopting these findings of the Legal Committee the Commission
said: "The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal
Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable
doubt that the PAVN has violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific
instances."' 2 Although the Polish representative dissented from these
conclusions,' 2 9 the Indian representative who signed the Commission
report issued a special statement indicating disagreement with the
statement of the Polish delegation and reiterating the stand and findings
of the Indian and Canadian delegations as formulated in the Special
Report." °
And in a dissenting report from the Canadian delegation to the Co-
Chairman of the Geneva Conference issued on February 13, 1965, the
Canadian delegation made public what he indicated were conclusions
of the Legal Committee of the I.C.C. to the effect that:
The Legal Committee concludes (reference paragraphs 742
to 746 and paragraph 754 in Section VI) that it is the aim of the
127. Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China,
(Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers, XXXIX (1961/62), at 6-7.
128. Id. at 7. (Emphasis added).
The Commission also found after discussing this armed aggression from the D.R.V.
that the responding United States military assistance was a violation by the R.V.N. of
Articles 16, 17 and 19 of the Geneva Agreements. Id. at 10.
In evaluating the legal import of these findings it should be kept in mind that the
Commission's findings amount to findings of aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
in breach of the Geneva Accords. As a result of such aggression, the R.V.N. would be en-
titled to suspension of any corresponding obligations that may be binding on it as necessary
to take appropriate defensive measures.
It should also be pointed out that even if all of the asserted political grievances of the
D.R.V. against the R.V.N. were legally justified, including the failure to hold elections, still
they do not remotely constitute an "armed attack" within any accepted interpretation of
Article 51 of the Charter. As such, an attack by the D.R.V. because of alleged breach
of political provisions is still violative of a major principle of the U.N. Charter. See the
discusions in sections 1B and IV infra.
129. Id. at 21-22.
130. Id. at 23.
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Vietnam Lao Dong Party (the ruling Party in the Zone in the
North) to bring about the overthrow of the Administration in
the South. In September 1960, the Third Congress of the Viet-
nam Lao Dong Party held in Hanoi (in the Zone in the North)
passed a resolution calling for the organization of a 'Front'
under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party for the
overthrow of the Administration in the South. Such a 'Front
for Liberation of the South' was, in fact, constituted under the
sponsorship of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party. There are present
and functioning in the Zone in the South branches of the Viet-
nam Lao Dong party and the Front for Liberation of the South
along with its armed branches, namely, the 'Forces for Lib-
eration of the South,' and the 'People's Self-Defence Armed
Forces.' The Vietnam Lao Dong Party and the Front for Lib-
eration of the South have the identical aim of overthrowing the
Administration in the South. The Vietnam Lao Dong Party,
the Front for Liberation of the South, the Forces for Liberation
of the South and the People's Self-Defence Armed Forces have
disseminated in the Zone in the South propaganda seeking to
incite the people to oppose and overthrow the Administration in
the South. There exists and functions a 'Voice' of the Front
for Liberation of the South and a 'Liberation Press Agency'
which assist in the above-mentioned activities. It is probable
that Hanoi Radio also has assisted in the said activities. Propa-
ganda literature of the Front for the Liberation of the South
and in favour of the activities of the Front has been published
in the Zone in the North and has been distributed above by the
official representatives of the DRVN.
The Legal Committee further concludes that:
(1) The Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the Zone in the North,
the various branches of the Vietnam Lao Dong Party in the
Zone in the South, the Front for Liberation of the South, the
Forces for Liberation of the South and the People's Self-
Defence Armed Forces have incited various sections of
the people residing in the Zone in the South, including
members of the Armed Forces of the South, to oppose the
Administration in the South, to overthrow it by violent
means and have indicated to them various means of do-
ing so.
(2) Those who ignored their exhortation and continued to sup-
port the Administration in the South have been threatened
with punishment and in certain cases such punishment
has been effected by the carrying out of death sentences.
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(3) The aim and function of the Front for Liberation of the
South, the Forces for Liberation of the South and the
People's Self-Defence Armed Forces are to organize and
to carry out under the leadership of the Vietnam Lao
Dong Party, hostile activities against the Armed Forces
and the Administration of the South by violent means
aimed at the overthrow of the Administration of the South.
The Legal Committee concludes also that the PAVN has
allowed the Zone in the North to be used as a base for the
organization of hostile activities in the Zone in the South, in-
cluding armed attacks, aimed at the overthrow of the Adminis-
tration in the South in violation of its obligations under the
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. 13 1
In this same report, the Canadian representative to the I.C.C. said:
It is the considered view of the Canadian Delegation that the
events which have taken place in both North and South Viet-
nam since February 7 are the direct result of the intensification
of the aggressive policy of the Government of North Vietnam.
In the opinion of the Canadian Delegation, therefore, it should
be the chief obligation of this Commission to focus all possible
attention on the continuing fact that North Vietnam has in-
creased its efforts to incite, encourage, and support hostile ac-
tivities in South Vietnam, aimed at the overthrow of the South
Vietnamese administration. These activities are in direct and
grave violation of the Geneva Agreement and constitute the
root cause of general instability in Vietnam, of which events
since February 7 should be seen as dangerous manifestations.
The cessation of hostile activities by North Vietnam is a pre-
requisite to the restoration of peace in Vietnam as foreseen by
the participants in the Geneva Conference of 1954.132
The majority report of the Indian and Polish delegations did not dis-
pute these findings.. but in a short separate statement on the Canadian
131. Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China,
February 13, 1965 (Vietnam No. 1 [1965], Command Paper 2609), at 12-13.
132. Id. at 14-15.
133. Id. at 4-5. The majority report was concerned with the commencement of United
States and R.V.N. bombing of the D.R.V. on February 7, 1965. After adverting to docu-
ments indicating that the bombing had taken place the Commission said:
These documents point to the seriousness of the situation and indicate viola-
tions of the Geneva Agreement.
The International Commission is examining and investigating these and con-
nected complaints still being received by it concerning similar serious events and
grave developments, and will transmit a report to the co-Chairmen as soon as
possible.
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statement the Polish representative indicated his disagreement with the
Canadian statement and denied that the material disclosed by the Cana-
dian representative had any sanction by the Commission.3 4 And in
another short separate statement the Indian representative denied that
the information quoted in the Canadian statement was sanctioned by
the Commission or any of its committees.3 5
To anyone familiar with the cautious wording of the I.C.C. Reports,
these findings within the context of Special I.C.C. Reports indicate
recognition of military assistance and direction from the D.R.V. aimed
at the overthrow of the Republic of Viet Nam by armed aggression.
This conclusion is expressed even more strongly by the SEATO
Council. In a communique issued on March 30, 1961, the SEATO Coun-
cil declared:
Having examined the situation in Laos and the Republic of
Viet-Nam, the Council unanimously approved the following
resolution: .. .the SEATO Council has noted with grave con-
cern the continued offensive by rebel'elements in Laos who are
continuing to be supplied and assisted by Communist powers in
flagrant disregard of the Geneva accords ...
The Council also noted with concern the efforts of an armed
minority, again supported from outside in violation of the
Geneva accords, to destroy the Government of South Viet-
Nam, and declared its firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such
takeover of that country. 13 6
And on April 15, 1964, with the French Council Member abstaining, the
final communique of the SEATO Council Meeting declared:
The Council expressed grave concern about the continuing
Communist aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam, a
Protocol State under the terms of the Manila Pact. Docu-
mentary and material evidence continues to show that this
Id. at 4. In evaluating the legal import of these findings see the statement of the Canadian
Delegation id. at 12-15 and note 128 supra.
134. Id. at 32.
135. Id. at 31. Although inquiries have been made in letters sent on April 14, 1966 to
both the Indian and Canadian delegations in an effort to clarify their apparently con-
tradictory reports with respect to the additional findings of the Legal Committee, at this
writing no reply has been received from the Indian delegation. In a letter of April 22, 1966
to J. N. Moore, Commissioner V. C. Moore of the Canadian Delegation indicated that the
letter had been forwarded to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa for future
substantive reply.
136. Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Council of Seato, Bangkok, March 27-29, 1961:
Communique Issued March 30, 1961, AMERICAN FORxIGN POLIcY 940, at 940-41 (Current
Documents 1961) (Emphasis added.)
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organized campaign is directed, supplied and supported by the
Communist regime in North Viet-Nam, in flagrant violation of
the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 ...
The Council agreed that the defeat of the Communist Cam-
paign is essential not only to the security of the Republic of
Viet-Nam, but to that of South-East Asia .... 137
And in a communique issued by the SEATO Council on May 5, 1965,
again with the French reserving commitment, the Council said:
The Council considered at length the dangerous situation
caused by the aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam-
an aggression organised, directed, supplied and supported by
the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam in contravention of
the basic obligations of international law and in flagrant viola-
tion of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962. The Council
noted with grave concern the increasing infiltration of arms and
combat personnel from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam
and the evidence that this infiltration includes members of the
regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam....
The Council reaffirmed its conclusion at Manila a year ago
that the defeat of this Communist campaign is essential not
only to the security of the Republic of Viet-Nam but to that
of South-East Asia....
The Council agreed that Communist subversion continued
to be a serious threat to the Asian member nations. It agreed
that measures envisaged, namely, material and other aid at the
request of the countries affected, should be continued.18
137. SEATO REcoRD 18, at 19 (Vol. III No. 3 June 1964). The French declared in
abstaining: "The French Council Member, while expressing the sympathy and friendship
of France for the Vietnamese people, who for such a long time have been undergoing such
severe trials and who aspire towards real independence, stated that under the present
serious circumstances it was wise to abstain from any declaration." Id. at 19.
The SEATO Council also "expressed concern that the achievement of a neutral and
independent Government of National Union in Laos is being jeopardized by repeated viola-
tions of the Geneva Agreement of 1962, particularly by North Vietnamese military assistance
and intervention and by repeated Pathet Lao attacks. . . ." Id. at 19-20.
See also the final communique of the thirteenth meeting of the ANZUS Council, July 18,
1964, in SEATO REcoRD 14 (Vol. III No. 4 August 1964). "The Council gave particular
attention to the aggression against South Viet Nam which the communist regime in Hanoi
organized and is directing, supplying and supporting in flagrant violation of the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and 1962." (The ANZUS Council is composed of representatives from
Australia, New Zealand and the United States.)
138. Extract from a Communique issued by the Council of the South-East Asia Treaty
Organization, Bangkok, 5 May 1965, in Documents Relating to British Involvement in the
Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834) 257,
at 258, 260; SEATO REcoRD 23, at 23-25 (Vol. IV No. 3 June 1965).
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The SEATO Council is composed of representatives from Thailand,
Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the United States, and the Philippines.
In recent study of the political roots of the Viet Cong-the National
Liberation Front (N.L.F.) and the People's Revolutionary Party
(P.R.P.)-published in the April 1966 issue of Foreign Affairs, George
A. Carver, Jr. writes:
In short, not only does the P.R.P. control all aspects of the
Viet Cong movement, including the N.L.F., and not only is
it a subordinate echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong
Party, but the P.R.P.'s own leaders appear to be individuals
who themselves occupy ranking positions within the Lao Dong
Party hierarchy.'39
An understanding of the Viet Cong's organizational structure
enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the
more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into South Viet Nam since
the Lao Dong Party's 1959 decision to pursue its objective of
political conquest by waging insurgent war. Until mid-to late
1963 these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic southerners
drawn from the pool of regrouped Viet Minh forces and
supporters taken north in 1954. They were not foot soldiers or
cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole
North Vietamese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead
they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and
technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders,
political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and
communications specialists who built the Viet Cong's military
force into what it is today. They also became the village, district,
provincial and regional committee chiefs and key committee
members who built the Viet Cong's political apparatus ...
Until the recent sharp rise in Viet Cong battlefield casualties,
The Government of France, which was only represented by an observer at this tenth
meeting of the SEATO Council, declared: "The French Observer indicated that, as he had
not participated in preparing this communique, the French Government does not consider
itself to be committed by it." Id. at 25.
The Council also "expressed concern that the Geneva Agreement of 1962 continues to
be violated by the presence of North Vietnamese military forces and supplies in Laos, by
the activities of the Pathet Lao, and by North Vietnamese use of the territory of Laos to
send men and material to the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam." Id. at 24. And the Council
"noted with concern evidence of increasing Communist subversion from outside the country
against Thailand notably in the north-eastern part of the country." Id. at 24-25.
139. Carver, The Faceless Viet Cong, 44 FOREIGN AFrTas 347, 364 (April 1966), re-
printed in 112 CONG. REC. 6150 (daily ed. March 22, 1966). George A. Carver, Jr. holds
degrees from Yale and Oxford, is a former officer in the U.S. Aid Mission in Saigon, and
has been associated with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
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approximately a third of all the personnel in Viet Cong military
units at and above the district company level were 'returnees'
trained in the North. At least half of the membership of most
P.R.P. district committees, and an even larger proportion at
higher echelons, also appear to be 'returnees.' Without this
infiltration from the North, in short, the present Viet Cong
organization could never have been developed. 4°
There are unquestionably many non-Communists heroically
serving in various components of the National Liberation
Front out of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in the
honest belief that they are thereby helping to build a better
political structure for their native land. As an organization,
however, the N.L.F. is a contrived political mechanism with no
indigenous roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao
Dong Party in Hanoi.' 4
No Vietnamese of what could accurately be described as
significant personal prestige or professional standing-not even
one of known leftist persuasion-has ever been willing to
associate himself publicly with the N.L.F. or lend it the use
of his name.'4 2
This direction of the N.L.F. by the D.R.V. is also backed up by
Professor Tai Sung An writing in the Summer 1965 issue of Orbis, the
Journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of
Pennsylvania who wrote:
The overall strategy of the Viet Cong insurrectionary move-
ment in South Vietnam is directed by the Lao Dong Party (the
North Vietnam Communist Party) under the overlordship of the
Chinese Communists. 43
And in April, 1966, following several weeks of political unrest in the
R.V.N., Thich Tri Quang, one of the leaders of the protest movement
said in discussing the nature of the Viet Cong in an interview:
Q. Do you believe there are non-Communist elements within
the Viet Cong?
140. Id. at 369-70.
141. Id. at 372.
142. Id. at 365. For an article substantially backing up this analysis of the N.L.F.
membership see Pike, How Strong Is the N.L.F.? reprinted in 112 CoNG. REC. 343 (daily
ed. Feb. 21, 1966).
143. Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam IX OaRBIS 426, at 429 (Sum-
mer 1965). Tai Sung An is an "Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington College,
Chestertown, Maryland, formerly, Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute."
Id. at 523.
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A. If so, they are completely exploited and led by the Com-
munists, so we can have no hope for them. Even if they
are only followers, they can be of no use to us. Being led or
directed by Communists is the same as being a Communist.
Q. What do you think of the Viet Cong movement?
A. This is mostly a matter of semantics to me. People try to
separate North Vietnamese Communists from South Viet-
namese Communists. No such separation exists. They are
both Communists. And as far as I am concerned, as a
religious man, the ideology they possess is much more
dangerous than the guns they possess.'44
And New York Times correspondent Neil Sheehan in an article in the
May 2, 1966 New York Times, provides an analysis of the evidence on
which the above conclusions are based which substantially supports these
findings as to the character of the National Liberation Front. He points
out that:
The available evidence strongly indicates that the war was
actually initiated on orders from Hanoi after the regime of the
late President Ngo Dinh Diem refused in 1956, with United
States support, to hold the Vietnam-wide elections that were to
decide the circumstances for a reunification of the country....
The instrument for the renewal of guerilla warfare was the clan-
destine organization that had been deliberately left behind when
the bulk of the Communist-led Vietminh troops, who fought the
French and were the predecessors of the Vietcong, were with-
drawn to the North in 1954.
The existence of such a clandestine Communist party organi-
zation in the South has been documented. In this regard, ana-
lysts also point out a fact often little understood in the West,
that there is only one Communist party in Vietnam and that its
organizational tentacles extend throughout both the North and
the South. At no time since the mid-nineteen-forties, when the
struggle against the Japanese, and then the French began, has
the politiburo of the party lost control over its branch in the
South....
By 1960, the evidence indicates, Hanoi decided that some
instrument was necessary to lend an aura of legitimacy and to
disguise Communist control over the guerrilla warfare its cadres
had fostered in the South. [leading to a call for the formation of
the N.L.F.]....
144. "A Talk with Thich Tri Quang," Time April 22, 1966, p. 27.
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Students of Vietnamese Communism view the character of the
alleged non-Communist leadership within the Liberation Front
as another indication that it is Communist controlled. Little is
known about these men, but what is known indicates that they
are, without exception, colorless figures with no significant
political standing. All have histories of left-wing activities....
[T]he Liberation Front does not control the Vietcong armed
forces, despite its claims to the contrary. Documentary evidence,
interrogation of prisoners and other intelligence data indicate
that guerilla units are directed by an organization known as the
Central Office for South Vietnam, or Cosvin as it is commonly
called here.
Cosvin is believed to be the senior Communist headquarters
in the South, reporting directly to the reunification department
of the Communist party in Hanoi and thus to the politburo.
Through its military affairs department, Cosvin acts as a high
command for the Vietcong guerrilla units ...
The Communist had hoped at the time of the Liberation
Front's formation in 1960 to attract prominent South Viet-
namese intellectuals, politicians and religious leaders .... None
have as yet joined the front .... Practically all prominent non-
Communist Vietnamese politicians, including Thich Tri Quang,
have repeatedly stated their belief that the front is controlled
by the Communists ... "
It should also be pointed out that even if all of the asserted political
grievances of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. were legally justified, in-
cluding the failure to hold elections, still they do not remotely constitute
an "armed attack" under any accepted definition of "armed attack"
within the meaning of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, or otherwise
present a self-defense situation justifying the use of the military instru-
ment by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. 46 As such, the evidence of
significant initiation and military assistance and direction of the con-
flict from Hanoi constitutes evidence of outside aggression in violation of
a major principle of the U.N. Charter and gives rise to appropriate
rights of self-defense in the Republic of Viet Nam, whether or not the
145. Neil Sheehan, "Hanoi's Troop Infiltration Said to Trouble Vietcong," N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1966, p. 1, col. 2 (city ed.), at p. 4, cols. 1-6. See also the articles by R. W. Apple,
Jr., "A Hanoi General May be In The South," N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1966, p. C 3, col. 1,
(city ed.); and Jack Raymond, "Vietnam: The Facts Behind the War," N.Y. Times, Feb. 6,
1966, p. 4E, col. 1.
146. See the discussion of "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51 at pp. 271-
309 infra and in the authorities cited pp. 271-94 inlra.
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attack was in response to legally justified assertions of breach of political
conditions in the Geneva Accords. 4 '
Documentation by the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam
with respect to the aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. may be
found in A Threat to the Peace, North Viet-Nam's Effort to Conquer
South Viet-Nam (1961) and Aggression from the North, The Record of
North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet-Nam (1965), two
reports issued by the U.S. Dept. of State, and Communist Aggression
Against The Republic of Viet-Nam (1964), and The Bogus War of Libera-
147. The principle of the U.N. Charter violated is, of course, the prohibition against
the use of force in international relations contained in Article 2, §§ 3 and 4.
With respect to the failure to hold elections in 1956 see generally Fall, How the French
Got Out of Viet-Nam in VIT NAm READER 81, at 87-91; MURTI, 178-195; Young, The
Southeast Asia Crisis, THE EIGHTH HAMMARSKJOLD FoRUM 5, at 109-114 (The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Working Paper 525/65/2, October 18, 1965).
The United States Government indeed did try to persuade President Diem
and his colleagues in Saigon to conduct the discussions for as long as necessary and
in elaborate detail with the communist authorities in a location which would have
been provided for this purpose in the demilitarized zone. However, as a matter of
policy, the government in Saigon decided that it should not and could not com-
promise its position by any such consultations. The governments of the United
States, France and Great Britain agreed jointly to persuade the governments in
Saigon otherwise, but, despite their efforts, they were not in any position to force
what they considered to be a sovereign government, recognized by many nations,
to undertake action which was considered detrimental, possibly leading to vital
harm, to the national interest and integrity of that independent state. At the
Summit Conference in July 1955 the Soviet delegation was apprised of this situa-
tion but did not show particular concern. In 1956 the Western governments were
of much the same opinion. The British and Soviet Co-Chairmen, anticipating that
the elections under Paragraph 7 would not take place, advised the Vietnamese au-
thorities in North Vietnam and in South Vietnam not to disturb the peace and
to cooperate with the International Commission. Apparently the Soviet Govern-
ment did not put any great pressure on its communist colleagues or on its Western
adversaries to enforce these so-called election provisions of the Geneva Agreements.
Id. at 113. (Kenneth T. Young, Jr. is the former United States Ambassador to Thailand.);
Tolischus, Elections in Vietnam, The New Leader, August 16, 1965, p. 9.
These elections were to be held in Vietnam in 1956. They were not, and the
impression has been spread that President Diem, prodded by the U.S., refused
to permit them for fear the Communists would win. That is not true. The United
States committed itself at Geneva to national unification elections supervised by
the United Nations for all partitioned countries, including Vietnam.
The Diem regime, which did not sign the Geneva Accords and did not consider
itself bound by them nevertheless agreed to the elections and in July 1955 de-
dared itself ready to discuss election procedures with Ho Chi Minh. But it
quite properly demanded that Ho first comply with the Geneva agreement by
creating the necessary conditions for free elections in the North, ending Communist
terror and totalitarian control and assuring liberties at least equal to those in the
South. These demands were repeated in 1958 and 1960.
Ibid. (Otto D. Tolischus is a Pulitzer Prize winning former member of the editorial board
of the New York Times.)
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tion in South Vietnam (1965), two reports issued by the Republic of Viet
Nam.
In testifying publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
April 20, 1966 Secretary of Defense McNamara said that his information
indicated that there were approximately 20,000 regular D.R.V. troops
presently operating in the R.V.N. and receiving "day to day and hour to
hour" direction from Hanoi, and that the infiltration rate from the D.R.V.
was continuing at the current rate of approximately 4,500 per month. He
also indicated that regular troops of the D.R.V. were operating in the
R.V.N. as early as 1964 and prior to commitment of United States combat
units as such.
And according to the United States Department of State:
In the three-year period from 1959-1961, North Viet Nam in-
filtrated an estimated 10,700 men into South Viet Nam.... The
gradual build-up of United States military assistance which
began in late 1961 was a direct and justifiable response to the
previous serious violations of the 1954 Geneva Agreements by
North Viet Nam. The aggression by Hanoi became substantial in
1959 and had intensified to dangerous proportions by late
1961....
It is now estimated that by the end of 1964 North Viet Nam
had infiltrated over 40,000 men into South Viet Nam. Most of
these men were infiltrated through the territory of Laos in plain
violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on the Neutrality of
Laos. Native North Vietnamese began to appear in South Viet
Nam in large numbers in early 1964, and in December 1964 full
units of the regular North Vietnamese army began to enter the
South. The latest evidence indicates that elements of the 325th
PAVN division began to prepare for the move south in April
1964....
The level of enemy activity increased sharply in 1965 and new
efforts were required to protect South Viet Nam from being over-
run. The number of incidents and large-scale enemy attacks
reached new highs, and the level of infiltration rose dramatically
over 1964. Final figures for 1965 are not yet available, but it is
estimated that seven regiments of the army of North Viet Nam
and thousands of other troops entered the South in 1965.148
Although the conclusions of the State Department "White Papers"
have been challenged with respect to the degree of indigenous v. outside
148. The Basis jor United States Actions in Viet Nam Under International Law 5
(Mimeograph U.S. Dept. of State).
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initiation, direction and assistance in the Viet Nam conflict,14 9 the totality
of evidence-whether or not all of the above evidence is accepted in its
entirety-strongly indicates that the campaign to overthrow the recog-
nized government of the Republic of Viet Nam by violence receives sub-
stantial military assistance and direction from the D.R.V. and suggests
that prior to any significant increases in United States assistance, D.R.V.
initiative was a critical element in the conflict. There can be no reasonable
doubt from the evidence that this was so prior to the commencement of
bombing of military targets in the D.R.V. in February, 1965 and the
introduction of United States combat units as such in the spring of 1965.
The statements and documents from representatives of third party states
as well as from the states directly concerned indicate international recog-
nition of this armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
This continuing aggression constitutes an "armed attack" within the
meaning of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and general prin-
ciples of international law, and is in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
Accords.
All of the frequently cited definitions of aggression from the most con-
servative to the broadest, apply to the D.R.V. activities. Many of these
definitions so closely fit these activities that they might well serve as
factual descriptions, especially written to describe the entire range of
those activities. Even the most narrowly conceived definitions apply to
a large portion of those activities and in their totality such activities cer-
tainly constitute an "armed attack" justifying use of the military instru-
ment in self-defense.
The findings of the International Control Commission and the evidence
discussed above indicate at least four categories of D.R.V. activities that
constitute aggression under customary international law and the United
Nations Charter. They are:
1. . . The PAVN has allowed the Zone in the North to be
used for inciting, encouraging and supporting hostile activities
in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Admin-
istration in the South.
2. Committing and encouraging acts of terrorism against the
government of the Republic of Viet Nam.
3. Violation of articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on
the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam.
4. Armed attack against the Republic of Viet Nam.'5"
149. See I. F. Stone, A Reply to the White Paper in GETTLEMAN, VIET NAM: HISTORY,
DOCUMENTS, AND OPINIONS ON A MAJOR WORLD CRISIS 317 (Fawcett ed. 1965), and in
VIET-NAm READER 155.
150. I.C.C. findings are quoted in part in Documents Relating to British Involvment in
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Each of these categories has the common characteristic of being di-
rected against the territorial and political integrity of the Republic of
Viet Nam and would seem to violate Article 2 (4) of the United Nations
Charter. In other words, such activities constitute highly intense attacks
of such impact as to create in the target state a reasonable expectation
that it must resort to the military instrument to preserve its political and
territorial integrity. This becomes evident when each of these categories is
considered in the light of the definitions of aggression under the United
Nations Charter and customary international law.
Fomenting Civil Strife and Aiding Rebellion in Another
State Constitute Aggression Under International Law
The United Nations has repeatedly condemned the creation of civil
strife by external elites using internal agents. Thus the General Assembly
said in Resolution 380-V.
The General Assembly... condemning the intervention of a
state in the internal affairs of another state for the purpose of
changing its government by the threat or use of force,
1. Solemnly reaffirms that whatever the weapons used, any
aggression, whether committed openly or by fomenting civil
strife in the interest of a foreign power, or otherwise is the grav-
est of all crimes against peace and security throughout the
world.' 5'
The General Assembly also condemned aid given by Yugoslavia, Bul-
garia, and Albania to Greek rebels in a manner significantly similar to
the D.R.V. activities. In Resolution 193 the General Assembly stated:
The Greek guerrillas have continued to receive aid and assist-
ance on a large scale from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
with the knowledge of the Government of those countries and
that the Greek guerrillas in the frontier have, as found by the
Special Committee:
(i) Been largely dependent on external supply. Great quanti-
ties of arms, ammunition and other military stores have come
across the border, notably during the times of heavy fighting....
(ii) Frequently moved at will in territory across the frontier
for tactical reasons, and have thus been able to concentrate their
the Indo-China Conftict 1945-1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834) at
195, 198. See also Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-
China, (Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command Paper, 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers, XXXIX (1961/62).
151. Resolution No. 380 (v) U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 13
at p. 17 (Doc. A 1775) Nov. 17, 1950 (emphasis added).
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forces without interference by the Greek army, and to return to
Greece when they wished..
(iii) Frequently retired safely into the territory of Albania,
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia when the Greek army exerted great
pressure.
3. Having noted further the conclusions of the Special Com-
mittee that a continuation of this situation constitutes a threat
to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece
and to peace in the Balkans and that the conduct of Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia had been inconsistent with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations....
5. Considers that the continued aid given by Albania, Bul-
garia, and Yugoslavia to the Greek guerillas endangers peace in
the Balkans, and is inconsistent with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations.
6. Calls upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cease
forthwith rendering any assistance or support in any form to the
guerillas in fighting against the Greek Government including the
use of their territories as a base for the preparation or launching
of armed action....
9. Recommends to all members of the United Nations and to
all other states that their Governments refrain from any action
designed to assist directly or through any other Government any
armed group fighting against the Greek Government .... 152
In article 2, paragraph 4 of the International Law Commission's Draft
of a Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the
I.L.C. condemned:
The organization, or encouragement of the organization, by
the authorities of a state, of armed bands within its territory or
any other territory for incursions into the territory of another
state; or the toleration of the organization of such armed bands
in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed
bands of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of
departure for incursions into the territory of another state as
well as direct participation in or support of such incursions. 5
In article 2(5) the "undertaking or encouraging by the authorities of a
152. Resolution 193 (iii) U.N. Ga. Ass. Orr. REc. 3d Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions pp. 18-20
(A/810) (1948) (emphasis added).
153. Adopted by the I.L.C., 3 June-28 July 1954, U.N. GEN. Ass. Osr. REc. 9th Sess.,
Supp. 9, p. 10 at 11 (A/2693).
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state of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another state"'15 4 is
condemned.
Such legal disapproval of a state's fomenting civil strife in another
state by offering sanctuary, military aid and encouragement to rebels
seeking to overthrow the government of the other state are not peculiarly
Western points of view. Communist nations have long purported to con-
demn the same activity. Thus in a draft resolution presented to the
General Assembly in 1954 the USSR labeled as aggression "Support of
armed bands organized in its own territory which invade the territory of
another state. . ... ,155
In the same resolution the USSR labels as indirect aggression an act
which creates "An internal upheaval in another state or a change of
policy in favour of the aggressor."' 56
Such definitions of aggression have historical precedent for the Soviet
Union. In 1933 the USSR concluded a treaty with Rumania, Poland,
Afghanistan, Persia, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, and Finland. Article 2(5)
labelled as aggression the "Provision of support to armed bands formed
in its territory that have invaded the territory of another state. . .. ""'
Such practices and pronouncements, taken together, constitute strong
authority that the International Control Commission's findings that the
DRV "has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encourag-
ing, and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at
the overthrow of the Administration in the South"' 58 amounts to a finding
that the D.R.V. has committed aggression against the R.V.N.
Committing and Encouraging Acts of Terrorism in the
Republic of Viet Nam Constitute Acts of Aggression
Under International Law
The finding of the Legal Committee of the International Control Com-
mission-according to the Canadian representative-that those who op-
posed the D.R.V.-Viet-Cong effort to overthrow the government of the
Republic of Viet Nam were "threatened with punishment and in certain
cases such punishment has been effected by the carrying out of death
sentences" constitutes a finding of aggression under international law.
154. Prepared by I.L.C. 16 May-27 July 1951, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 6th Sess. Supp.
9. p. 10 at 12 (A/1858).
155. Article 1(f), USSR, Draft Resolution 18 Oct. 1954 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., 9th
Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 51, at 6 (A/C. 6/L332) (Rev. 1).
156. Id. at art 2(c).
157. 147 L.N.T.S. 69, at 73. The treaty is also found in BRiGrs, LAW OF NATIONS 969,
at 970 (1952).
158. See Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-
1965, supra note 150, at 195, 198.
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The seriousness of these acts of terrorism under international law can
be appreciated only when the specific form they take is considered. The
acts of terrorism are designed to have the greatest possible impact on
what the United Nations Charter refers to in Article 2 (4) as the "political
independence of [a] state." The acts of terrorism are directed at school
teachers and village chiefs and others whose effective performance of
their duties is vital to the functioning of the recognized Government of
the Republic of Viet Nam. Whether the persons attacked are popular or
unpopular, such activities encouraged by the D.R.V. constitute aggression
under international law.
The dangerous impact such acts of terrorism may have on the peace of
the world is appreciated by customary international law as interpreted
by the practice of states and the law of the United Nations as interpreted
by the International Law Commission.
The International Law Commission condemns as endangering "the
peace and security of mankind,"
... the undertaking or encouragement by the authorities of a
state of terrorist activities in another state or the toleration by
the authorities of a state of organized activities calculated to
carry out terrorist acts in another state."9
Similarly the Soviet draft resolution labels as indirect aggression an act
which "Encourages subversive activity against another State (acts of
terrorism, diversionary acts, etc.).""'
Violation of the Military Cease-Fire Provisions of the 1954
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam
Constitutes Aggression Under International Law
The International Law Commission has stated that international peace
and security is endangered by
Acts by the Authorities of a State in violation of its obligation
under a treaty which is designed to ensure international peace
and security by means of restrictions or limitations on arma-
ments, or on military training, or on fortifications, or of other re-
strictions of the same character.''
A fortiori this provision would certainly seem to condemn as an offense
against peace and security the violation of a military cease-fire line in a
non self-defense situation; a violation which creates in another state a
well grounded apprehension that its territorial or political integrity is
159. See article 2(6), ILC Draft Code, supra note 154, at 12.
160. Par. 2(a) USSR, Draft Resolution, supra note 155, at 6. (emphasis added).
161. See I.L.C. Draft Code, supra note 154, at 12.
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militarily threatened. The treaty violations by the D.R.V. meet these re-
quirements.
The International Control Commission found that the D.R.V. had vio-
lated articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostilities. Each of these articles provides for the limitation of military
activities. 62
Article 10 provides for the complete cessation of armed hostilities in
Viet Nam. 6'
Article 19 requires that the parties shall ensure that the zones assigned
to them ". . . are not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further
an aggressive policy."' 64
Article 24 requires that "The armed forces of each party shall respect
the demilitarized zone and the territory under the military control of the
other party. .. 165
Article 27 places responsibility for insuring the performance of the
agreement on the commanders of the respective parties. 66
The cumulative effect of these findings of treaty violations is a finding
by a competent international body of aggression against the Republic
of Viet Nam by the D.R.V.
Armed Attack is Universally Considered Aggression
Under International Law
Even apart from violation of any specific treaty provisions armed attack
is universally considered an act of aggression justifying the use of the
military instrument in self-defense.'67
The D.R.V.'s armed attack upon the Republic of Viet Nam, involving
the use of significant numbers of regular troops of the D.R.V., is without
legal justification. Their claims of violation of the election provisions of
the Geneva accords would not, even if legally valid, justify such attacks.
Such political questions pose no real threat to the operation of the gov-
ernmental machinery or to the territorial integrity of the D.R.V. and
cannot be considered an "armed attack" on the D.R.V. within the meaning
of Article 5 1 of the United Nations Charter. This principle of interna-
162. The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities may be found in Further Documents
Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Conference (Miscellaneous No. 20






167. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
[Vol. 5:235
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO VIET NAM
tional law that political conditions in another state do not justify individual
armed attack is widely accepted. In its draft resolution on aggression the
USSR states in paragraph 6:
The attacks referred to in paragraph 1 [armed attacks] and
acts of economic, ideological and indirect aggression... may not
be justified by any considerations of a political, economic or
strategic nature.... In particular, the following may not be used
as justification:
A. The internal situation of any state, as for example
(b) Alleged shortcomings of its administration.
(e) Establishment or maintenance in any State of any
political, economic or social system.'68
This principle would also seem to be applicable in the case of armed
attack across an international cease-fire line.
Thus, the whole spectrum of acts of aggression, ranging from the direct
and coarse to the indirect and subtle has been catalogued. Such aggression
in its totality constitutes an armed attack within the meaning of Article
51 of the United Nations Charter. This attack is directed at the territorial
and political integrity of the Republic of Viet Nam reasonably creating
expectations in that state that it must use the military instrument to
protect itself.
Professor Kelsen supports this interpretation that such activities con-
stitute armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter:
Since the Charter of the United Nations does not define the
term "armed attack" used in article 51, the members of the
United Nations in exercising their right of "individual or col-
lective self-defense" may interpret "armed" attack to mean not
only an action in which a state uses its armed force but also a
revolutionary movement which takes place in one state but which
is initiated or supported by another state. In this case the mem-
bers could come to the assistance of the legitimate government
against which the revolutionary movement is directed.'69
168. USSR Draft Resolution, supra note 155, at 6-7. (emphasis added).
169. KELsEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1954), XLIX
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INT. LAW STUDIES 1954 (1956). Brownlie states:
In the present connexion it might be argued that "armed attack" in article 51
of the Charter refers to a trespass, a direct invasion, and not to activities described
by some jurist as "indirect aggression." But providing there is control by the princi-
pal, the aggressor state, and an actual use of force by its agents, there is "armed
attack."
See Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 260 (1961).
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In any event, the infiltration of regular troops of the D.R.V. army would
alone seem to satisfy anyone's definition of "armed attack" under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter. The evidence suggests that even this
was taking place prior to the introduction of United States combat units
as such and the bombing of the D.R.V.
United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam
Is Lawful Under Customary International Law
and The United Nations Charter
The right of the Republic of Viet Nam to request military assistance
and of the United States to grant such a request is well established in inter-
national law. This right is derived from three sources, any one of which
would be sufficient alone to support the United States military aid to the
Republic of Viet Nam. The sources are (1) customary international law,
(2) the right of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter, and (3) the right of regional self-defense, of which the
collective assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam and the regional defense
structure of the South East Asian Treaty Organization are examples. The
cumulative effect of these mutually reinforcing strands of authority is to
confer upon the United States military presence in Viet Nam strong legal
credentials. This can be best appreciated by first considering each of -the
component parts of the legal authority and by then taking an overview of
the complete structure.
Customary International Law Authorizes the
United States Military Assistance
The right of a state which is attacked (externally or internally) to in-
vite other states to assist in its defense and the right of the invited state
or states to render assistance is supported in both the ancient and con-
temporary practices of states. The invitation and response may result
from the authority of a treaty or the necessity of the moment: Vattel
noted that "... . they who are not tied by a treaty may for their own con-
duct, take the merit of the cause into consideration, and assist the party
which they shall judge to have right on its side, in case this party shall
request their assistance, or accept the offer of it . *,27o That the right
to request and render defensive assistance is not an occasionally permitted
departure from a general rule is indicated by Woolsey who states "...
there is nothing in the law of nations which forbids one nation to render
assistance to the established government in such case of revolt, if its
assistance is invoked. The aid is not interference ....
Not only is the rendering of military assistance to a widely recognized
government under attack a legal right; in some contexts it may become
170. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 490 (1829) (emphasis added).
171. WOOLSEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (1st ed. 1860) (emphasis added).
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a necessity for the maintenance of world order and genuine self-deter-
mination. This is especially true where the attack is wholly or partly
external and assistance is needed to protect the autonomy or self-deter-
mination of the requesting state.
One contemporary scholar, Professor Richard Falk, has written that
in some situations the failure to render military assistance to the legiti-
mate government might constitute intervention on behalf of the other
side whether or not such was the intention." 2 The legal principle of non-
interference is based on the need to promote internal autonomy, or self-
determination; conversely when the situation is such that the failure to
give military assistance would result in the defeat of a legitimate govern-
ment with a consequent defeat of the principle of self-determination, then
such a failure to give assistance on request may even be regarded as illegal
intervention on the other side. Falk applies this principle to the world com-
munity as it is currently composed by stating that "Furthermore it is
evident that the existence of an important aggressor or 'expanding'
state in the world community makes non-intervention impossible. A re-
fusal to exert influence to balance the opposing exertion of influence does
not protect the internal autonomy of the third state, it merely forfeits its
destiny to the expanding state .... Eventually such forbearance will pro-
duce the threat of interference to one's own public order autonomy. That
is, to a large degree non-intervention must be a universally shared and
practiced ideal if it is to be feasible for any state. '173 Lauterpacht indicates
that military assistance upon request may not be properly termed inter-
vention whether the attack is internal or external because intervention im-
plies a "dictatorial interference."'1 74 Lauterpacht further indicates that
customary international law permits defense agreements to preserve a
form of government against coerced change. He says that "a state that has
guaranteed by treaty the form of government of another state. . . has a
right to intervene in case of a change in the form of government ....
The practice of states is replete with examples of the exercise of the
right to request defensive assistance and the right of the invited state to
render such assistance. One frequently cited example bears significant
similarity in its context to the Viet Nam situation. In 1826, Spain was
playing a role similar to that of the D.R.V. by rendering military assist-
ance and sanctuary to insurgents who were supporting the pretender to the
throne of Portugal in an effort to overthrow the regency. 7 6 Pursuant to
request Great Britain dispatched a corps of troops to assist Portugal. This
172. Falk, The United States and the Doctrine of Nonintervention in the Internal
Affairs of Independent States, 5 HOWARD L.J. 163, 168 (1959).
173. Id. at 173.
174. I OPPENHEIf, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955).
175. Id. at 309.
176. WHEATON, LAW OF NATIONS 90 (1836).
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example which is cited by Wheaton, Lauterpacht and others as evidence
of customary law is significantly relevant to the situation in Viet Nam.'
The right under customary international law of an attacked state to
request, and the invited state to render, aid is plainly applicable to the
cooperative effort of the United States and the Republic of Viet Nam.
The Viet Nam conflict cannot be fairly characterized as civil war with
respect to choice of legal rules to be invoked, because there are, as has
been pointed out, substantial expectations that the Republic of Viet Nam
and the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam are separate states under inter-
national law, and in any event the D.R.V. has been providing significant
armed assistance to the Viet-Cong in violation of the core of an interna-
tional cease-fire line. However, there is substantial authority that the
right of the Republic of Viet Nam to request and of the United States to
render military assistance remains in full force even if the Viet Nam
conflict could be appropriately characterized as a civil war. Lauterpacht
notes that when those opposing the recognized government are mere in-
surgents or rebels that third states may assist the government but not the
insurgents, and Garner seems to hold the view that international law per-
mits third states to assist only the recognized government in a civil war
situation.' Applied to the Viet Nam conflict this means that even if
there were no contextual differences from a civil war the United States
assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam would still be lawful but the
aid of the D.R.V. to the Viet-Cong would be illegal. Lauterpacht further
notes that if the rebels attain the status of belligerency then the conflict
becomes an international war and it would seem that in a context of
international conflict third states may assist the recognized government
in defending itself against international attack.170 Therefore even if the
The contemporary practice of states under the United Nations Charter provides ample
support for military assistance to widely recognized governments even in civil conflict situ-
ations. Professor Sohn, in a recent letter to the authors, has called attention to several recent
examples. He cites among other examples:
4. When military revolts tried to overthrow the Governments of Kenya,
Uganda and Tanganyika in 1964, these Governments asked for British assistance and
no objection was raised by anybody to it, though attempts were made later to
replace the British troops with African troops.
5. Similarly, when revolts started in Gabon and other French-speaking West
African states in 1964, French troops were invited to restore peace.
Consequently, there are ample precedents for United States action in Vietnam.
Letter from Louis B. Sohn, Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard, April 21, 1966.
177. WHEATEN, LAW OF NATIONS 90 (1836); I OPPENHEUM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 305
(8th ed. Lauterpacht, 1955).
178. II OPPENHEni, INTERNATIONAL LAW 660 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952). See the
discussion of Garner's views in note 179 infra.
179. Ibid.
The majority of commentators seem to support the view that even in a civil war
situation military aid may be rendered to the widely recognized government. The majority
also seems to support the view that aid may not be rendered to the rebels as such, at
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Viet-Cong were purely indigenous to the R.V.N., received no outside
assistance, and were considered to have attained the status of belligerency,
there is still authority that the United States assistance to the Republic of
Viet Nam would be lawful. The Viet-Cong, however, not only receive out-
side assistance but do not meet the requirements of belligerency, which are
said to include some stability of control over territory and people, the
least prior to achieving belligerent status. See note 181 infra for a discussion demonstrating
that the N.L.F.-Viet-Cong has not achieved belligerent status under international law. In
a comment on the Spanish Civil War Garner notes that:
there is no rule of international law which forbids the goverment of one state from
rendering assistance to the established legitimate government of another state with
a view to enabling it to suppress an insurrection against its authority . . . . If
assistance is rendered to the legitimate government it is not a case of unlawful
intervention as is the giving of assistance to rebels who are arrayed against its
authority.
Garner, Question of International Law in the Spanish Civil War, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 66,
68 (1937). Professor Borchard has also taken the position that the recognized government
and the rebels should not be treated alike. In his view international law permits military aid
to the recognized government but it ". . . requires that revolutionists receive no aid or
comfort . . . ." Borchard, "Neutrality" and Civil Wars, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1937)..
Writing of the Spanish Civil War, Professor O'Rourke states:
Until an insurrection has achieved the status of belligerency, it would seem,
therefore, that the established government may expect partial treatment from third
powers. Non-intervention, which treats both Combatants impartially, amounts to
neutrality. While one appreciates the diplomatic dilemma which gave birth to the
policy, unless a recognition of belligerency was implicit in the move, non-intervention
is legally incorrect.
O'Rourke, Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 398, 410
(1937).
Garner further notes that the Institute of International Law determined that:
Among the obligations of foreign Powers in respect to the legitimate govern-
ment is the duty "not to furnish to the insurgents either arms, munitions, military
supplies or financial aid" or to "allow a hostile military expedition against an
established and recognized government to be organized within their domains."
Garner also points out that:
• . . among the jurists who supported the resolutions were Holland, Westlake,
Rolin-Joequemyns, Pierantoni, Brusa, Renault and Von Bar. This also appears to
be the view of all reputable text-writers who have discussed the subject, among
whom may be mentioned Rougier, Hyde, Oppenheim, Weiose, Ferand-Giraud,
Fiore and La Pradelle.
Garner, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 66, 68 (1937).
Professor Friedmann has indicated that this seems to be the prevailing view. He states:
"What is probably still the prevailing view is that the incumbent government, but not the
insurgents, has the right to ask for assistance from foreign governments, at least as long
as insurgents are not recognized as 'belligerents' or 'insurgents.'" Friedmann, Intervention,
Civil War and the Role of International Law, 1965 PRoc., Am. Soc. INT'L L. 67, 72.
Garner takes the position that even recognition of belligerency of the rebels does not
permit states to render military aid to the rebels. 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 66, 69-70 (1937).
As has already been noted, Vattel seems to have taken the position that either side can
be lawfully aided in a civil war context, although it may be doubtful whether the rebels may
be aided prior to belligerency. See note 170, supra.
A minority of commentators, which apparently consists principally of Quincy Wright
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maintenance of an established government, and observance of the rules
of war. Greenspan notes, for example, that to be considered belligerents
the opponents of the recognized government must observe the rules of
war. 8 ' The Viet-Cong, though, have repeatedly broken the laws of war-
fare. Many of these violations take the form of acts of terrorism directed
against the civilian population, including village officials, school teachers
and ordinary farm laborers. 8' The rising tempo of terrorism is indicated
by this statement made by Bernard Fall:
Statistics now began to pile up inexorably: 452 village chiefs
were lost by South Viet Nam in 1957-58. By January, 1960 they
were being lost at the rate of fifteen a week. On May 25, 1961,
President Kennedy told Congress that minor officials were being
killed in Viet Nam at the rate of 4,000 a year: eleven a day. In
1964, over 1,500 small officials were lost, and over 400 during the
first four months of 1965.182
and Sir William Hall, seem to espouse the view that the mere existence of a rebellion of
which the outcome is uncertain is sufficient to make the recognized government incompetent
to ask for military assistance from another state. See Wright, United States Intervention
in the Lebanon, 53 Amd. J. INT'L L. 112, 121-122 (1959); HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, § 94, p. 347 (8th ed. 1924). Hall, however, would not seem to apply this doctrine to
situations where the military opposition to the government is externally assisted or directed.
He recognizes as legal, military assistance which is designed to check intervention in the
affairs of the assisted state by a third state. He notes that: "Interventions which have for
their object to check illegal intervention by another state are based upon the principle that
a state is at liberty to oppose the commission of any act, which in the eye of the law is
wrong. . . ." He further states that: "It has already been seen that the existence of a right
to oppose acts contrary to law, and to use force for the purpose when infractions are
sufficiently serious, is a necessary condition of the existence of efficient international law."
Id. § 92, at 341-42.
Therefore, in situations in which the rebels are unlawfully receiving external military
assistance and direction the authorities are unanimous or nearly so in saying that the widely
recognized government may receive defensive military assistance. Any meaningful concept
of self-determination strongly supports this conclusion.
180. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 18-19 (1959).
181. See Id. at 170-171 for a discussion of Article 33, Geneva Convention IV, 1949
prohibiting reprisals against the civilian population. At 155-156 Greenspan indicates that
such conventions are considered to embody customary law and are considered binding on
non-signatories. The rules of the conventions, being declaratory of customary law, would
thus be relevant in determining whether or not the insurgents have gained belligerent status.
With respect to the laws of war it might also be pointed out that the attempts of the
International Red Cross to enforce the rights of American prisoners of war to send and
receive mail have been rebuffed by the D.R.V. The D.R.V., though a signatory to the
relevant convention, has characterized its American captives as "war criminals" and not
POW's. Moreover, the N.L.F. does not consider itself bound by these conventions. See N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1966, p. 3, col. 5. The explicit denials by the N.L.F. that the rules of
customary law embodied in these conventions apply to it, are another indication that
the N.L.F. can not be considered to have gained belligerent status. For a discussion and
quotation of the relevant articles, articles 69-74 of Geneva Convention III, 1949 on POW's
see GREENSPAN, op. cit. supra note 180, at 126-128. See also the discussion in note 303 infra.
182. VIET-NAm READER 257.
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School teachers, whose job was to prepare the people for self-govern-
ment, were among the most frequent victims.1 8 A typical example of
Viet-Cong activities directed against civilians engaged in such pursuits
as growing food is the recent killing by a Viet-Cong mine of 54 farm work-
ers riding in civilian buses. 4 It would seem that just with respect to this
element alone, the Viet-Cong are far from having achieved a belligerent
status. Moreover, the status of belligerency, as historically understood,
grows out of internal revolt. Here, however, there is substantial evidence,
noted above, that the Viet-Cong receive significant direction and control
from the D.R.V., and that there was significant initiation of the conflict
from the D.R.V.
In summary, customary international law affirms the right of the
Republic of Viet Nam to request defensive aid and the right of the United
States to grant such aid. The United States was invited in by the widely
recognized government of the R.V.N. No successor government has
asked us to leave. In fact, the present Chief of State, as well as civilian
leaders opposed to the present government, have recently reaffirmed
their desire for continued United States assistance. 8 5
The Right of Collective Self-Defense Under Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter Authorizes United States Military
Assistance
The right under customary international law of one nation to assist
another in defense against aggression is reaffirmed by Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter which takes cognizance of the "inherent" right
of individual and "collective self-defense." Several distinguished scholars
believe that the phrase "collective self-defense" used in the Charter not
only reaffirms the right of self-defense but in at least one sense expands it.
Lauterpacht has stated the principle as follows:
It will be noted that, in a sense art. 51 enlarges the right of
self-defense as usually understood and the corresponding right
of resort to force by authorizing both individual and collective
self-defense. This means that a member of the United Nations
is permitted to have recourse to action in self-defense not only
when it is itself the object of armed attack, but also when such
183. In a recent article Senator Edward Kennedy stated that "school teachers have
been the prime targets of terrorism" conducted by the Viet-Cong. See Hearings on S. 2793
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 109-110
(1966). Senator Kennedy further noted that in 1965 alone over 11,000 civil servants-a high
proportion of them teachers-were killed, abducted or wounded by the Vietcong. Ibid.
184. Time, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 32.
185. See Joint Communique, Chiefs of State R.V.N. and U.S., part III, par. 9 and
part IV, in N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1966, p. 14, col. 8. See also the statement by Thich Tri
Quang at note 125 supra.
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attack is directed against any other state or states whose safety
and independence are deemed vital to the safety and inde-
pendence of the state thus resisting or participating in forcible
resistance to the aggressor.186
McNair is in substantial agreement when he says "... the phrase
individual or collective self-defense leaves something to be desired, but its
significance lies in the fact that it enlarges the right of self-defense by
authorizing and legalizing collective action...""'
Collective Self-Defense May Be by Non-Contiguous States
The origins of Article 51 of the Charter as well as the practice of
states under that article indicate that states which are not geographically
contiguous may assist each other by collective self-defense. The origins of
the article at the San Francisco conference creating the United Nations
indicate that those who adopted it had in mind mutual defense acts by
states which were not contiguous as well as those which were. In the
debates concerning the term "collective self-defense" an exchange
occurred between the representatives of the USSR and the United
Kingdom. The two representatives indicated agreement on two significant
points. First, they agreed that the term extended to "agreements such as
the Anglo-Soviet and French-Soviet pacts."'88 Secondly, they agreed
that such agreements were "clearly not regional pacts."' 89 No dissent
186. II OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 155 (7th ed. Lauterpacht 1952).
187. McNAIR, LAW Op TREATIEs 579 (1961) (emphasis added).
188. 17 U.N. CoNT. INT'L. ORG. Doc. 396.
189. Ibid. The mistaken belief that Art. 51 permits collective self-defense only by
contiguous states may stem from the fact that for a time prior to the adoption of the
U.N. Charter the San Francisco Conference labelled the article which eventually became
Art. 51 as Art. 52. Article 52 finally became the number given to an entirely different
article which deals with regional arrangements. See 17 U.N. CONT. INTr'L. ORG. Doc. 492,
which records what finally became Art. 51 as being Art. 52 of the skeleton charter.
Not only is geographical proximity not a pre-requisite for membership in regional
defense organizations under Article 51 of the Charter, but neither are cultural, historic,
linguistic or spiritual ties necessary. At the San Francisco Conference, an Egyptian proposal
to include such ties as necessary elements in the definition of regional arrangements was
defeated in Committee 111/4 by a vote of 29 to 5. See 12 U.N. CONF. INT'L. ORG. Doc. 701-02.
The defeated proposal stated:
There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent
nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of
their proximity, community of interest or cultural ties, linguistic, historical or
spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of
any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and
security in their region as well as for the safeguarding of their interest and develop-
ment of their economic and cultural relations.
12 U.N. CONF. INT'L. ORG. Doc. 850. In the debates prior to the defeat of the Egyptian
proposal the delegate of the United States stated:
While the language submitted by the delegate of Egypt clearly defined obvious
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from this view is recorded in a meeting that included representatives
from countries widely varying in their ranks in the world's power
spectrum.
The practice of states under Article 51 has indicated that geographical
contiguity of the parties is not a requirement of collective self-defense.
For example, Denmark and Greece, widely separated countries, are both
parties of NATO.' 90 This alliance has existed for 17 years without having
been regarded as illegal for lack of contiguity and historical or ethnic
ties of some party states. Another example of a defense pact concluded
between non-contiguous countries is the Baghdad (now CENTO) Pact
which at one time included Iraq and Great Britain who were hardly next
door neighbors. 9'
Collective Self-Defense Does Not Require Prior
Security Council Approval
Three factors combine to demonstrate that collective self-defense may
be taken without prior authorization of the Security Council. They are:
(1) the wording of Article 51 itself, (2) the origins of Article 51 as seen
at the San Francisco conference, and (3) the practice of states subsequent
to adoption of Article 51. This section will take up these factors one at a
time.
1. The terms of Article 51. Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations until the
legitimate and eligible factors for a regional arrangement, it was probable that it
failed to cover all the situations which might be embraced by regional arrangements.
12 U.N. CoNF. INT'L. ORG. Doe. 701.
Without taking note of these United Nations records or citing any authority for the
proposition the Memorandum of Law of Lawyers Committee on American Policy toward
Vietnam states that:
The concept that the United States-a country separated by oceans and thousands of
miles from southeast Asia and bereft of any historical or ethnic connection with the
peoples of southeast Asia-could validly be considered a member of a regional system
implanted in southeast Asia is utterly alien to the regional systems envisaged in the
charter.
112 CONG. REC. 2551, 2554 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). The prevailing evidence clearly indicates
that there are no such restrictions on regional defensive organizations under Article 51 of the
Charter. In any event, it is generally accepted that any assistance to a state engaged in
lawful self-defense is authorized pursuant to Article 51 whether or not such assistance is
pursuant to action under a regional system.
190. For the text of the NATO Treaty of April 4, 1949, see TIAS 1964, 63 Stat. 2241
(1949).
191. Accession of the U.K. to the Pact of Mutual Cooperation Between Turkey And
Iraq Signed At Baghdad on Feb. 24, 1955, (Miscellaneous No. 5 [1955], Command Paper
9429).
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Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by members
in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
The use of the term "inherent" is significant. The inherent right of
self-defense under customary international law was not limited by a
requirement that prior approval be obtained from a central mechanism.
The use of the term "inherent" can be taken to mean that the Charter
reaffirms the lack of such prior restraint. It is also significant that the
requirement for prior Security Council authorization appears in a
different chapter (VIII) from the one (VII) in which Article 51 is
found and that requirement does not refer to collective self-defense but
rather to chapter VIII "enforcement" action. In addition, the use of the
phrase "until the Security Council has taken measures" indicates that
action may be taken before the Security Council acts.
2. The origins of Article 51. The diplomatic negotiations at the
San Francisco conference which established the United Nations indicate
that the very reason for the insertion of Article 51 was a desire to avoid
the necessity of obtaining prior approval of the Security Council for
collective self-defense. Several of the Latin American delegations were
afraid that their ability to take collective defensive measures could be
destroyed by a big-power veto in the Security Council.'92 Article 51 was
therefore inserted in order to avoid the possibility that a major power
could render other states legally defenseless without the ability to take
action on their own or receive aid from the Council. It should be recalled
at this point that the right of collective self-defense expressed by Article
51 applies to both non-regional and regional defensive action and is not
limited to the right of the Latin American countries. 9 '
The record of the debates in the Senate on the advice and consent to
the ratification of the SEATO treaty indicate that the Senate was also
acting pursuant to the understanding that Article 51 collective defense
action did not require prior Security Council approval.' 94
3. The practice of states under Article 51. The practice of states as
indicated by a succession of mutual defense pacts entered into subsequent
192. RUSSELL & MUTIER, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 668-713 (1958).
193. 17 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Doc. 396.
194. The Senate's concept of the relation between Article 51 self-defense action and the
Security Council is discussed below in the section of this article dealing with SEATO. See
note 202 infra.
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to the adoption of the Charter indicates that in the opinion of the parties
prior approval by the Security Council of defensive action is not required.
Each of these agreements makes direct reference to Article 51 of the
Charter and interprets that provision in the manner that its terms clearly
demand, i.e., that initial action may be taken by the aggrieved party and
its allies and that such action may continue until it is effectively replaced
by Security Council measures. In order that it may be seen that such an
interpretation is widely shared even by non-Western nations, the first
example quoted will be the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance of 1955 signed by the Soviet Union, Albania,
Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Re-
public, the Polish People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic,
and the Czechoslovak Republic. Article 4 of the Treaty provides:
In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of
the Parties to the Treaty by any state or group of states, each
of the Parties in the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to in-
dividual or collective self-defense in accordance with Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization, shall
immediately, either individually or in agreement with other
Parties to the Treaty, come to the assistance of the state or
states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary in-
cluding armed force. The Parties to the Treaty shall immediately
consult concerning the necessary measures to be taken by them
jointly in order to restore and maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken on the basis of this article shall be
reported to the Security Council in conformity with the pro-
visions of the Charter of the United Nations Organization.
These measures shall be discontinued immediately when the
Security Council adopts the necessary measures to restore and
maintain peace and security.'95
Moreover, such an interpretation of Article 51 is not confined to the
principal capital exporting powers. A quotation from the Joint Defense
and Economic Cooperation Treaty (1950) of the Arab League concluded
between Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Lebanese Republic,
Egypt, and Yemen demonstrates this. Article 2 of that Treaty provides
that:
The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression
made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to
be directed against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the
right of self-defense individually and collectively they under-
195. For complete text see Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents 1919-
1955, STAFF OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE 84TH CONG., 2D. SESS., 551 (Comm.
Print 1956) [hereinafter cited as Disarmament and Security].
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: take to go without delay to the aid of the state or states against
,which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to
take, individually and collectively, all steps available, including
the use of armed force, to repel aggression and restore security
and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact
and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League
Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such an
act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check
it. 196
Ruth Lawson summarizes the relationship of collective defense organ-
izations to the Security Council as follows:
The relationship of contemporary regional and global organ-
izations is worthy of special comment. The collective defense
organizations based on the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio,
Manila, Baghdad, and Warsaw pacts are ultimately grounded in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which with notable
prescience legitimized collective defense against armed attack
without Security Council authorization.'97
U.N. Members May Act in the Collective Self-Defense
of Non-Members
The practice of states since the signing of the Charter has indicated
that it is the genuine expectation of the World Community that United
Nations member states may conclude collective defense arrangements
with non-members. At the time of the conclusion of the NATO Treaty
two of the parties, Italy and Portugal were not members. 9 " Kelsen
states ". . . according to an almost generally accepted interpretation of
196. Id. at 622 ff.
197. LAWSON, INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATION VI (1962).
That collective defense action under Article 51 is entirely different from "enforce-
ment action" which under articles 52 can be taken only with prior Security Council approval
is indicated by Kunz. He states:
As in municipal law, self-defense under Art. 51 is not a procedure to enforce
the law, is not designed to punish the aggressor or to obtain indemnities, is not
an enforcement action by the United Nations, but serves primarily to repel an illegal
armed attack.
See Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 872, 876 (1947). From this it would seem that Article 52
"enforcement action" is action by the United Nations, through its own forces or those of a
regional agency to which it has delegated authority to enforce international law concerning
aggression or to take other action collectively authorized by the United Nations. Prior
approval of the Security Council is required before a regional body can take such "enforce-
ment action" on behalf of the world organization. Prior approval is not required, however,
before a nation or group of nations can act in collective defense pursuant to Article 51,
whether acting under a regional arrangement or not.
198. KELSEN, op. cit. supra note 169, at 128.
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Article 51 the right of collective self-defense may also be exercised in
case of an armed attack against a non-member state."1 99 Apparently no
international law scholar has ever seriously suggested that the United
Nations Charter prohibits the right of self-defense of non-members or of
the right of members to assist in the collective self-defense of non-
members.
The various arrangements made between the United States and the
Republic of Viet Nam amount to a collective self-defense request. These
arrangements are composed of such acts as the exchange of letters be-
tween President Eisenhower and Premier Diem, and President Thieu's
recent reaffirmation of the desire for United States assistance. 0 0 The close
interaction between the two governments as demonstrated at the recent
Honolulu conference is a further indication of this collective defense
arrangement.
SEA TO Regional Defense Agreement is Based
on Article 51 and Covers the R.V.N.
The institutional framework of the United States military assistance
to the Republic of Viet Nam is provided by the SEATO regional defense
agreement 20 1 which is firmly rooted in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter which expanded the concept of self-defense to provide for such
collective arrangements. Senator Mansfield, a member of the United
States delegation to the conference which established SEATO, made
clear the relation of SEATO to Article 51 when he told the Senate that:
The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty is consistent
with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. The treaty
would come under the provisions of Article 51, providing that
nothing contained in the United Nations Charter shall deprive
199. Id. at 88. Waldock, in speaking of the interpretation that Article 51 does not
permit U.N. Members to act in defense of non-members states, ". . . we know this inter-
pretation of the words was completely rejected by the United Nations with respect to
the invasion of South Korea." See, BRaiRLY, LAW Or NATIONs 305 (6th ed. Waldock 1963).
Without noting Kelsen and Waldock, in fact, without citing any authority, the
Memorandum of Law of Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam implies
that because Article 51 speaks of "an armed attack against a member of the United Nations,"
that "neither the right of individual .. .nor .. .collective self-defense can become operative"
with respect to the R.V.N., a non-member of the United Nations. See 112 CONG. REC.
2552, '2554 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). The authority is clearly against such an interpretation.
And as a policy question such an interpretation makes even less sense. It -would mean, for
example, that the People's Republic of China would have no right to individual or collective
defense.
200. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 3, col. 2. See also note 185 supra.
201. The text of the SEATO Treaty may be found in Background Information Relating
to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, United State- Senate 62
(Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
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one of the states from the individual or collective right of self-
defense.20
Senator Mansfield further noted in the same speech that measures
taken under Article 51 "do not need prior approval of the Security
Council...
The legal structure created by this agreement is composed of two
strands: (a) the umbrella of protection extended by the treaty to the
Republic of Viet Nam2°5 and (b) repeated action on the part of the
Republic of Viet Nam indicating acceptance of this protection.
The SEATO Treaty was concluded in September 1954 by Thailand, the
Philippines, Australia, Pakistan, France, New Zealand, Great Britain
and the United States.2 4 The primary purpose of the treaty was to
insure self-determination of the peoples of Southeast Asia by insuring
the territorial and political integrity of the states into which they were
organized. 0 5 While Viet Nam was not a party to the treaty the free
territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet Nam was designated
by the parties as a protocol state as to which the treaties' protection
against aggression extended.0 6 Such protection was not intended by the
parties to the agreement to be forced on Viet Nam or any other protocol
state. Article 4(3) states, "It is understood that no action on the
territory of any state designated by unanimous agreement [as a protocol
state] or on territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation
or with the consent of the government concerned.""0 7 The Republic of
Viet Nam has consented to the over-all protection of the Treaty and has
requested the particular defensive assistance currently being rendered by
several parties to the Treaty. A treaty may confer a benefit, on a country
not a party, if the parties to the treaty are clear and unequivocal as to
their intention to confer such a benefit. 2 8 The parties to the SEATO
Treaty made their intention to confer the benefit clear and the Republic
of Viet Nam made clear its acceptance. In 1957 a joint declaration was
issued by President Eisenhower and President Diem of the Republic of
Viet Nam. In this statement specific recognition was given to the
application of the SEATO treaty to the Republic of Viet Nam. Because
of the importance of this statement as an indication of the Republic of
202. 101 CONG. REC. 1055 (1955).
203. See the Protocol to the SEATO treaty in Background Information Relating to
Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 66
(Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
204. Id. at 62, 65.
205. See Preamble to the SEATO treaty, Id. at 62.
206. See the Protocol to the SEATO treaty, Id. at 66.
207. Id. at 63.
208. BRIGGS, LAW OF NATIONS 871 (1952).
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Viet Nam's approval of the SEATO shield of protection the two final
paragraphs of the declaration will in large part be quoted:
President Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem
noted ... the large buildup of Vietnamese communist military
forces in North Vietnam during the past 2-1/2 years, the harsh
suppression of the revolts of the people of North Vietnam in
seeking liberty, and their increasing hardships .... In particular
they agreed that the continued military buildup of the Chinese
Communists, their refusal to renounce the use of force, and their
unwillingness to subscribe to standards of conduct of civilized
nations constitute a continuing threat to the safety of all free
nations in Asia. To counter this threat, President Ngo Dinh
Diem indicated his strong desire and his efforts to seek closer
cooperation with the free countries of Asia.
Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is covered by Article IV
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President
Eisenhower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggres-
sion or subversion threatening the political independence of the
Republic of Vietnam would be considered as endangering peace
and stability. The just settlement of problems of the area by
peaceful and legitimate means within the framework of the
United Nations Charter will continue to be the mutual concern
of both governments. Finally, President Eisenhower and Presi-
dent Ngo Dinh Diem expressed the desire and determination
of the two governments to cooperate closely together for free-
dom and independence in the world." 9
The SEATO treaty has proved to be more than an abstract framework
within which to discuss the theory of collective self-defense. Since the
SEATO Council contains several Southeast Asian nations among its
members, it is one of the better suited deliberative bodies of the World
Community to judge aggression and its effects on self-determination of
the peoples of that area. As has been mentioned previously, the Council
has on two occasions, 1964 and 1965,210 adjudged that aggression was being
committed by North Vietnam against the Republic of Viet Nam. This
regional finding has been effectuated by military support on the part of a
majority of the countries composing SEATO. Combat troops have been
contributed by Australia and New Zealand. Thailand has given support
209. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate 73-74 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
210. See notes 137-38 supra. The decision to render military assistance to the R.V.N.
pursuant to SEATO can be validly made by individual members as well as by the SEATO
Council as such. Ruth Lawson notes that under both the SEATO and NATO treaties
1... the commitment to act in event of armed attack is a matter for unilateral decision..
LAWSON, INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 276 (1962),
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by permitting its territory to be used as the site of air bases for supporting
operations against aggression aimed at the R.V.N. The Philippines has
indicated that it will dispatch some 2,000 support troops."' It should be
noted that another Asian country, South Korea, though not a party to
the SEATO Treaty has contributed some 20,000 combat 'and support
troops for the collective defense effort and has recently indicated that it
will double this amount. 1 -
In summary, the SEATO treaty has at least the following bearing on
the legality of military assistance to the Republic of Viet Narm: It
creates an international body to some extent capable of making a de-
termination as to the existence of aggression against area countries; by
extending its protection to the Republic of Viet Nam it recognized that
that country was the potential object of aggression; the R.V.N. completed
the institutional structure for its defense by explicitly acquiescing, in the
SEATO protection; the SEATO Council has explicitly determined on
two occasions the existence of external aggression from North Viet Nam
against the R.V.N.; the terms of the treaty (Art. IV) permit defensive
assistance to protected countries upon request; and such request was
made by the Republic of Viet Nam to which a majority of the SEATO
states are rendering some assistance.
These determinations and actions indicate that in the opinion of the
assisting SEATO parties the Republic of Viet Nam was competent to
make a request for military assistance and that the request was proper.
The Fundamental Principle of Self-Determination
The principles of customary international law and Article 51 collective
self-defense are but separate manifestations of a larger principle: self-
determination. Taken separately each of the principles discussed Appears
to furnish legal support for the United States presence in the R.V.N.
Their cumulative effect is seen in the principle of self-determination.
This principle would seem to require that if there are ambiguities in
customary international law and the United Nations Charter, they should
be interpreted in a way to promote the genuine freedom of choice of
the Republic of Viet Nam to determine its own form of government and
society.
The right of self-determination has frequently found expression in the
practice of the United Nations. One example that is conspicuously
relevant to the Viet Nam situation is the United Nation's treatment of the
crisis confronting Greece immediately after the Second World War. In
that crisis military assistance was rendered to the Greek government by
the United States and Great Britain to oppose rebels who had been
211. New Haven Register, April 11, 1966, p. 1, col. 5.
212. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1966, p. 7, col. 1.
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receiving arms, ammunition, other military assistance and sanctuary
from the communist governments of Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
Far from condemning the actions of the United States and Great Britain,
the United Nations gave effect to the principle of self-determination by
noting that a continuation of the action of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia "constitutes a threat to the political independence and territorial
integrity of Greece and to peace in the Balkans and that the conduct of
Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had been inconsistent with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ..
This principle of self-determination would also seem to require that
the United States continue to examine its policies in Viet Nam to ensure
that alternatives are effectuated which maximize the genuine freedom of
choice of the people of the Republic of Viet Nam.
THE UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN VIET NAM ARE LAWFUL
The Defensive Use of the Military Instrument by the United
States and the Republic of Viet Nam Was Necessary
Under international law there are two requirements for the use of the
military instrument in lawful self-defense, necessity and proportion-
ality.2 14 The first. of these requirements of lawful self-defense, necessity,
has clearly been met; the factual basis has been discussed in the pre-
ceding sections.
Armed attack launched from and by the D.R.V., civil strife fomented
by the D.R.V., acts of terrorism inspired by the D.R.V., and cease-fire
violations committed by the D.R.V. are acts directed at the Republic of
Viet Nam's territorial and political integrity. Such acts created a situation
of overwhelming necessity under either traditional international law
standards or the United Nations Charter for a limited military response
in self-defense directed at interdicting the aggression from the D.R.V.
Many of the International Control Commission findings and other
evidence demonstrating the necessity for use of the military instrument
against the D.R.V. indicate that an armed attack occurred as early as the
period from 1959 to 1962 or even earlier and was accelerated thereafter.
The bombing of the D.R.V. did not begin until February 1965. This time
lag between attack and response indicates that according to still another
criterion, time, the D.R.V. is an aggressor in its actions against the R.V.N.
213. General Assembly Resolution 193 (111) para. 3, supra note 152.
214. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 217-218 (1961).
There is . . . increasing recognition that the requirements of necessity and propor-
tionality as ancillary prescriptions (in slightly lower-order generalization) of the
basic community policy prohibiting change by violence, can ultimately be subjected
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The second requirement of lawful self-defense, proportionality of the
response, has also been met.
The Defensive Use of the Military Instrument by the United States
and the Republic of Viet Nam is Proportional
The military response of the United States and the Republic of Viet
Nam has been aimed at interdicting the D.R.V. aggression against the
R.V.N. and has been carefully limited to those resources of the D.R.V.
which contribute to that aggression.
This is most clearly demonstrated as to the bombing of the D.R.V. by
Secretary of Defense McNamara's account of how the targets were
selected with that objective in mind:
The airstrikes have been carefully limited to military targets,
primarily to infiltration targets, to transit points, to barracks,
to supply depots, to ammunition depots, to routes of communica-
tion, all feeding the infiltration line from North Viet-Nam into
Laos and then into South Viet-Nam.
More recently there have been added to this target system
railroads, highways, and bridges which are the foundation of
the infiltration routes. ...
The primary emphasis has been placed upon the routes south
of 20 degrees north .... Hanoi is at about the 21st parallel. ...
Our strikes are concentrated on the lines of communication
running south and east and west, south of 20 degrees.
.... The basic objective of the strikes has been to inhibit, to
reduce, to deflect, the movement southward of men and material.
We have sought to deny them the use of their primary lines of
communication and to force dependence on an inadequate secon-
dary road system and inadequate means of support.
The strikes have been designed to increase the dependence on
an already overburdened road transport system by denying the
use of the rail lines in the South. In summary, our objectives
have been to force them off the rails onto the highways and off
the highways onto their feet....
These carefully controlled rail strikes will continue as neces-
sary to impede the infiltration and to persuade the North
Vietnamese leadership that their aggression against the South
will not succeed....
Q. Mr. Secretary, what efforts are made to avoid killing
civilians in our airstrikes?
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A. Each target is chosen after a very careful review of all
reconnaissance photographs. We have carried out very complete
reconnaissance of this entire area. Each target is chosen after
careful review of reconnaissance photographs to insure that it
is isolated and separate and apart from urban population or
civilian population areas.216
The proportionality of the airstrikes is indicated not only by the limited
nature of the targets but also by the manner in which the airstrikes have
been used to serve the diplomatic objective: a negotiated settlement.
The bombing has been stopped twice: once for approximately a week and
again for 37 days.2 16 Both pauses were to encourage the D.R.V. to
negotiate. Both peace overtures were substantially disregarded by the
D.R.V.2 17
The ground operations conducted by the United States and the Re-
public of Viet Nam also conform to the requirements of proportionality.
This is true both as to the number of the troops involved and the nature
of the operations.
In a recent address at Yale University, Bernard Fall noted that the
optimum ratio of counter-guerrilla troops to guerrillas is 10 or 15 to 1.218
Occasionally an even higher percentage is necessary. In Malaya the
percentage was 55 to 1219 According to Fall, the recent figures indicate
that the ratio of United States-R.V.N. troops to D.R.V.-Viet-Cong troops
is approximately 3-1/2 to 4 to 1.220 Such figures indicate that far from
being excessive, the United States-Republic of Viet Nam troop strength
could be increased several fold above current levels and still remain
easily within the bounds of proportionality.
The nature of the military operations conducted by the Republic of
Viet Nam and the United States is appropriate to the exercise of the
right of self-defense.2 2 1 A large number of the military operations have
been clearing operations designed to assert control over Viet-Cong in-
fluenced areas and thus make possible a return of normal governmental
215. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate 210-12 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
216. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
217. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 7, for an announcement by Ho Chi Minh
refusing offers from the U.S. for unconditional peace negotiations. See Secretary Rusk's
news conference, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1966, p. 2, cols. 3-8. See also President Johnson's
news conference announcing the resumption of the bombing of the D.R.V., N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 1966, p. 1, col. 1.
218. Address by Bernard Fall, Yale University, March 3, 1966.
219. Ibid.
220. Ibid.
221. See Newsweek, April 18, 1966, p. 28
1966-1967]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
12supervision over these areas.22 Operations thus conceived are directly
related to the territorial and political integrity of the Republic of Viet
Nam.
Other operations which deliberately seek out D.R.V. and Viet-Cong
troops in the R.V.N. and engage them in battle are also appropriate to
the exercise of the right of self-defense. The legal Committee of the
International Control Commission has found that a D.R.V.-Viet-Cong
objective is the overthrow of the recognized Government of the Re-
public of Viet Nam. It would seem, then, that all operations within the
R.V.N. against such troops, whether the troops are transient or hold
particular territory, are appropriate measures to insure the territorial
and political integrity of the Republic of Viet Nam.
THE UNITED STATES HAS MET ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
At the conclusion of his term in February 1966 as President of the
United Nations Security Council, Akira Matsui of Japan said in a letter
to the members of the Council that differences of view on the question of
Viet Nam had "given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune
for the Council to hold further debate at this time."2" This was in-
dicative of the unfortunate response to efforts on the part of the United
States to utilize the machinery of the United Nations for seeking peace in
Viet Nam. These efforts show full compliance by the United States with
the requirement of Article 51 of the Charter that "Measures taken by
members in self-defense shall immediately be reported to the Security
Council." They further show full compliance by the United States with
the requirements of Article 33 that settlement by peaceful diplomatic
means be attempted of any dispute that is "likely to endanger inter-
national peace and security." The response by the Security Council and
U.N. officials to these efforts indicates that the United Nations is
presently reluctant to exercise its prerogative under Article 36 to "recom-
mend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." Furthermore,
the response indicates that the Security Council did not deem it neces-
sary to take any action which under Article 51 would require a cessation
of defensive action by the United States and the Republic of Viet Nam.
These efforts and the response will be examined in detail chronologically.
On August 2, 1964 and again on August 4, 1964 United States ships
were attacked in international waters by torpedo boats from the D.R.V.
224
222. Ibid.
223. Quoted in United Nations Press Service Release WS/231, 4 March, 1966.
224. Statement by U.S. Ambassador Stevenson to the Security Council August 5, 1964,
in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate 124-25 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
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Between the first and second attacks the United States complied with
Article 33 by communicating its displeasure in a note to the Hanoi re-
gime.225 These peaceful efforts resulted in the second attack by the D.R.V.
vessels. The United States then conducted a limited and measured
response in the form of air strikes on the docking and supporting
facilities of the torpedo boats.2 26
The very next day this defensive action was reported to the Security
Council by United States Ambassador Stevenson. This desire of the
United States to use the peace seeking facilities of the United Nations
sharply contrasts with the attitude of the Hanoi regime. In a statement
made on August 8, 1964 the Government of the D.R.V. made the following
statement: "The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Viet
Nam stresses that the United Nations Security Council has no right to
examine this problem.... ,2
The next defensive action against the D.R.V. was also immediately
reported to the Security Council.229 On February 7, 196520 Hanoi con-
trolled Viet-Cong attacked the United States installation at Pleiku causing
loss of American lives. The incident was a calculated escalation in a
context of increasing armed attack from the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
and United States forces advising in their defense. The limited and
measured response directed at this increasing armed attack was aimed at
the staging areas in the D.R.V. from which guerillas infiltrated into the
Republic of Viet Nam,23' and has continued to be aimed at interdicting
this armed attack.
The Security Council, after having been clearly informed of the
United States action, made no effort to replace United States action with
action of its own as it had a right to do under Article 51. The inability of
the United Nations to take such action was clearly demonstrated by
Secretary-General U Thant at a news conference on February 24, 1965.
225. Id. at 125.
226. Ibid.
227. Id. at 124.
228. U.N. SEcuRITY COUNCiL OFF. REC., 19th year, Supp. July, August, September 1964
at 170 (S/5888). In contrast to this D.R.V. attitude, the R.V.N. communicated with the
President of the Security Council on August 13th & 15th, 1964, offering its full co-operation
in the investigation of the incident, calling attention to the overall problem of aggression from
the D.R.V., submitting several R.V.N. "white papers" containing factual evidence of that
aggression to be circulated as official Council documents, and offering to accredit a delegation
to the Security Council to participate in debates on the incident. See The Bogus War of
Liberation In South Vietnam 43-47 (The Republic of Vietnam, June 1965).
229. Letter from Ambassador Stevenson to Security Council President, Feb. 7, 1965 in
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate 149-151 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
230. Ibid.
231. Id. at 150.
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Question: ... If no progress is made toward negotiations, might
you feel compelled unilaterally to step into the breach and bring
the matter to the Security Council?
The Secretary General: I do not think that is a practical
proposition, for reasons that are obvious and well known to you.
The government of North Viet-Nam has all along maintained
that the United Nations is not competent to deal with the ques-
tion of Viet-Nam since, in its view, there is already in existence
an international machinery established in 1954 in Geneva.
They have all along maintained that position and, as you all
know, it is a position also maintained by the Peoples Republic of
China. As far as the United Nations is concerned, I think the
greatest impediment to the discussion of the question of Viet-
Nam in one of the principal organs of the United Nations is the
fact that more than two parties directly concerned in the ques-
tion are not members of this organization. I therefore do not
see any immediate prospect of useful discussion in the Security
Council... . 2
The United States has made continuous efforts of the sort envisaged
by Article 33, i.e., diplomatic attempts to bring about negotiations. Such
attempts were made continously but were most dramatically emphasized
by the two pauses in the limited and measured bombing of the D.R.V.
The first occurred in May 1965 after President Johnson's April speech
at John Hopkins University calling for unconditional negotiations. 33 A
232. Press Conference, Feb. 24, 1965, quoted in ViET-NAm READER 263, 267 and in
Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict
in Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam No. 3 [1965], Command Paper 2756), at 21. See also the July 10:
Report From "The Times": U Thant's Visit To London.
U Thant declined to comment on the visit of Mr. Harold Davies to Hanoi, but
on the suggestion that the United Nations should be involved in Vietnam he said
that China and North Vietnam had always maintained that international machinery
already existed to cope with the question of Vietnam.
'In their view,' he said, 'the United Nations should not, and must not, be
involved in trying to find a peaceful solution to the problem.'
U Thant said that he did not think, therefore, that there was any immediate
prospect of United Nations' involvement. Primarily the question of Vietnam was, he
said, linked more with the Geneva Agreement of 1954.
Id. at 109.
233. Speech of President Johnson, April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins University printed
in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate 197 (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965).
The extensive efforts of the United States, Britain, Canada, and a number of non-
aligned nations to achieve a peaceful solution pursuant to Article 33 of the Charter through
negotiation, the machinery of the Geneva Accords and the machinery of the United Nations
have been consistently refused by the D.R.V., the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of
China. See the documents contained in Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote
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a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Viet-Nam (Viet-Nam No. 3 [1965], Command
Paper 2756). By way of indicative extracts:
Preface. Id. at 7:
As will be seen from document No. 12, Mr. Gromyko (who visited London
at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government from March 16 to 20) was unwilling
to consider a joint message of an uncontroversial nature and said that in the
prevailing circumstances it would be inappropriate even to discuss the possibility
of convening an international conference. Much to the regret of Her Majesty's
Government, therefore, and in spite of repeated efforts to induce the Soviet Govern-
ment to reconsider their attitude, subsequent British efforts to promote negotia-
tions on Viet-Nam have perforce been unilateral and their effectiveness has been
greatly diminished by the absence of the traditional cooperation ....
The story of these unilateral British efforts, together with those made by many
other Governments and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, is set
out in the other documents now published. In spite of the discouraging responses
from China, North Viet-Nam and the National Front for the Liberations of South
Viet-Nam, Her Majesty's Government intend to persevere in their efforts ....
February 11: Mr. Kosygin's Visit To North Viet-Nam: Joint Communique (Extract). Id.
at 18.
The two sides unanimously declared that the only correct way to settle the South
Vietnam problem is: The USA must correctly implement the Geneva Agreements,
end at once the aggressive war, withdraw all its troops, military personnel and
weapons from South Vietnam, stop all interference in South Vietnam's affairs and
let the South Vietnamese people settle by themselves their internal affairs.
March 10: Statement by Huynh Tan Phat, the Leader of the Delegation of the South
Viet-Namese Liberation Front to the Indo Chinese Peoples' Conference at Phnom Penh. Id.
at 24.
When asked why the SVNLF supported the proposal for the convening of new
Geneva conferences on Laos and Cambodia and did not consent to hold such a
conference on the South Vietnam question, Huynh Tan Phat said that every country
had its specific conditions. . . . [F]irst and foremost, the US imperialists should
withdraw all their troops, military personnel, arms and war material from South
Vietnam and leave the South Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs.
March 15: Declaration by the Seventeen Non-Aligned Countries. Id. at 25.
We . . . make an urgent appeal to the parties concerned to start . . . negotiations,
as soon as possible, without posing any precondition. ...
March 16: Note on Contacts Between the Co-Chairmen. Id. at 28.
When Mr. Gromyko visited London from March 16-20 at the invitation of
H.M. Government, the question of negotiations on Viet-Nam was discussed in
detail with him by the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. During the course
of these conversations, Mr. Gromyko rejected the idea put to him by the Foreign
Secretary that the two co-Chairmen might agree on a message in terms sufficiently
objective to be mutually acceptable to other members of the Conference. He also
rejected the Prime Minister's proposal that the two co-Chairmen should actually
reconvene the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and expressed the view that, until
what he called American aggression in Viet-Nam had been terminated, it would
be inappropriate even to discuss the possibility of calling a conference.
April 1: The Foreign Secretary's Speech to the House of Commons (Extracts). Id. at 38-40.
What we have had to struggle with during these last weeks is a situation where
the repeated attitude of the Communist side was that it saw no need for negotia-
tions or a conference at all. It has sometimes been suggested that this attitude of the
Communist Powers can be blamed on us; that if we had been prepared to engage
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in phrases condemnatory of the United States, or to dissociate ourselves from its
actions, we should have got a better response. But I think that we should notice
what response others have been getting-France, India and Yugoslavia.
The French approach glanced at, but no result from it; the Indian ignored and
the People's Daily, in Peking, saying on March 22, of the Yugoslav initiative, "the
Tito clique serves America" and going on to say that President Tito had no right
to express opinions about Vietnam ...
It might be said that the United States Government should spell out more fully.
what was required as a satisfactory assurance by North Vietnam that it was prepared
to cease attacks on the South, or that the United States should describe the exact
process through which a cease-fire might be reached, or that it should describe more
fully how it pictures the future of Vietnam, for all these things must at some time be
part of the discussion.
It is difficult for the United States to do this so long as there is no indication
from the other side of its preparedness to consider a settlement on any terms. If and
when there is a clear indication to that effect, when the other side communicates in
any form that it desires a cessation of hostilities, or considers there is room for
negotiation, then the door would be open and there would be something which could.
be regarded as a basis for negotiation; and then the thoroughly sound proposition
that this whole problem must have a political and not merely a military solution
could become alive and real.
April 8: Reply by the United States Government to the Declaration by the Seventeen Non-
Aligned Countries. Id. at 49-50.
We welcome the concern and interest of the governments participating in the
declaration of March 15; just as we welcome any initiative aimed at bringing peace
to any part of the world. The declaration is a constructive contribution to the
effort for peace ...
There may be many ways to this kind of peace. In discussion or negotiation
with the governments concerned, in large groups or in small ones, in the reaffirmation
of old agreements or their strengthening with new ones.
We have stated this position over and over again, to friend and foe alike. And
we remain ready-with this purpose-for unconditional discussions.
April 8: Speech by Mr. Pham Van Dong (The Four Points) in North Viet-Nam (Extracts).
Id. at 51.
It is the unswerving policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam to strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, and to
correctly implement their basic provisions as embodied in the following points:
1. . . . According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must with-
draw from South Vietnam all U.S. troops, military personnel and weapons of all
kinds, dismantle all U.S. military bases there, cancel its "military alliance" with
South Vietnam. It must end its policy of intervention and aggression in South
Vietnam. According to the Geneva Agreements, the U.S. government must stop
its acts of war against North Vietnam, completely cease all encroachments on the
territory and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. ...
3. The internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Viet-
namese people themselves, in accordance with the programme of the South Vietnam
National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference. ...
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is of the view that
the above-expounded stand is the basis for the soundest political settlement of the
Vietnam problem. If this basis is recognized, favourable conditions will be created
for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem and it will be possible to con-
sider the reconvening of an international conference along the pattern of the 1954
Geneva Conference on Vietnam.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that any ap-
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proach contrary to the above stand is inappropriate; any approach tending to
secure a U.N. intervention in the Vietnam situation is also inappropriate because
such approaches are basically at variance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on
Vietnam.
April 11: "Observer" Article in the Peking Peoples' Daily "Johnson's Big Swindle" (Ex-
tracts). Id. at 52-53.
As a matter of fact, the talk about "unconditional discussions" is a swindle
pure and simple ...
The South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation solemnly declared some
time ago that 'all negotiations with the U.S. imperialists at this moment are utterly
useless if they still refuse to withdraw from South Viet Nam all their troops and
all kinds of war materials and means and those of their satellite countries, if they
still refuse to dismantle all their military bases in South Viet Nam, if the traitors
still surrender the South Vietnamese people's sacred rights to independence and
democracy to the U.S. imperialists and if the South Viet Nam National Front
for Liberation-the only genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese
people-does not have its decisive voice.' . . .
If the American aggressors refuse to quit South Viet Nam, the only road open to
them is one of total defeat .... We would like to tell the Johnson Administration:
whatever you have done or may possibly do, the Chinese people will staunchly side
with the Vietnamese people and fight shoulder to shoulder with them to the end
for the complete defeat of the American aggressors.
April 12: Article in the Peking Peoples' Daily "Serious Advice for U Thant" id. at 54-55.
According to Western press reports, U.N. Secretary-General U Thant has on
more than one occasion of late indicated his intention to visit China and the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to 'inquire about' what he calls 'the possibility
of achieving a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam.'
- If U Thant is undertaking this activity in the capacity of U.N. Secretary-
General, then we should like to tell him in all seriousness to spare himself the
trouble.
The Viet Nam question has nothing to do with the United Nations. The 1954
Geneva agreements were reached outside the United Nations, and the latter has
no right to interfere in the affairs of Viet Nam or of Indo-China as a whole. It
is the responsibility of the Geneva Conference participant nations to uphold the
Geneva Agreements, and no meddling by the United Nations is called for, nor
will it be tolerated. This is the case; it was so in the past, and so will it remain
in the future....
The United Nations has never taken a just stand on the Viet Nam question. It has
absolutely no say concerning a settlement of the South Viet Nam question ....
In short, U.N. intervention in affairs of Indo-China cannot be tolerated ....
We would like to advise U Thant: save yourself the trouble. There is nothing
for the United Nations to do in Viet Nam, neither is it qualified to do anything
there.
April 12: Reply by the Chinese Government to the British Co-Chairman's Message of
April 2. Id. at 57-58.
. . . [T]he Chinese Government hereby states to the British Government that
in the present circumstances it is not suitable for a special representative of the
British Government to contact the Chinese Government on the problems of Viet
Nam and Indo-China, and that he is not welcome.
April 14: Reply of the Canadian Government to the Declaration of Seventeen Non-Aligned
Countries. Id. at 60.
The Canadian Government welcomes the spirit in which this appeal has been
launched and commends the sponsoring nations for their initiative which reflects
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the anxiety of all responsible nations of the world over the deepening crisis in
Vietnam and their concern for a peaceful resolution of the conflict....
Discussions or negotiations, however, require a willingness of both sides to
participate. The Canadian Government earnestly hopes therefore that all the other
interested governments will respond affirmatively to the appeal as a demonstration
of their concern for peace, and that they will not hesitate to take up the offer
of unconditional discussions made by the President of the United States of America.
April 22: Editorial in the Peking Peoples' Daily on the Declaration of the Seventeen
Non-Aligned Countries (Extract). Id. at 66-67.
The Viet-Namese people will never agree to negotiations "without any pre-
conditions." They have on more than one occasion made clear their stand ...
Frankly speaking, the 17-Nation "appeal" completely cater to the interests
of United States imperialism and has become a shield in the hands of the Johnson
Administration to ward off worldwide condemnation of and opposition to the
United States crimes of aggression.
Why has the 17-Nation "appeal" catered so much to the needs of United States
imperialism? Credit should be given to the Tito clique of Yugoslavia.
It is common knowledge that from beginning to end the document was master-
minded and created by the Tito clique. As early as March 2 this year, Tito wrote
to Johnson urging "negotiations" with "neither party putting forward any pre-
conditions," and stressing that this would "directly benefit" the United States.
Johnson immediately replied. He bestowed high praise upon Tito and added that
"in your conversations and communications with the leaders of other countries,
you will reflect this understanding." These instructions from the United States boss
sent the Titoites scurrying everywhere, and soon the "appeal" was produced.
May 13: Statement to the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary: Mr. Gordon
Walker's Tour. Id. at 78-79.
It was a disappointment that the Chinese and North Vietnamese refused to
see Mr. Gordon Walker. It is also regrettable that even the Soviet Government are,
so far, only willing to contemplate negotiations on Cambodia rather than on
Vietnam.
May 15: Note on a Meeting Between Mr. Gromyko and the Foreign Secretary in Vienna.
Id. at 80.
The Foreign Secretary again raised with Mr. Gromyko the question of con-
vening the Geneva Council on Indo-China, arguing that the sooner this took place
the better, but Mr. Gromyko could not agree that the Soviet Union should take
part in negotiations on this subject.
June 3: Statement in the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary id. at 86-87.
I must tell the House that at present a barrier is erected at the very
beginning of the road. That barrier is the refusal of the Governments of North
Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union to negotiate at all.
July 19: Prime Minister's Speech in the House of Commons (Extracts). Id. at 111-116.
On more than one occasion we have tried to use the good offices of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. His proposed peace tour secured the same
result as the unofficial visit of Mr. Gordon Walker. The Indian representative was
rebuffed, the seventeen non-aligned nations were rebuffed, and France was rebuffed.
More recently we secured the almost unanimous Commonwealth support for a
Commonwealth Mission on Vietnam, and again Peking and Hanoi refused to
accept the Mission. . ..
... [T]o get a political solution means getting men round a table. Every effort
to do this-whether through the Co-Chairmen, whether through the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, whether through the French initiative, whether
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through my right hon. Friend's message to the Heads of the Geneva Conference
Governments, whether through the initiative of the 17 non-aligned countries,
whether through the initiative of the Commonwealth Peace Mission and subsequent
attempts to get acceptance of that Mission-has so far foundered on the unwilling-
ness of Hanoi, and, to the extent to which China accepts responsibility for these
matters, of Peking to agree to negotiations. I do not think that there will be any
disagreement with that proposition.
• .. [A]ll these attempts have established the willingness of the United States,
the Government of South Vietnam and of the majority of the Geneva parties
to have negotiations. No further diplomatic approaches are necessary with them.
July 30: Text of a Letter on Viet-Nam Sent by Mr. Goldberg to the President of the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations. Id. at 124-25.
Members of the Council also are aware of the prolonged and repeated efforts
of the United States Government to open a path to peaceful solution of the disputes
of South East Asia, beginning with our acceptance of the terms of the Geneva
Accords of 1954. These efforts have included:
various approaches to Hanoi, Peking and Moscow;
support of peaceful overtures by the United Kingdom, Canada, and the British
Commonwealth of Nations;favourable reactions to proposals made by seventeen non-aligned nations, and
later by the Government of India;
approval of efforts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to initiate
peace talks;
endorsement of a larger role for the United Nations in South East Asia, in-
cluding a United Nations Mission of Observers along the frontier between Viet
Nam and Cambodia, a United Nations Mission to investigate alleged suppression
of minority rights in Viet Nam, and a United Nations invitation to Hanoi to
participate in Security Council discussions of the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin;
major participation, directly and through the United Nations, in economic and
social development projects in South East Asia;
a direct appeal by the President of the United States to the members of the
United Nations to use their influence in bringing all parties to the peace table;
repeated assertions on the highest authority that the United States is prepared
to engage in negotiations or discussions of any character with no prior conditions
whatever.
On at least fifteen occasions in the past four-and-a-half years, the United States
has initiated or supported efforts to resolve the issues in South East Asia by peace-
ful negotiations.
I am sure that the other members of the Security Council share the deep regrets
of my Government in the fact that none of these initiatives has met with any
favourable response whatever. It is especially unfortunate that the rigime in Hanoi,
which, along with the Republic of Viet Nam, is most directly involved in the
conflict, has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this
dispute in any manner and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the
Council.
See also the Renmin Ribao Observer editorials reprinted in SUPPORT THE PEOPLE OF VIET
NAM, DEFEAT U.S. AGoRESSORS II (Foreign Languages Press Peking 1965).
• .. President Ho Chi Minh has solemnly declared to the world:
To settle the South Viet Nam question, the United States must, first of all,
withdraw from South Viet Nam, let the South Vietnamese people decide for
themselves their own affairs, and stop its provocative attacks against the
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
The Chinese Government and people fully support President Ho Chi Minh's state-
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further pause of 37 days took place beginning December 24, 1965.284
During this period U.S. diplomatic missions to many of the world's states
indicated the U.S. desire for negotiationsY 5 This lengthy pause concluded
on January 31, 1966 without having received a favorable response from
Hanoi. On January 28, 1966, Hanoi, in letters to the heads of several
states, reiterated its unwillingness to engage in unconditional negoti-
ations .2
36
On January 31, 1966 the United States again sought the assistance of
the United Nations in its peace keeping efforts .1 7 Ambassador Goldberg
ment. They are resolved, together with the Vietnamese people, to carry to the end
the joint struggle to oust the U.S. aggressors from Viet Nam.
Renmin Ribao Editorial April 12, 1965, "Solemn Pledge of the Thirty Million Vietnamese
People." Id. at 7-8.
Only the withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from South Viet Nam can create the
indispensable pre-condition for the peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam question
in accordance with the Geneva agreements and provide a reliable guarantee for the
Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs and to achieve the peaceful reunifica-
tion of their motherland.
Renmin Ribao Editorial April 16, 1965, "People of the World, Act Now and Force the U.S.
Aggressors to Get Out of Viet Nam I" id. at 29, 32.
234. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 8.
235. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1965, p. 1, col. 8; id. p. 7, col. 1; id. p. 6, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Dec. 31, 1965, p. 1, cols. 7-8.
For a recent indication of the continuing United States efforts to achieve a peaceful
settlement see N.Y. Times, June 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 6 (city ed.).
Through Peking and other diplomatic channels, the Administration . . . has
sent a new message to Hanoi pledging willingness to cease bombing if North Viet-
nam, under some form of international verification, stops infiltrating troops into
South Vietnam ... .
Thus far, according to highly placed officials, there has been no reaction from
Peking or Hanoi to the two American initiatives.
Ibid.
236. See the N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1966, p. 1, col. 7, for a statement by D.R.V. President
Ho Chi Minh rejecting U.S. offers to negotiate. See also note 233 supra.
237. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1966, p. 1, col. 4, p. 12, cols. 2-6. Ambassador Goldberg's
January 31, 1966, request that the Security Council consider the Vietnamese conflict and
adopt the United States resolution calling for an international peace conference clearly
complies with the requirements of Article 37 of the Charter. Article 37(1) states as follows:
Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to
settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security
Council.
Article 33 states:
(1) The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution
by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own-
choice. ...
Thus the wording of Articles 37 and 33 would seem to require, or at the least permit,
the parties to a dispute to attempt a diplomatic settlement among themselves before they
refer the matter to the Security Council. Prior to January 31, 1966, the U.S. was engaged
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placed formally before the Security Council a draft resolution calling for
immediate negotiations without preconditions. The draft resolution
provided that:
The Security Council, deeply concerned at the continuation
of hostilities in Vietnam,
in extensive diplomatic efforts to interest the D.R.V. in negotiations. See note 233 supra.
Thus it can not be said that the U.S. unlawfully delayed formally presenting the Viet Nam
controversy to the U.N. for it was acting in compliance with the spirit of Articles 33 and
37 that settlement among the parties be first attempted before the dispute is referred to the
Security Council. Moreover, there was some feeling that premature referral to the United
Nations might inhibit the possibility of a negotiated settlement by freezing the positions
of the parties in the resulting debate.
The United States presented evidence of the nature of the Viet Nam conflict on February
27, 1965, in the form of a paper entitled "Aggression from the North (S/6206)." The
presentation of evidence not only satisfies the reporting requirement of Article 51, it goes
beyond that requirement.
A clearer understanding of United States compliance with the requirements of the
Charter can be gained if U.S. approaches to the U.N. are considered in tabular form. Op-
posite the U.S. approaches are found the articles of the Charter with which the acts comply.
This list of Public U.S. Communications to the Security Council and Secretary-General
is printed in Hearings on S. 2793 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th
Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1 at 634-35 (1966). The listing of the Charter Articles with which the
acts comply represents the conclusions of the authors of this paper and is not to be found
in the committee print.
PUBLIC U.S. COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
SECRETARY-GENERAL
51 & 37- 1. August 5, 1964.-Letter from Ambassador Stevenson requesting a
Security Council meeting on the Tonkin Gulf incidents (S/5849).
2. September 9, 1964.-Ambassador Stevenson informed the Security
Council President of U.S. views on the report of the Security Council
Mission to Cambodia and Vietnam dated July 27, 1964. In particular,
he commended the report's suggestions looking toward the establish-
ment of a group of U.N. observers and the resumption of political
relations between Cambodia and Vietnam. He concluded that im-
plementation of the report's recommendations represented "practical,
although limited, steps by which the U.N. can exercise its peace-keeping
responsibilities and contribute to a reduction of tension in southeast
Asia" (S/5955).
51- 3. February 7, 1965.-Letter from Ambassador Stevenson informing
the Council members, in accordance with article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter, of the air attacks against military installations in North Vietnam
which were undertaken by the United States and Government of Viet-
nam in response to increasing infiltration from the north and expanded
attacks by Vietcong forces in the south (S/6174).
51- 4. February 27, 1965.-Ambassador Stevenson's letter to the Security
Council President forwarding for the information of all U.N. members
the text of the Department's paper entitled "Aggression from the
North" (S/6206).
5. April 2, 1965.-In a letter to the Security Council President, Am-
bassador Stevenson rejected a Soviet charge that U.S. forces were using
"poisonous gases" in Vietnam. The U.S. letter attached excerpts from
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Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security,
Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954
and 1962 have not been implemented,
Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honorable settle-
ment of the conflict in Vietnam,
Recognizing the right of all people, including those in Viet-
nam, to self-determination,
1. Calls for immediate discussions without preconditions at
on date among the appropriate
interested governments to arrange a conference looking toward
the application of the Geneva Accords.of 1954 and 1962 and the
establishment of a durable peace in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk's March 25, 1965, press conference on this subject
(S/6270).
33 & 51- 6. April 9, 1965.-The text of President Johnson's April 7 address at
Johns Hopkins University was transmitted to the Security Council
President for the information of all U.N. members.
33-possibly
-37 7. July 28, 1965.-President Johnson wrote Secretary-General U Thant
expressing the hope that all the resources of the United Nations could
be used to bring about peace in Vietnam.
33-possibly
37 8. July 30, 1965.-Ambassador Goldberg wrote the Security Council
President informing U.N. members of U.S. efforts to find a peaceful
solution in Vietnam and inviting the members of the Security Council
to collaborate with the United States in the search for an acceptable
formula to restore peace and security in southeast Asia. (S/6575).
33- 9. January 4, 1966.-Ambassador Goldberg informed the Secretary
General of the purposes and content of the U.S. "peace offensive" and
again urged members of the Security Council to give even more earnest
thought to what they might do to achieve peace in Vietnam (S/7067).
51 & 37- 10. January 31, 1966.-Ambassador Goldberg requested the Security
Council President to convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council
to consider the situation in Vietnam (S/7105).
The text of these messages may be found id. at 635-47.
Despite these efforts, opposition to U.N. action continues on the part of some members.
Because of the opposition of France and the U.S.S.R., Secretary-General U Thant recently
said "I have to say that at least for the moment the U.N. cannot and should not be effec-
tively involved in peace-keeping operations or any operations of the nature of the main-
tenance of international peace and security or law and order, in Vietnam." N.Y. Times,
May 13, 1966, p. 2, col. 1.
On June 2, 1966, Nguyen Duy Lien, the Permanent Observer of the R.V.N. to the
United Nations requested Secretary-General U Thant to provide United Nations observers
at the September elections for a constituent assembly in the R.V.N. The proposal was
welcomed by the United States and Britain. See "Saigon Asks U.N. to Observe Vote," N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1966, p. c3, col. 1 (city ed.). The proposal, however, met opposition
elsewhere within the United Nations. See "Saigon Bid to U.N. Meets Opposition," N.Y.
Times, June 4, 1966, p. c3, col. 1 (city ed.), N.Y. Times; June 11, 1966, p. c5, col. I (city ed.).
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2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a
conference be arrangements for the cessation of hostilities under
effective supervision,
3. Offers to assist in achieving the purpose of this resolution
by all appropriate means including the provision of arbitrators
or mediators,
4. Calls on all concerned to cooperate fully in the imple-
mentation of the resolution,
5. Requests the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate
in the implementation of this resolution.23
The draft resolution presented by the United States was not adopted.
In fact, there was little interest in discussing the matter, beyond that
displayed by the United States. On January 21, 1966, shortly prior to the
introduction of the resolution and during the second United States
bombing pause "the Secretary-General said he did not think that an open
debate in the Security Council would be useful."2 9 In another statement
made on the same day the Secretary-General stated that the United
Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force
in Cyprus "were in danger of being curtailed in the near future because of
a lack of funds." 4 The same lack of funds would seem to be a factor
precluding any U.N. peace-keeping activities in Viet Nam.
Despite these inauspicious signs the United States presented its
resolution. So reluctant were many of the Security Council members to
even discuss this peace effort that the United States barely achieved the
requisite 9 votes (of 15 members) to have the resolution set for dis-
cussion.24' Russia and Bulgaria voted against discussing the matter and
Franc&, among others, abstained.242 The result of the discussion was the
statement by the Security Council President with which this section be-
gan: that no agreement could be reached.
It should also be pointed out that under Article 35 of the Charter any
238. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1966, p. 12, cols. 2-6.
239. United Nations Press Release WS/225, Jan. 21, 1966, at 2.
240. Ibid.
241. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 3, 1966, p. 1, col. 3.
242. Ibid.
For an indication of U.N. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg's emphasis on the processes
of international law and the United Nations as essentials in the search for world peace,
see "Goldberg Rebuts Acheson View That Peace by Law is 'Illusory,'" N.Y. Times, May 19,
1966, p. 6c, col. 4 (city ed.). "'The way to peace in this turbulent age is to keep to that
national vision, to work with all our might for the establishment of a structure of law
that will be reliable and just to all nations,' he continued.
" 'For though law alone cannot assure world peace there can be no peace without it.'"
Id. at col. 5.
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member or even non-member of the United Nations could have brought
the Viet Nam situation to the attention of the Security Council. And
under Article 99: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of
the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security."
The United States and all of the other nations of the world must, of
course, continually work to strengthen and assist the United Nations in
undertaking solutions to problems such as Viet Nam. It is particularly
important that every feasible effort continue to be made to maximize the
potential of the United Nations to seek a solution to the Viet Nam
situation. As United Nations Ambassador Goldberg has repeatedly
indicated, the search for a peaceful negotiated solution must continue.
The facts, however, indicate that the United States has met its obligations
under the United Nations Charter.
THE GENEVA ACCORDS SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES'
POSITION
Nothing in the Geneva Accords Requires the United States to Abstainfrom Resisting Aggression Against the Republic of Viet Nam
As has been seen, the Geneva Accords of 1954 with respect to Viet
Nam consisted of an Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities between
the D.R.V. and the French Union forces, and a Final Declaration of the
conference.24 The United States did not sign or otherwise agree to be
bound by either the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the Final
Declaration and made this position clear at the Conference itself. It is a
well accepted principle of international law that treaties ordinarily
cannot impose obligations on states which are not parties to them. As
Lord McNair, a former President of the International Court of Justice
has written: "[N] o State can be bound by any treaty provision unless it
has given its assent, and that principle is applicable equally to all types
of treaty."" Similarly, Article 18 of the Harvard Research Draft Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties provides: "A treaty may not impose
obligations upon a State which is not a party thereto.. ,.245 And Article
58 of the International Law Commission 1964 Draft Articles on the Law
of Treaties provides:
A treaty applies only between the parties and neither imposes
any obligations nor confers any rights upon a State not party to
it without its consent. 4 6
243. Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Con-
ference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [19541, Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers, XXXI (1953/54), at 9-11, 27-38.
244. McNAMR, THE LAW oF TREATIES 162 (1961).
245. 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 918 (Supp. 1935).
246. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixteenth session
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The commentary to this article said:
There appears to be almost universal agreement that the rule
laid down in this article-that a treaty applies only between the
parties-is the fundamental rule governing the effect of a treaty
upon States not parties. '. . . There was complete agreement
amongst the members that there is no exception in the case of
obligations; a treaty never by its own force alone creates
obligations for non-parties. The division of opinion related to
the question whether a treaty may of its own force confer rights
upon a non-party. 47
There is some authority that so-called "law-making" treaties such as
the Hague Conventions on the rules of land warfare or the United Nations
Charter which are accepted as customary law may create expectations
that may bind non-party states.24 The detailed provisions of the Agree-
ment on the Cessation of Hostilities or of the Final Declaration cannot
be validly characterized as such, however, and in any event the proposi-
tion has less certainty in a context in which a state expressly refused to
be bound at the time the so-called "law-making" treaty was entered
into.249
11 May-24 July 1964, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 19th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 7 (A/5809)
(1964).
247. Id. at 7-8.
248. See generally McNAiR, THE LAW OF TREATiES 310, 255-71 (1961).
There is substantial authority for the proposition that even non-members of the U.N.
are bound by the obligation to refrain from the use of force embodied in Article 2, section
4 of the Charter. See Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 515, at 522 (1962). And see the address
by Secretary of State Dean Rusk 1965 PRoc., Aaa. Soc. INT'L L. 247.
... [Llast year, a United Nations Special Committee on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States met in Mexico
City. All shades of United Nations opinion were represented. The Committee's
purpose was to study and possibly to elaborate certain of those principles. The
Committee debated much and agreed on little. But on one point, it reached swift
and unanimous agreement: that all states, and not only all Members of the United
Nations, are bound to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Non-
recognition of the statehood of a political entity was held not to affect the inter-
national application of this cardinal rule of general international law.
Id. at 249-50.
Whether or not a non-member is bound by the force of the provision as such, this
would seem to be a strong rule of general international law today. See generally McDouoAL
& F E IcANo, LAW & MmIrU WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 129-31, 138-48 (1961). Moreover,
Article 2, section 6 of the Charter certainly indicates an intention that even non-members
be held to this standard. And since the D.R.V. has a pending application for United Nations
membership, which under Article 4, section 1 of the Charter is an undertaking to accept
the obligations of the Charter, it hardly seems harsh to judge its actions by the Charter.
See notes 103 & 104 supra.
249. This is not to suggest that the nations of the world not expressly agreeing to the
Geneva Accords are free to assist either the D.R.V. or the R.V.N. in an aggressive attack
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The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities was signed only by
representatives of the D.R.V. and the French Union Forces25 ° and it is
clear that the United States, not being a party to it, was not bound by
it. With respect to the Final Declaration of the Conference, as has been
pointed out, it was not signed by any state, but was orally agreed to by
France, Britain, Cambodia, the D.R.V., Laos, the People's Republic of
China, and the U.S.S.R. It was, however, expressly rejected as a binding
obligation by the United States and was not agreed to by the State of
Viet Nam. This United States' position, clearly enunciated at the con-
ference, that it was not prepared to join in the Final Declaration of the
Conference including the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Viet Nam has so often been misstated that the pertinent extracts from the
official verbatim record of the Final Plenary Session of the Conference
are here set out in full.
The Chairman (Mr. Eden): . . . Finally, gentlemen, there is
the Draft Declaration by the Conference, which takes note of
all these documents [Including the Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities in Viet Nam]. I think all my colleagues have copies
of this Draft Declaration before them. I will ask my colleagues
in turn to express themselves upon this Declaration.
The Representative of France.
M. Mend~s-France (France): Mr. Chairman, the French
Delegation approves the terms of this Declaration....
The Chairman: The Representative of the People's Republic
of China.
Mr. Chou En-Lai (People's Republic of China): We agree.
The Chairman: On behalf of Her Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom, I associate myself with the final Declara-
tion of this Conference.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Mr. Molotov (U.S.S.R.): The Soviet Delegation agrees....
The Chairman: . . . The Representative of the Democratic
Republic of Viet Nam.
Mr. Pham van Dong (Democratic Republic of Viet Nam):
aimed at the political and territorial integrity of the other state. Such an attack across
an international cease-fire line, if not pursuant to the right of individual or collective self-
defense or collective action expressly authorized by the United Nations, would clearly
constitute a violation of the customary international law prohibition against the use of
force in international relations embodied in Article 2, sections 3 & 4 of the United Nations
Charter.
250. See note 44 supra.
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Mr. Chairman, I agree completely with the words pronounced
by you....
The Chairman: . . . I will continue calling upon countries to
speak on the subject of the Declaration. I call upon the United
States of America.
Mr. Bedell Smith (United States): Mr. Chairman, Fellow
Delegates, as I stated to my colleagues during our meeting on
July 18, my Government is not prepared to join in a Declaration
by the Conference such as is submitted. However, the United
States makes this unilateral declaration of its position in these
matters:
DECLARATION
The Government of the United States being resolved to devote
its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the United Nations.
Takes Note
of the Agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21,
1954, between (a) the Franco-Laotian Command and the Com-
mand of the People's Army of Viet Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer
Army Command and the Command of the People's Army of
Viet Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command and the Command
of the People's Army of Viet Nam, and paragraphs 1 to 12 of the
Declaration presented to the Geneva Conference on 21st July,
-1954.
The Government of the United States of America
Declares with regard to the aforesaid Agreements and para-
graphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force
to disturb them, in accordance with Article 2 (Section 4) of the
Charter of the United Nations dealing with the obligation of
Members to refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any renewal of the
aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements with grave
concern and as seriously threatening international peace and
security.
In connection with the statement in the Declaration con-
cerning free elections in Viet Nam, my Government wishes to
make clear its position which it has expressed in a Declaration
made in Washington on 29th June, 1954, as follows:
In the case of nations now divided against their will,
we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free
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elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure
that they are conducted fairly.
With respect to the statement made by the Representative of
the State of Viet Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional
position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future
and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder
this. Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does
indicate any departure from this traditional position.
We share the hope that the agreement will permit Cambodia,
Laos and Viet Nam to play their part in full independence and
sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will
enable the peoples of that area to determine their own future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman: The Conference will, I think, wish to take note
of the statement of the Representative of the United States of
America.251
Mr. Bedell Smith's statements for the United States made it evident to
all concerned that the United States would not consent to be bound by
the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the
Final Declaration of the Conference, a position with which all of the
delegations were already aware. Before making the United States' uni-
lateral declaration Mr. Bedell Smith unequivocally stated that the
United States was not prepared to join in the Final Declaration of the
Conference. This statement is sometimes omitted by those adverting to
whether the United States approved or consented to be bound by the
provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the Final
Declaration of the Conference . 5 2 Moreover, the United States' statement
251. Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Con-
ference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [1954] Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers XXXI (1953/54), at 5-7.
In this unilateral declaration the United States refused even to take note of paragraph 13,
the last paragraph of the Final Declaration of the Conference. Paragraph 13 provides:
The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question
which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in
order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the Agreements
on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam are respected.
In refusing even to take note of this agreement to consult between members of the Con-
ference, the United States was indicating in yet another way its separateness from the
Conference decisions.
252. See for example APrTHEKR, MISSION To HANOI 98 (1966). SCHEER, HOW THE
UNITED STATES GOT INvoLvED IN VIETNAM 18 (1965). Scheer asserts:
The United States and the Diem government were later to claim that they
were not bound by the agreement because they had not signed it. However, the
United States, for its part, had implied approval when it returned Walter Bedell
Smith to the conference, from which he had earlier been withdrawn, at the in-
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which followed was not inconsistent with this unequivocal statement but
merely took note of a substantial part of the agreements reached at
Geneva, made an express unilateral two point declaration, and ended with
a statement of position. Nothing in this statement indicates United States'
consent to be bound by the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities or the Final Declaration of the Conference. Point one of
the two point express declaration merely indicated that the United States
would act in accordance with its existing obligations under the United
Nations Charter with respect to refraining from disturbing the agreement
by threats or use of force. This statement that the United States "will
refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb them, in accordance
with Article 2 (Section 4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing
with the obligation of Members to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force" is, even standing alone, clearly not an
agreement to be bound by the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessa-
tion of Hostilities or the Final Declaration of the Conference. For being
bound not to disturb the agreements by force in accordance with pre-
existing United Nations obligations as to when force is and when it is
not permissible is quite a different thing from subscribing to all of the
provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the Final
Declaration of the Conference, including provisions such as limitations
on the introduction of military equipment into Viet Nam, etc.253 And
taken together with Mr. Bedell Smith's unequivocal statement that the
sistence of the English and the French. Eisenhower acknowledged in his Mandate
for Change: "Our direct interest in these negotiations arose out of the assumption
that the United States would be expected to act as one of the guarantors of what-
ever agreement should be achieved." He also wrote: "By and large, the settlement
obtained by the French Union at Geneva in 1954 was the best it could get under
the circumstances."
As to the United States feelings about the Conference and the reasons for Bedell
Smith's return see SUR1vEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 62-64 (Royal Institute of In-
ternational Affairs 1957); THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1954 248-49 (Council on
Foreign Relations 1956).
There was no formal guarantee of the agreements. The Conference Powers,
except for the U.SA. and Viet Nam, issued a Final Declaration taking note of the
agreements. The U.S.A. issued a unilateral declaration that it would 'refrain from
the use or threat of force to disturb' the agreements and 'would view any renewal
of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern.' The
Vietnamese government undertook not to use force to resist the carrying of the
cease-fire into effect though it maintained its reservations on the settlement.
SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954, supra, at 67.
With respect to Scheer's quotations from MANDATE FOR CHANGE see also pp. 44748
where former President Eisenhower pointed out that the United States was refusing to
participate in the resolution and that in a news conference on July 21, 1954--the day of
the Final Declaration of the Conference-he had indicated that the United States was
"not a party to or bound by the decisions taken at the conference .... " MANDATE FOR
CHANGE, 44748.
253. See notes 46, 112 & 124 supra.
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United States would not join in the Final Declaration of the Conference,
there can be no doubt that the United States did not consent to be bound
by the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the
Final Declaration of the Conference.
It should also be noted that there were only two points to the express
declaration paragraph of the United States' statement issued at Geneva.
Point one of the declaration which declared that the United States would
act in accordance with Article 2, Section 4 of the United Nations Charter,
and point two of the declaration which declared that the United States
would view aggression in violation of the agreements as seriously threaten-
ing international peace and security. The statement of position which
followed this express two point declaration does not seem a part of the
formal declaration as such, since it was neither numbered (iii) nor a
continuation of point (ii) in the same paragraph with the declaration.
Regardless of the effect of this discussion of position in the statement,2"4
which in any event does not effect the conclusions of this paper, it is clear
that the heart of the United States' unilateral declaration at Geneva was
its two point formal declaration. Nothing in this formal declaration, or
anything else in the United States' statement at the final plenary session of
the Conference indicated that the United States consented to be bound
by the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the
Final Declaration of the Conference.
As was pointed out in a Comment in the California Law Review in
1962:
Since the United States was not obligated to become a party to
the Accords and did not become a party, it hardly seems argu-
able that it is bound by them.... By restating adherence to the
charter and by warning against renewal of aggression the United
States cannot be said to have become a party to the Accords.
The unilateral declaration of the United States does not con-
stitute a binding obligation. Those who have stated or implied
that the Accords and unilateral declaration bind the United
States have offered no legal reasons to support their position.
Their only possible support comes from the United States de-
nunciations of Communist violations of the Accords. It might be
argued that by relying on the Accords the United States has
254. The United States in reiterating that it "shall continue to seek to achieve unity
through free elections, supervised by the United Nations to ensure that they are conducted
fairly," was calling for a proposal which had been rejected by the Communist delegations.
The communist delegations have also rejected United Nations supervision of
an armistice, favored by a number of delegations. In a proposal for reestablishing.
peace throughout the national territory of Vietnam, the Vietnam representative
[the State of Viet Nam] asked that elections be held there under the auspices of
the United Nations.
"The News In Review," United Nations Review 2 (Vol. 1, July 1954).
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obligated itself to observe them. But it would be anomalous to
say that a nonsignatory state must observe an agreement merely
because it has protested against violations of the agreement by a
signatory. There appear to be no rules of international law
leading to such a result, and a contrary result is indicated by the
rule that the violation of essential provisions of an agreement
creates a right for the other party to cancel the agreement.
255
The contemporaneous declarations of the then United States President
and Secretary of State reinforce the clear indication to all concerned
made at the Geneva Conference that the United States was not bound by
the Final Declaration of the conference. Thus, President Eisenhower
indicated in a statement on July 21, 1954, the day of the Final Declara-
tion of the Geneva Conference, that the United States was not a party to
or bound by the Geneva Accords:
The United States has not been a belligerent in the war. The
primary responsibility for the settlement in Indochina rested
with those nations which participated ii the fighting. Our role
at Geneva has been at all times to try to be helpful where desired
and to aid France and Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam to
obtain a just and honorable settlement which will take into
a:ccount the needs of the interested people. Accordingly, the
United States has not itself been party to or bound by the
decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will
lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and
the needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains
features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how
they work in practice.
The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the
effect that it is not prepared to join in the Conference declara-
tion, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say
that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained
in article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States
will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that
any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as
a matter of grave concern ....
The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other
free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective
defense in Southeast Asia in order to prevent further direct or
indirect Communist aggression in that general area.256
255. Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 515, at 519 (1962).
256. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965), at 60.
(Emphasis added.)
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In his Mandate for Change, President Eisenhower again emphasized
that the United States was not bound by the decisions taken at the
Conference25 7 and also pointed out that on July 20, 1954, the day before
the final settlement:
The Russians were pressing for a conference resolution and
for us to join in adopting all the provisos. We, of course, were
refusing to participate in the resolution but were authorizing
Bedell to make a declaration which would note the conference
decisions and state that we would not use force to disturb
them.258
And at a news conference on July 23, 1954, Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles said:
[S]ince the United States itself was neither a belligerent in
Indochina nor subject to compulsions which applied to others,
we did not become a party to the conference results. We merely
noted them and said that, in accordance with the United Nations
Charter, we would not seek by force to overthrow the settle-
ment. 259
These conference records and contemporaneous statements demonstrate
unequivocally that the United States did not join in the Agreement on the
Cessation of Hostilities or the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva
Conference. Moreover, this conclusion does not rest on a mere technicality
as to whether the United States did or did not sign the agreement at
Geneva, as has been implied by some,260 but reflects the fundamental
proposition that the United States clearly never consented to be bound
by the provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities or the
Final Declaration of the Conference, a position which was even at the
time of the Conference made abundantly evident to all concerned. The
only United States obligation stemming from the Conference itself, if a
new obligation at all, was that expressed in the United States unilateral
declaration. As has been seen, in its formal declaration at the Conference
the United States declared:
(i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb
them, [the Geneva Accords] in accordance with Article 2 (Sec-
tion 4) of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with the
obligations of Members to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it would view any
renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agree-
257. MATDATE FOR CHANGE 448.
258. id. at 447.
259. SCaaR 19.
260. See Id. at 18.
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ments with grave concern and as seriously threatening inter-
national peace and security....
The first point of this declaration was declaratory of the already existing
obligations of the United States under the United Nations Charter. For
since the United States was a member of the United Nations it was, of
course, already bound by Article 2 of the United Nations Charter. But
as has been shown, collective defense action taken pursuant to Article 51
of the Charter is in accordance with Article 2, Section 4 of the Charter.
That is, Article 2 is subject to the self-defense exceptions also written
into the Charter. Thus, the United States may assist the R.V.N. pursuant
to the right of self-defense consistent with even its first point in its
unilateral declaration at Geneva as well as consistent with the United
Nations Charter and general principles of customary international law.
Moreover, the second point of the declaration, to the effect that aggression
in violation of the agreements would be viewed with grave concern and as
seriously threatening international peace and security indicates the
United States interest in assisting the Republic of Viet Nam against
future aggression. The present aggression of the D.R.V. against the
R.V.N. constitutes such future aggression, the threat of which was un-
mistakably adverted to by the United States in its Geneva declaration.
Assistance to the R.V.N. in these circumstances is entirely consistent
with the unilateral declaration of the United States.
The present United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is
entirely consistent with the expectations created by the United States
actions at the Geneva Conference of 1954. This assistance to the Republic
of Viet Nam cannot violate the Geneva Accords because the United
States was never legally bound by either the Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities or the Final Declaration of the Conference. And similarly,
this assistance is consistent with the unilateral declaration of the United
States with respect to the Geneva Accords since the United States
assistance is authorized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
and 'the declaration expressly indicated the United States interest in pro-
tecting the Republic of Viet Nam against aggression.
Although a separate issue, it should also be pointed out that there are
some reasons for suggesting that the Republic of Viet Nam was never
bound by the provisions of the final settlement of the Conference, includ-
ing the election provisions, although its nearly twelve year acceptance of
the cease fire and partition pending elections would suggest that today it is
either obligated by these provisions or the de facto separation largely re-
sulting from them.2"1 For like the United States, the State of Viet Nam
261. Whether bound or not, an aggressive attack by the R.V.N. on the D.R.V. across
the internationally set cease-fire line in Viet Nam would seem to be a violation of the rule
of customary international law embodied in Article2, sections 3 & 4 of the U.N. Charter
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was not a signatory to the Geneva Accords and has consistently protested
substantially all but the cease-fire provisions of the final settlement.262
Thus, prior to the Indo-China phase of the Conference, on April 25,
1954 the Government of the State of Viet Nam issued a communique that:
With regard to Viet-Namese unity, it is known that various
plans have been drawn up which would entail a partition of
Viet-Nam. Such solutions may offer certain specious advantages
of a diplomatic nature, but their adoption would present ex-
tremely grave disadvantages and dangers for the future.... Viet-
against the use of force in international relations, unless the action was taken in lawful
individual or collective defense or pursuant to collective action expressly authorized by the
United.Nations. The same principle would also apply to the D.R.V. See note 249 supra.
See also Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 515, at 520 (1962).
The agreement was signed by North Vietnam and France, but not by South
Nietnam [sic]. It therefore can be argued that South Vietnam acquired no fights
under the agreement. The question of Vietnam's right under the agreement is
really irrelevant since, whether the Vietminh obligation is owed to Vietnam or not,
there is a Vietminh obligation owed at least to France. By sending troops into
Vietnam the Vietminh have violated article 24 of the agreement.
Ibid.
Although Article 27 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities says that: "The
signatories of the present Agreement and their successors in their functions shall be re-
sponsible for ensuring and observance and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof
S. .," if the R.V.N. is not otherwise bound by the provisions of the agreement there is
little reason to suggest that it is bound by this provision. Moreover, it is not clear from
this provision that the parties adverted to the R.V.N. as a successor "in their functions";
for example, it is also open to the interpretation that they were referring to successive
Commanders-in-Chief of the PAVN and French Union Forces.
262. For an account of the Geneva Conference see SuRVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1954, 42-73 (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1957).
Reactions to the agreement, and to the end of the marathon conference, ranged
from that of Mr. Chou, who called it all "a tremendous success" (which from his
point of view it certainly was) to that of Mr. Tran Van Do, the Vietnamese
Foreign Minister, [the State of Viet Nam] who resigned on the spot.
Id. at 67.
For objections raised during the Conference by the State of Viet Nam which did not
participate in the drafting of the Final Declaration see Id. at 48 & 64.
See also Do VANG LY, AcGREssiONs BY CHINA 104, 110-11, 114, 150 (2d ed. 1960).
The Geneva agreement was arrived at on July 20. Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem, who
had assumed office by this time not only did not recognize the agreement but
vehemently protested against it.
Id. at 104.
But the armistice agreement, it may be mentioned, was a bilateral military
accord between a French general and the Vietminh Commander-in-Chief. The
French general did not have the legal sanction to negotiate an armistice-he had
no delegation of powers from Mr. Diem's Government, from where alone he could
have got it. In 1949, the French had returned Vietnam's sovereignty by a solemn
treaty signed with Emperor Bao Dai; and Bao Dai had delegated full civil and
military powers to Mr. Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954. Mr. Diem's representative alone
could have negotiated for Vietnam.
Id. at 110-11.
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Nam would never be prepared to consider the possibility of ne-
gotiations in which France, violating the basic principles of the
French Union from which her authority is derived, were to nego-
tiate with those who are in rebellion against the Viet-Namese
nation or with hostile Powers, thereby disregarding or sacrificing
her partner.
Whatever may happen, neither the Head of the State nor the
Viet-Namese Government will consider themselves bound by
decisions which by running counter to national independence
and unity would violate the rights of peoples and reward aggres-
sion, contrary to the ideals of the United Nations Charter and to
democratic ideals.263
And on July 18, 1954, Dr. Tran Van Do, the Representative of the State
of Viet Nam said at the Geneva Conference:
The Viet-Namese Delegate said that he must categorically dis-
sociate himself from any discussion on either the French or the
Soviet draft of the proposed final conference resolution on the
grounds that he could not accept the principle of partition on
which the cease-fire in Viet-Nam was to be based. He reserved
the right to make known the views of his Government at a sub-
sequent session. The Viet-Namese Delegation formally protested
against partition and therefore rejected both French and Soviet
drafts. 2 4
And at the final plenary session of the conference Dr. Tran Van Do did
not agree to the Final Declaration of the conference but instead offered an
amendment to it:
The Chairman: ... I call on the Representative of the State
of Viet Nam.
Mr. Tran Van Do (State of Viet Nam): Mr. Chairman, as
regards the final Declaration of the Conference, the Vietnamese
Delegation requests the Conference to incorporate in this Dec-
laration after Article 10, the following text:
"The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Gov-
ernment of the State of Viet Nam undertaking:
"to make and support every effort to re-establish a real and
lasting peace in Viet Nam;
"not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the
cease-fire into effect, in spite of the objections and res-
263. Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965
(Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965], Command Paper 2834), at 87.
264. Ibid.
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ervations that the State of Viet Nam has expressed,
especially in its final statement."
The Chairman: I shall be glad to hear any views that my col-
leagues may wish to express. But, as I understand the position,
the final Declaration has already been drafted and this additional
paragraph has only just now been received; indeed, it has been
amended since I received the text a few minutes ago. In all the
circumstances, I suggest that the best course we can take is
that the Conference should take note of the Declaration of the
State of Viet Nam in this respect. If any of my colleagues has
a contrary view, perhaps they would be good enough to say so.
(None.). 265
Mr. Tran Van Do (State of Viet Nam): Mr. Chairman, I ex-
pressed the view of the Delegation of the State of Viet Nam in
my statement and I would have this Conference take note of it
in its final act.
The Chairman: As I think I explained, we cannot now amend
our final act, which is the statement of the Conference as a
whole, but the Declaration of the Representative of the State of
Viet Nam will be taken note of....
Any other observations? (None.).... 266
Moreover, it is clear from this exchange that the Conference was aware
of the reservations of the State of Viet Nam but made no objections to
them.
In his final statement for the State of Viet Nam, made at the conclud-
ing Plenary Session of the Conference on July 21, Foreign Minister Tran
Van Do proposed provisional control by the United Nations over the
entire territory pending free elections and said:
[T] he Government of the State of Vietnam requests that note
be made of its solemn protest against the manner in which the
armistice has been concluded and against the conditions of the
armistice which take no account of the profound aspirations of
the Vietnamese people, and of the fact that it reserves to itself
complete freedom of action to guarantee the sacred right of the
Vietnamese people to territorial unity, national independence
and freedom.267
265. Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indo-China at the Geneva Con-
ference (Miscellaneous No. 20 [1954] Command Paper 9239). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers XXXI (1953/54), at 7-8.
266. Id. at 9.
267. DocumENTS ON AmERICAN FOREiGN RELATIONS 1954 315-316, 318 (Council on
Foreign Relations). The statement provides in full:
The delegation of the State of Vietnam has presented a proposal designed to
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Nor can it be validly maintained that the French delegation agreed to
the Final Declaration on behalf of the State of Viet Nam, for the French
delegation responded in the name of France only, and there is no sug-
gestion in their acceptance that they were also binding the State of Viet
Nam. Both the separate presence and participation of the delegation from
the State of Viet Nam and the statements of the French delegation at the
Conference indicated that the French neither intended to nor were legally
capable of binding the State of Viet Nam. Thus in the opening statement
on the Indo-China phase of the Geneva Conference on May 8, 1954,
M. Bidault, the then French Foreign Minister said:
obtain an armistice without division, even provisional, of the territory of Vietnam,
through the disarmament of all the belligerent forces after their withdrawal to the
smallest possible zones of regroupment and the institutions of a provisional control
by the United Nations over the entire territory, pending the reestablishment of peace
and arrangements permitting the Vietnamese people to determine its destiny through
free elections. The delegation protests the summary rejection of this proposal, the
only one which respects the aspirations of the Vietnamese people. It insists that,
at least, the demilitarization and neutralization of the Catholic religious communities
in the delta of Northern Vietnam be accepted by the Conference.
It protests solemnly: (a) the hasty conclusion of the armistice agreement,
contracted only by the high authority of France and the Vietminh notwithstanding
the fact that many clauses of this agreement are of such a nature as gravely to
compromise the political future of the Vietnamese people; (b) the fact that this
armistice agreement abandons to the Vietminh territories, many of which are still in
the possession of Vietnamese troops, and thus essential to the defense of Vietnam
in opposing a larger expansion of Communism and virtually deprives Vietnam of the
imprescriptible right to organize its defense otherwise than by the maintenance of a
foreign army on its territory; (c) the fact that the French High Command has
arrogated to itself without preliminary agreement with the delegation of the State
of Vietnam the right to fix the date of future elections, notwithstanding that a matter
of a clearly political character is concerned.
Consequently, the Government of the State of Vietnam requests that note
be made of its solemn protest against the manner in which the armistice has been
concluded and against the conditions of the armistice which take no account of the
profound aspirations of the Vietnamese people, and of the fact that it reserves to
itself complete freedom of action to guarantee the sacred right of the Vietnamese
people to territorial unity, national independence and freedom.
(Copy supplied by the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet Nam to the United
Nations).
See also TuE UNITED STATES fl WoRLD AFFAiRs 1954 252-53 (Council on Foreign
Relations 1956).
The agreement on Vietnam was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Vietminh ("People's Army of Vietnam") and the Commander-in-Chief of the French
Union forces in Indochina, but lacked the signature of any representative of the
state of Vietnam. In fact, the Vietnamese delegation not only refused to sign but
entered a solemn protest against the "hasty conclusion" of the armistice, the
abandonment to the Vietminh of territories still in possession of Vietnamese troops,
and the intrusion of the French High Command in political matters without pre-
liminary Vietnamese agreement. In view of these facts, it stated, the Government
of Vietnam reserved "complete freedom of action to guarantee the sacred right
of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity, national independence and freedom."
Ibid.
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[I] ndependence has already been completed....
In Viet Nam, and in spite of the war, France has been able to
keep its promises and full independence has been recognized and
has become effective. Thirty-five free countries, by recognising
those three states [Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos], and a num-
ber of international organizations by accepting them in their
midst, have consecrated that independence. The national Gov-
ernment of Viet Nam has been able to set up an administration
to organize its finance, to develop its economy, to establish dip-
lomatic relations with the main free countries. It built up an
army. All those elements mean sovereignty.268
And in this opening statement he also said that the French Government
has recognized: "fully and unreservedly the independence of Viet
Nam. .... ,'M And on May 14, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the
Conference, Bidault said:
[T]here does exist a Government of the State of Viet Nam.
That Government is the Government of His Majesty, Bao Dai.
... This Government [Bao Dai's State of Viet Nam] is fully and
solely competent to commit Viet Nam.27°
French Prime Minister Mends-France's only request to the United
States shortly after taking office on June 18th indicates that there was
268. See note 37 supra.
269. See note 37 supra.
270. See note 37 supra. See also notes 33 & 36 supra.
Since France had entered into a treaty with the State of Viet Nam granting it indepen-
dence prior to French approval of the Accords, there is a strong case that France was not
legally capable of binding the State of Viet Nam by its agreement to the Accords. Article
22(c) of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
If a State assumes by a treaty with another State an obligation which is in
conflict with an obligation which it has assumed by an earlier treaty with a third
State, the obligation assumed by the earlier treaty takes priority over the obligation
assumed by the later treaty.
The Comment to Article 22(c) says:
What a State gives by treaty to another State it cannot take away by a treaty
subsequently concluded with a third State, at least not without the consent of the
first-mentioned State. Manifestly that would be in contravention of the rule
pacta sunt servanda ...
Writers on international law seem to be unanimous in opinion as to the general
principle that the obligations assumed by a State in a treaty with another State
should prevail over those assumed by the same State under a later treaty with a
third State. ...
Apparently in no case in practice has the general principle of the priority of the
obligations previously assumed by a State over those subsequently assumed by it
with a third State, ever been seriously denied, and no decision of an international
tribunal is known in which the contrary principle has been sustained.
29 Am. J. INT'L L. 1024, 1025, 1029 (Supp. 1935).
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some truth politically in the independence of the State of Viet Nam at
the Conference. As Eisenhower reported in his memoirs:
Mends-France had only one request: that we use our in-
fluence with the Vietnamese Premier, Ngo Dinh Diem-newly
appointed by Bao Dai-to prevent him for needlessly obstruct-
ing any honorable truce which the French might reach with the
Vietminh.2 '
Anthony Eden's memoirs bear out this fear of Prime Minister Mends-
France of Vietnamese opposition to the Accords. 2 As has been shown in
the discussion on the statehood of the R.V.N., there were also significant
expectations that the State of Viet Nam was independent under inter-
national law prior to the July 21st conclusion of the Accords.27 There
are some reasons for suggesting then, that since the Republic of Viet Nam
never consented to be bound by the Geneva Accords, except not to use
force to resist the carrying of the cease fire into effect,274 it was never
legally bound by the other provisions of the final settlement. This has,
in fact, been the unequivocal position of the Republic of Viet Nam and
their predecessor the State of Viet Nam from even prior to the Accords
to the present. Both in their public statements27 and in their relationship
with the International Control Commission 276 this position has been con-
271. MANDATE FOR CHANGE 442. See also note 36 supra.
272. See EDEN, FULL CIRCLE 146 (1960).
273. See notes 33, 36, 37 & 270 and accompanying text supra.
274. See SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1954 67 (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1957). "The Vietnamese government undertook not to use force to resist the carrying
of the cease-fire into effect though it maintained its reservations on the settlement." Ibid.
See also the note delivered by the Government of Viet-Nam to H. M. Ambassador,
Saigon, 3 April 1956 in Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China
Conflict 1945-1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965] Command Paper 2834), at 95.
[T]he Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam will not have recourse to vio-
lence to resolve its problems and will uphold existing conditions of the present state
of peace (Maintiendra les donnees de fait de l'etat actual de paix). It will not seek
to violate the demarcation line and the demilitarised zone, as they have resulted
from the situation of facts existing at the present time in Viet-Nam.
Id. at 96.
275. See text at notes 263 & 267 supra. "[N]ot being a signatory of these Agreements,
the Government of Viet-Nam has declared on several occasions that it does not consider
itself as bound by their provisions." Note delivered by the Government of Viet-Nam to
H.M. Ambassador, Saigon, 3 April, 1956 in Documents Relating to British Involvement
in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-1965. (Miscellaneous No. 25 [1965] Command Paper 2834),
at 95. "We have not signed the Geneva Agreements. We are not bound in any way by
these agreements, signed against the will of the Viet-Namese people." Declaration broadcast
by M. Ngo Dinh Diem, Saigon, 16 July, 1955, id. at 107. "The Government [the State of
Viet Nam] does not consider itself in any way bound by the Geneva Agreements, of which
it was not a signatory." Statement by the Government of Viet-Nam, Saigon, 12 August,
1955, id. at 109. See also "Vietnam in World Affairs" 73-84 (June 1956, Review published
by the Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Vietnam.)
276. As civil and military administration in the zone south of the provisional demar-
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sistently reasserted. Again, the point is that the position of the Republic
of Viet Nam that it is not bound by the provisions of the Agreement on
the Cessation of Hostilities or the Final Declaration is not merely a later
asserted technicality based on an accident that they had not signed the
Accords,277 but stems from their continuing objections and refusal to be
bound by the Geneva settlements prior to Geneva, at Geneva, and after
Geneva, a position which was certainly clear to all of the participants at
the Conference. These continuing objections to the Geneva Accords spe-
cifically lend credence to the R.V.N.'s position that it is not bound by the
election provisions of the Accords.278
Both the United States and R.V.N. declarations at the Conference and
their subsequent conduct do give rise, though, to expectations that neither
state will attack the integrity of the D.R.V. as a sovereign entity, except
in lawful self-defense. The present United States assistance to the R.V.N.
cation line has been passing into the hands of the Government of the State of Viet-
nam, which has not signed and is according to its repeated public declarations
opposed to both the Geneva Agreement and the Final Declaration, further con-
tinuance of the Commission's activities and the effective discharge of its respon-
sibilities are in serious jeopardy as the Commission, established under Article 44
of the Agreement, can only draw its authority from the Agreement itself and has no
other sanction. We would like to add in this connexion that during our discussions
with the Government of the State of Vietnam, we have been told that it will give
full protection and practical co-operation to the Commission as an International
Peace Commission but will not make a formal or public declaration to that effect
in view of the position taken up by it with reference to the Geneva Agreement
and the Final Declaration.
Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in
Vietnam. (Vietnam No. 3 [1955] Command Paper 9654). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers, XLV (1955/56), at 17. "[T]he Government of the Republic of Vietnam
had stated that it was prepared to offer effective cooperation to the Commission but that
it was not prepared to assume responsibility for the implementation of the Geneva Agree-
ments in Vietnam." Seventh Interim Report of the International Commission for Super-
vision and Control in Vietnam (Vietnam No. 2 [1957] Command Paper 335). Great Britain
Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXX (1957158), at 19.
277. See the implication in SC-EER 18.
278. For the position of the R.V.N. toward the I.C.C. and elections see SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1955-56, 18-19 (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1960).
Great Britain-a Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference-agrees that the election
provisions of the Accords are not legally binding on the R.V.N.
Her Majesty's Government have always regarded it as desirable that these
elections should be held and have advised the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam to enter into consultations with the Viet Minh authorities in order to ensure
that all the necessary conditions obtain for a free expression of the national will as
a preliminary to holding free general elections by secret ballot. Nevertheless, Her
Majesty's Government do not agree that the Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam were legally obliged to follow this course. ...
Note delivered by H.M. Embassy, Moscow, to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union, 9
April, 1956, in Documents relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945-
1965 (Miscellaneous No. 25 [19651 Command Paper 2834), at 124-25.
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with its narrowly defined aims of interdicting the D.R.V. aggression
against the R.V.N. is consistent with those expectations.
It should be pointed out, however, that for these reasons discussed
below, even if the United States and the R.V.N. were bound by all of the
provisions of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Final
Declaration it would not detract from the lawfulness of the present United
States assistance.
Aggression by the D.R.V. Against the R.V.N. Violates the Geneva
Accords and Fundamental Principles of the United Nations
Charter: This Material Breach of Agreement Permits
Suspension of Any Corresponding Obligations Which
May be Binding on the United States
or the R.V.N.
The D.R.V. was one of the two principal parties to the Geneva Accords
on Viet Nam, having signed the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities
in Viet Nam and having consented to the Final Declaration of the Con-
ference. Since a major purpose of the Geneva Accords on Viet Nam, as
indicated by the signed Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, was a
military cease fire and a withdrawal of the combatant forces to the North
and South, any armed aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a
fundamental violation of the Geneva Accords. This serious violation of
the Geneva Accords by the D.R.V. is, among other evidence, documented
by the findings of the International Commission for Supervision and
Control:
The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam pro-
ceeds on the principle of the complete cessation of all hostilities
in Viet-Nam, respect by either Party of the Zone assigned to the
other, and the inescapable responsibility of the Parties for the
fulfilment of the obligations resulting therefrom.
Article 10 of the Agreement states expressly the obligation of
the two Parties to order and enforce the complete cessation of
all hostilities in Viet-Nam.
Article 19 of the Agreement casts the obligation on the two
Parties to ensure that the Zones assigned to them are not used
for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive
policy.
Article 24 of the Agreement proceeds on the principle of the
inviolability of the Demilitarized Zone and the territories as-
signed to the two Parties and states expressly that the armed
forces of each Party shall respect the territory under the military
control of the other Party and shall commit no act and undertake
no operation against the other Party.
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Article 27 of the Agreement affirms expressly the responsi-
bility of the Commanders of the Forces of the two Parties of
ensuring full compliance with all the provisions of the Agree-
ment by all elements and military personnel under their Com-
mand.
It follows that the using of one Zone for the organisation or
the carrying out of any hostile activities in the other Zone,
violations by members of the Armed Forces of one Party of the
territory of the other Party, or the commission by any element
under the control of one Party, or the commission by any element
under the control of one party of any act directed against the
other Party, would be contrary to the fundamental provisions
of the Agreement which enjoin mutual respect for the territories
assigned to the two Parties....
The Commission accepts the conclusions reached by the Legal
Committee that there is sufficient evidence to show beyond rea-
sonable doubt that the PAVN [the army of the D.R.V.] has
violated Articles 10, 19, 24 and 27 in specific instances .... 279
Because this aggression by the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a con-
tinuing violation of a major provision of the Geneva Accords, the situa-
tion under international law is not comparable to that of a civil war. And
this is true even if the D.R.V. and the R.V.N. were to be regarded as
merely separate "temporary zones" not qualifying as states. For the cease
fire provisions violated by this aggression have been agreed to by the
D.R.V. and have been set by an international conference. Moreover, as
has been discussed in section I there are substantial expectations that the
D.R.V. and the R.V.N. are separate states under international law.
The major thrust of contemporary international law as reflected in
the United Nations Charter is to outlaw the use of force by individual
states unless required by self-defense. International grievances that fall
short of self-defense, such as political grievances, no matter how serious
must be settled without the use of force by individual states. Thus, Article
2 of the United Nations Charter, which is in this respect substantially
reflective of a long series of major international understandings, 280
provides:
§ 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered.
279. Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China,
(Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers, XXXIX(1961/62), at 6-7.
280. See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW & MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 129-31, 138-48
(1961) ; BIGcGS, TIE LAW OF NATIONS 968-72, 980 (2nd ed. 1952).
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§ 4. All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
This renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes is reflected in the
well-recognized principle that even breach of treaty may not be remedied
by unilateral resort to force, provided, of course, that the breach does not
also present a self-defense situation. 81 Moreover, by its pending applica-
tion for membership in the United Nations the D.R.V. is itself holding
out, pursuant to Article 4 of the Charter which sets forth qualifications
for membership, that it is a state and that it accepts the obligations con-
tained in the Charter. 82
There is no question but that the D.R.V. is not acting in self-defense
in its armed aggression against the R.V.N. 83 For the explicit findings of
the Legal Committee of the I.C.C. that the D.R.V. was in violation of the
Geneva Accords in its armed aggression against the R.V.N. occurred
several years prior to the United States and R.V.N. bombing of military
targets in the D.R.V. 284 In addition, the United States and the Republic
of Viet Nam have repeatedly made clear that the bombing of the D.R.V.
will cease when the aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is halted,
and that their objective is not an attack on the political and territorial
integrity of the D.R.V. As a result, regardless of the validity of its political
grievances against the R.V.N., the D.R.V. is not only violating the Geneva
Accords in its aggression against the R.V.N. but in doing so is acting
contra to one of the most fundamental provisions of the United Nations
Charter which is itself largely declaratory of customary international
law. Such a resort to the use of force in a non self-defense situation is
clearly unlawful even assuming that the principal allegations of the D.R.V.
against the R.V.N. were all legally justified. A study of the International
Control Commission Reports with respect to the grievances asserted by
the D.R.V. demonstrates that the D.R.V. has no legitimate claim to
justify its aggression against the R.V.N. as self-defense. The principal
281. See McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 576-78 (1961). "It need hardly be said that the
breach of a treaty is not in itself an 'armed attack' within the meaning of Article 51 of the
Charter." Id. at 577 n.1.
282. See notes 103 and 104 supra. For the proposition that even non-members of the
U.N. are bound by the obligation to refrain from the use of force embodied in Article 2,
section 4 of the Charter see note 248 supra.
283. For the proposition that the Vietminh activities against the R.V.N. "unquestionably
violate international law" see Comment, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 515, at 520 (1962).
284. The Special Report making these findings was issued on June 2, 1962 and apparently
reflected evidence of aggression accruing during the preceding years. See Special Report to
the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, (Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Com-
mand Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXIX (1961/62), at
paragraphs 5, 8 & 9.
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D.R.V. allegations of R.V.N. breach of the Accords are failure to consult
on the holding of elections in 1956, reprisals against resistance leaders,
inadequate cooperation with I.C.C. controls, and entering into a military
alliance with and receiving military assistance from the United States." 5
Since none of these principal asserted grievances of the D.R.V. constitute
an "armed attack" on the D.R.V. within the meaning of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter,286 or otherwise constitute a self-defense situa-
tion,287 even if all of these grievances were legally justified and the R.V.N.
were bound by the applicable provisions of the Geneva Accords, the
D.R.V., in its aggression against the R.V.N. would still clearly be acting
contra to a fundamental principle of the United Nations which is also
part of customary international law and which is binding on the D.R.V.
This fundamental principle is that disputes be settled by peaceful means
285. See the First through Eleventh Interim Reports of the International Commission
for Supervision and Control in Vietnam and the 1962 Special Report to the Co-Chairmen
of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. First and Second Reports (Vietnam No. 1 [1955],
Command Paper 9461). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XIX (1954/55);
Third Report (Vietnam No. 2 [1955], Command Paper 9499). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers XLV (1955/56); Fourth Report (Vietnam No. 3 [1955], Command Paper
9654). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XLV (1955/56) ; Fifth Report (Vietnam
No. 1 [1956], Command Paper 9706). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XLV
(1955/56); Sixth Report (Vietnam No. 1 [1957], Command Paper 31). Great Britain
Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXIII (1956/57); Seventh Report (Vietnam No. 2 [1957],
Command Paper 335). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXX (1957/58);
Eighth Report (Vietnam No. 1 [1958], Command Paper 509). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers XXX (1957/58); Ninth Report (Vietnam No. 1 [1959], Command Paper
726). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXIV (1958/59) ; Tenth Report
(Vietnami No. 1 [1960], Command Paper 1040). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers XXXVI (1959/60); Eleventh Report (Vietnam No. 1 [1961], Command Paper 1551).
Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXIX (1961/62); 1962 Special Report
(Vietnam No. 1 [19621, Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers XXXIX (1961/62).
The principal grievances asserted by the R.V.N. against the D.R.V. are failure to
properly implement provisions initially allowing refugees to freely transfer zones, inadequate
cooperation with I.C.C. controls, and armed aggression against the R.V.N. Ibid.
It might be noted that in the Eleventh Interim Report the Commission said:
The Indian and Canadian Delegations are convinced that there have been many
instances of non-co-operation by both Parties which have impeded the work of the
Commission and its Teams. These have not in all cases reached the stage of formal
citations because of evasions and lack of cooperation on the part of the Party
concerned. For this reason the two Delegations agree that, in the experience of the
Commission, the number of formal citations in itself is no fair measure of the degree
of co-operation received from either party.
Id. at 25.
286. See note 281 supra.
287. See generally McDOUCAL & FELICIANO, LAW & MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
121-260 (1961).
Even today in Viet Nam there can be little question that the intense D.R.V.-Viet-
Cong attack is aimed at the political and territorial integrity of the R.V.N. and that the
R.V.N.-United States response is directed at interdicting that attack.
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and that political grievances do no justify resort to the use of force. The
D.R.V. may not lawfully seek to remedy asserted breach of treaty by the
use of force in this situation, which, even assuming all of the grievances
of the D.R.V. to be legally justified, clearly falls short of permissible self-
defense. Moreover, a characterization of self-defense broad enough to
justify the present armed attack by the D.R.V. on the R.V.N. would
probably sanction armed aggression by one or the other of the separate
governments in Germany, China, and Korea against the other. Such a
spurious characterization not only fails to come within the accepted mean-
ing of self-defense in international law but is clearly too disruptive of
minimum world public order.
The R.V.N., on the other hand, has made it clear that it has requested
substantial United States military assistance to offset outside aggression
and that when that aggression halts, the United States military presence
will no longer be required. 2 8 It is a generally recognized principle of inter-
national law that a material breach of an international agreement by
one of the parties entitles any other party to suspend the operation of
corresponding obligations in the agreement in whole or in part. Article 42
of the International Law Commission 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of
Treaties provides:
Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a con-
sequence of its breach
1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminat-
ing the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the
parties entitles:
(b) A party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a
ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in
part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;
(c) Any other party to suspend the operation of the treaty
with respect to itself if the treaty is of such a character that a
material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes
the position of every party with respect to the further perform-
ance of its obligations under the treaty.
288. See, e.g., the communication from the Liason Mission of the R.V.N. to the I.C.C.
on December 9, 1961, in Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on
Indo-China (Vietnam No. 1 [1962], Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary
Sessional Papers XXXIX (1961/62), at paragraph 13, set out in text at note 122 supra.
See also the Statement of Adlai E. Stevenson to the Security Council on August 5, 1964,
in Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm. Print June 16, 1965), at 124-27.
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3. A material breach of a treaty, for the purpose of the present
article, consists in:
(a) A repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present
articles; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplish-
ment of any of the objects or purposes of the treaty.2 8 9
It would be hard to posit a violation of a more essential treaty pro-
vision than the D.R.V.'s documented violation by armed aggression of
the military cease-fire provisions of the Accords. Since this continuing
aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N. is a material breach of the
Accords, even if the United States and the R.V.N. were bound by the
limitations on the introduction of military arms and personnel and other
corresponding provisions contained in the Geneva Accords, this breach
certainly justifies a suspension of the pertinent treaty terms consistent
with the right of self-defense of the R.V.N. Finally, regardless of rules
as to suspension of treaty as a consequence of breach, the right of self-
defense is an inherent right of sovereignty and there is authority that it
"is implicit in every treaty."29
To summarize, the documented armed aggression of the D.R.V. in
violation of the Geneva Accords is clearly neither justified by alleged
breach of treaty nor is otherwise lawful, even if the D.R.V.'s principal
grievances against the R.V.N., including the failure to hold elections, were
all legally justified grievances. This armed aggression by the D.R.V. is a
fundamental violation of the agreements which presents a self-defense
289. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second Part of its
Seventeenth Session, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/184 (Jan. 1966), at Annex, p. 5.
The great majority of writers recognize that the violation of a treaty by one
party may give rise to a right in the other party to abrogate the treaty or to suspend
the performance of its own obligations under the treaty. A violation of a treaty
obligation, as of any other obligation, may give rise to a right in the other party to
take non-forcible reprisals and these reprisals may properly relate to the defaulting
party's rights under the treaty ...
Commentary to Article 42 of the International Law Commission 1963 Draft Articles on the
Law of Treaties, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifteenth
Session, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 17 (A/5509) (1963).
See generally authorities cited in The Legality of U.S. Participation In the Defense of
Viet-Nam 10 n. 22 (Reprint from the March 28, 1966 Department of State Bulletin-
Department of State publication 8062, Far Eastern Series 147).
290. See the statement of Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg during the negotiations
in 1928 leading to the conclusion of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in BRIGCs, THE LAW OF NATIONS
977-78 (2d ed. 1952). In any event, it is difficult to see how anything in the Geneva Accords
could bind the R.V.N. or the United States to refrain from appropriate defensive measures
in a context in which the R.V.N. is subjected to D.R.V. aggression in violation of those
Accords.
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situation clearly permitting suspension of any corresponding obligation
which may be binding on the United States or the R.V.N.
With respect to the United States, not only is the United States not
bound by these provisions of the Geneva Accords, but it would seem that
by rendering assistance to the R.V.N. to defend against aggression from
the D.R.V., the United States is acting to preserve and guarantee a major
provision of the Geneva Accords, as well as to uphold the principles of the
United Nations; action which is certainly consistent with its 1954 Geneva
declaration.
Furthermore, the I.C.C. has impliedly recognized the greater serious-
ness of D.R.V. aggression against the R.V.N. as compared with the re-
sponding military assistance from the United States. For in its 1962
Special Report it significantly discusses the D.R.V. aggression before it
discusses the responding United States military assistance, an order of
discussion which is considered important enough by the Polish Delegation
to protest it in its dissenting statement to the report.29 '
In addition to D.R.V. violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords and funda-
mental principles of the United Nations, there is evidence that the
D.R.V. has been infiltrating troops into the R.V.N. through Laos and has
been using Laotian territory to conduct hostilities against the R.V.N. 92
Such actions are in clear violation of the fourteen power 1962 Geneva
Agreements on the Neutrality of Laos which were signed by the D.R.V. 29
291. The majority report wrongly admitted unfounded allegation of aggression
and subversion brought by the Republic of Viet-Nam against the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam in spite of the fact that they do not find any legal justifica-
tion in the stipulation of the Geneva Agreement and furthermore are not substantial
and based on any evidence. These artificial allegations have been advanced in the
report as a most important item before a problem described in insignificant terms of
receiving military aid from the United States of America.
Special Report to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China (Vietnam No. 1
[1962], Command Paper 1755). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXIX
(1961/62), at 21.
292. See the finding of the SEATO COUNCIL to this effect in note 138 supra. See
also the recent Laotian accusation against the D.R.V. to the effect that it is guilty of
"repeated aggression" against Laos. "Hanoi Aggression is Charged By Laos," N.Y. Times,
Feb. 24, 1966, p. 6c, col. 4 (city ed.), excerpts at note 298 infra; and President Johnson's
Message to Congress, August 5, 1964, in Background Information Relating to Southeast
Asia and Vietnam, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Rev. ed. Comm.
Print June 16, 1965), at 122-24.
293. For the complete text of the 1962 Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of
Laos see Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos: Geneva, July 23, 1962,
(Treaty Series No. 27 [1963], Command Paper 2025). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers XXXVII (1962/63).
For the Conference documents as well as the complete text of the 1962 Declaration
and Protocol see International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question, Geneva,
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Articles 4 and 6 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos provide:
The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops,
foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel
into Laos is prohibited.
The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war
material generally, except such quantities of conventional arma-
ments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary
for the national defence of Laos, is prohibited. 94
And the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos makes it even more ex-
plicit:
(g) [T]hey [the signatories] will not introduce into the King-
dom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel in any form
whatsoever, nor will they in any way facilitate or connive at the
introduction of any foreign troops or military personnel;
(h) [T] hey will not establish nor will they in any way facilitate
or connive at the establishment in the Kingdom of Laos of any
foreign military base, foreign strong point or other foreign mili-
tary installation of any kind;
(i) [T]hey will not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos
for interference in the internal affairs of other countries .... 295
Moreover, by her own statement of neutrality which explicitly became
part of the international agreement on Laos,296 not even the Government
of Laos could authorize such D.R.V. actions on Laotian territory. 97 In
May 12, 1961-July 23, 1962 (Laos No. 1 [1962], Command Paper 1828). Great Britain
Parliamentary Sessional Papers XXXVII (1961/62). For the participation of the D.R.V. in
the Conference and their signature of the Declaration and the Protocol see Command Paper
2025, supra note 2, 22, 26 & 60.
294. Command Paper 2025, supra note 293, at 27; Command Paper 1828, supra note
293, at 20.
295. Command Paper 2025, supra note 293, at 4; Command Paper 1828, supra note
293, at 17.
296. Command Paper 2025, supra note 293, at 2, 4; Command Paper 1828, supra note
293, at 15, 17-18.
297. The statement of neutrality by the Royal Government of Laos which became an
integral part of the Conference Declaration provides:
(3) It [Laos] will not resort to the use or threat of force in any way which
might impair the peace of other countries, and will not interfere in the internal affairs
of other countries;
(4) It will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether
military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of
Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on Laotian
territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes
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any event, the government of Laos has given no such authorization.2 98
Insofar as the D.R.V. forces make use of Laotian territory in their aggres-
sion against the R.V.N., then, they also violate the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ments on Laos.
Senator Fulbright, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, has indicated his understanding that the D.R.V. has engaged in
hostilities against the R.V.N. in violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva
Accords and the United Nations Charter. In supporting the passage of
the 1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution Senator Fulbright said:
Certainly supported and quite possibly incited by Communist
China, North Vietnam has persistently engaged in subversion
and more direct hostilities against the duly constituted govern-
ments of both Laos and South Vietnam. It has done these things
in gross violation of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 and of the
Geneva Agreement of 1962 pertaining to Laos. It has done these
things in violation of international law, in contempt of the
United Nations Charter, in malice toward its neighbors, and in
reckless disregard of the requirements of peace in southeast
Asia.299
An analysis of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and fundamental
principles of general international law embodied in Article 2 of the
United Nations Charter supports the lawfulness of the present United
States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam and unmistakably demon-
strates the unlawfulness of the D.R.V. aggression against the R.V.N.
or for the purpose of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor
recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO ...
(6) . . . [Ilt will require the withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and
military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be
introduced into Laos ....
Command Paper 2025, supra note 293, at 2; Command Paper 1828, supra note 293, at 16.
298. This would seem fairly to be implied from the recent Laotian Government accusa-
tions against the D.R.V. to the effect that it is guilty of "repeated aggression" against Laos.
See ."Hanoi Aggression Is Charged by Laos," N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1966, p. 6c, col. 4
(city ed.).
A spokesman for the Laotian Government, Phagna Bouasy, denounced the
North Vietnamese government today, accusing it of 'repeated aggression' against
Laos.
We hold the Government of Hanoi responsible for all the aggression, all the
dead, all the bad things that have happened to our Kingdom since that Govuern-
ment [sic] took the decision to aid the Neo Lao Hak Sat [the pro-Communist
parent grop [siclof the Pathet Lao] in nourishing, adding to and spreading disorder
in this country, he said....
Mr. Bouasy said that 20,000 North Vietnamese were fighting in Laos, but
reliable military sources here estimate the figure at 'not more than 10,000.'
Ibid.
299. 110 CoNo. REC. 18400 (1964).
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D.R.V. Aggression Against the R.V.N. Is a Fundamental Change
in Conditions, Constituting Grounds for Suspending Any
Corresponding Obligation Which May Be Binding
on the United States or the R.V.N.
Even if the United States were bound by the provisions of the 1954
Geneva Accords, and even if the D.R.V. aggression was not a material
breach of the Accords, the aggression against the R.V.N. is a fundamental
change in conditions constituting grounds for suspending any treaty pro-
visions with respect to prohibitions on military assistance and related con-
ditions.
Article 44 of the International Law Commission 1966 Draft Articles
on the Law of Treaties, which is essentially declaratory of general inter-
national law in this respect provides:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred
with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a
treaty and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be
invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the
treaty unless:
(a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an es-
sential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the
scope of obligations still to be performed under the treaty .... 30o
With respect to the Geneva Accords, few changes could be a more
fundamental change in circumstances constituting an essential basis for
consent and radically transforming the scope of any obligations under-
taken, than the D.R.V.'s disregard of the cease-fire provisions of the
Accords. For the military cease-fire was the very essence of the under-
standing of all the states participating in the Conference. Point two of the
United States unilateral declaration, to the effect that the United States
would view any renewal of aggression in violation of the agreements with
grave concern, even makes this explicit as far as the United States is con-
cerned. In fact, point two of the United States declaration greatly
strengthens the case under this rule of general international law as it
indicates that the possibility of future aggression was adverted to as im-
portant by the United States at the time of the 1954 Geneva Conference
300. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Second Part
of its Seventeenth Session U.N. Doc. No. A/CN. 4/184 (Jan. 28, 1966), at Annex, p. 6.
For a general discussion of this principle see the Commentary to Article 44 of the
International Law Commission 1963 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties. Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifteenth Session, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REC. 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 20-23 (A/5509) (1963).
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itself. In a situation of armed aggression of the D.R.V. against the R.V.N.
in violation of a major principle of the agreements, any obligation to
refrain from rendering military assistance to the R.V.N. in the absence
of such aggression is inapplicable after the occurrence of such aggression.
The present situation, involving aggression by the D.R.V. against the
R.V.N. in clear violation of the Geneva agreements, coupled with the
continuing inability of the International Control Commission to deal with
the problem,"0 ' constitutes beyond question a fundamental change in
essential conditions contemplated by the participants at the Geneva Con-
ference. As a result, even if the United States were bound by the pro-
visions of the 1954 Accords, and was not justified in suspending obliga-
tions because of D.R.V. breach, aggression against the R.V.N. is a funda-
mental change in essential conditions existing at the time of agreement
and constitutes grounds for suspending any corresponding treaty obliga-
tions in order to meet such aggression.
CONCLUSION
United Nations Ambassador Arthur Goldberg recently said:
Our nation derives its great influence in the world not only
from great physical power, but also from the fact that our basic
law and our national outlook are premised on the equality and
dignity of all men.
The way to peace in this turbulent age is to keep to that na-
tional vision, to work with all our might for the establishment of
a structure of law that will be reliable and just to all nations.
For though law alone cannot assure world peace, there can be
no peace without it. Our national power and all our energies
should operate in the light of that truth.0 2
The United States assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam is a lawful
policy alternative. That lawfulness means compliance within the spirit of
Ambassador Goldberg's words with the basic structures of international
law and the United Nations; structures designed to promote self-
determination and world public order. In carrying out policies within
301. Even when functioning at maximum potential, the Commission can not be rated
as well suited to the task of policing the peace in Viet Nam. It is evident from the Reports
of the Commission, however, that there has been an increasing breakdown in its effectiveness,
particularly in its later years. In its Eleventh Interim Report, for example, the Commission
invited the attention of the Co-Chairmen to its deteriorating financial position. Eleventh
Interim Report of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam
(Vietnam No. 1 [1961], Command Paper 1551). Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional
Papers XXXIX (1961/62), at 27.
302. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1966, p. 6, col. 4 (city ed.), at col. 5. (Typographical errors
corrected).
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these structures "our national power and all our energies" must continue
to be used to maximize the prospects for peace and secure self -determina-
tion and economic and social progress to the people of the Republic of
Viet Nam.t
Editor's footnote. This paper as originally submitted to Congress included substantial
material on the lawfulness of United States assistance under internal constitutional processes.
Unfortunately space limitations precluded our printing this material. For development of
the executive-congressional authorization for assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam and
its constitutional basis see the discussion in Moore & Underwood, The Lawfulness of United
States Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 112 CONG. REC. 14943, 14960-67, 14983-89
(daily ed. July 14, 1966).
